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The Legislative Audit Council performs audits of state agencies and 
programs, in which we identify ways to reduce the cost and improve the 
performance of state agencies, and provide information to the 
General Assembly and the public. We help ensure that operations are 
efficient and that agencies follow the law to achieve the desired results. 
We provide information, analysis, and recommendations to help the 
General Assembly improve state agencies and to help the citizens of  
South Carolina oversee state government. The LAC is part of the legislative 
branch of state government and, therefore, it is organizationally independent 
of the executive branch agencies it audits. Our audits must be requested by 
the General Assembly, either by statute or on an as-needed basis,  
Senate Oversight Committee, or House Oversight Committee. 
 
The Legislative Audit Council is composed of five public members,  
one of whom must be a practicing certified or licensed public accountant 
and one of whom must be an attorney. In addition, four members of the 
General Assembly serve ex officio.     
 
Audits by the Legislative Audit Council are conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards as set forth by the 
Comptroller General of the United States.   
 
Copies of all LAC audits are available at no charge. We encourage you to 
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Audit Objectives  Section 112 of Act 146 of 2010 requires the Legislative Audit Council to 
conduct periodic management audits of the Department of Employment 
and Workforce’s (DEW) finances and operations. This engagement is the 
last one required by the act. Our audit objectives are: 
 
• Provide a detailed accounting of the revenues and expenditures from 
the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund since FY 13-14. 
• Determine the adequacy of the process for notifying state officials of 
the financial status of the Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund. 
• Assess alternatives for maintaining the solvency of the Unemployment 
Insurance Trust Fund. 
• Examine the unemployment eligibility benefit process for efficiency 
and compliance with law and agency policy. 
• Evaluate DEW’s programs for returning claimants to work. 
• Review the contingency assessment account for propriety. 
• Evaluate DEW’s fraud and overpayment process. 






The period of this review was generally 2014 through 2018 with 
consideration of earlier or later periods when relevant. Information used 
in this report was obtained from a variety of sources including: 
 
•  Interviews with DEW staff. 
•  DEW financial records and audited financial statements. 
•  State law and agency policy. 
•  Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Annual Assessment reports. 
•  U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) publications. 
•  Claimant records. 
 
Criteria used to measure performance included state laws, agency policies, 
practices in other states, and USDOL guidance. We used several samples, 
which are described in the audit report. We reviewed agency internal 
controls related to the audit objectives, including overpayments, tax 
collection practices, use of contingency assessment funds, claimant 
eligibility, and unemployment data validation. Our findings are detailed in 
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 When addressing some of our objectives, we relied on computer-generated 
data maintained by DEW. Where possible, we compared this data to other 
agency records to determine its validity. When viewed in relation to other 
evidence, we believe the data used in this report is reliable. DEW did not 
provide source documents we requested in some instances; these are noted 
in our report.  
 
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those generally accepted government 
auditing standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
 
 
Scope Impairment  Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), as listed 
in the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) Government 
Auditing Standards publication, requires that we report significant 
constraints imposed upon the audit approach that limit our ability to 
address audit objectives. The limitations noted in this audit that constituted 
a scope impairment include: 
 
 Denials or excessive delays of access to certain records or individuals. 
We incurred both denials and excessive delays of access to records, 
particularly source documents, and cogent, on-point explanations.  
 Significant delays in receiving information that should be readily 
available. 
 Responses to inquiries that were unclear, vague, or otherwise 
insufficient. 
 Multiple requests for one piece of information. 
 
We experienced significant delays in receiving the documentation we 
needed to conduct the audit. DEW delayed answering our requests and 
at times, provided incomplete or erroneous information. For example, 
one request for financial data took more than five months to obtain. 
We received two general ledger expense lists for the same expense account 
and both had the same total expense. However, one of the lists contained 
31 entries that the other list did not have. We requested explanation and 
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The average turnaround time for our data requests was approximately 
37 days from request to receipt. Although we understand that some requests 
may take a week or more to compile, it is rare, in our audit experience, 
for requests to take over a month to complete and most requests are 
processed and data provided within five to seven business days. We had to 
repeat the requests and remind DEW that the requests were outstanding. 
Oftentimes the data received was incomplete/insufficient or did not address 
the issue, which required another data request and another delay.  
 
 












* Includes instances of ignored requests. 
 
 
Most requests required us to follow up and request the information again.  
 One request for information on the differences between DEW’s prior 
automated payment system and the new Southeast Consortium 
Unemployment Insurance Benefits Initiative (SCUBI) was fulfilled 
several months after the initial request and after five follow-up requests. 
We ultimately received a copy of a manual for the prior system. 
This request could have been readily fulfilled with minimal delay and 
without the need for any follow-up requests. 
 A request for source documentation regarding the implementation of 
previous audit recommendations took over two months to fulfill and 
necessitated four follow-up requests.  
 
We encountered dozens of examples of easily answerable questions that, 
nonetheless, saw significant delays in responses.  
 A request for a template, an existing document, took over two months 
to fulfill. This could have been sent immediately upon request. 
 A request for a manual took 47 days to receive. Manuals are readily 
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Certain responses to relatively simple requests contained insufficient, 
vague, or unclear information.  
 A request for examples of monitoring reports was responded to 
after four months with a one-sentence answer, and no examples 
were provided. 
 We requested the number of employees who work in DEW’s Benefit 
Payment Control (BPC) and Fraud, Investigation, Recovery and 
Enforcement (FIRE) programs. DEW responded in a vague manner 
by saying that all unemployment staff are involved in fraud detection. 
Questions on the specific number of personnel working in distinct 
divisions of DEW should be easily answerable. 
 A response for a request for financial data consisted of a spreadsheet with 
undecipherable codes that did not include a key to interpret the codes. 
 
We were not provided with several documents.  
 We requested a sample of DEW’s Benefit, Timeliness, and Quality (BTQ) 
reviews. The BTQ reviews involve review of DEW’s claims files for a 
determination of whether they were processed properly. Our lack of 
access to these files prevented us from examining an area with potential 
findings for improvement of the unemployment claims process.  
 We had planned on reviewing multiple years of contingency assessment 
expenditures; however, since the response was so slow, we were only 
able to review one year.  
 
Although we were eventually able to complete most of the audit work 
necessary to meet the audit objectives, these constraints significantly 
delayed the completion of the audit report. Delays in responses in the 
early stages of the process compound the time it takes to complete the 
audit process.  
 
Continuation/Revision of DEW’s Programs 
S.C. Code §2-15-50(b)(2) requires us to review the effectiveness of an 
agency to determine if it should be continued, revised, or eliminated. 
DEW operates a federal program at the state level. We did not conclude 
from this review that DEW should be eliminated; however, we made a 
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Background  The unemployment insurance program was created in 1935 by the 
Social Security Act as a federal-state partnership. Each state, acting as an 
agent of the federal government, is responsible for administering its 
individual state unemployment insurance program. The South Carolina 
Department of Employment and Workforce (DEW), formerly the 
Employment Security Commission, was established in 1936. DEW is 
responsible for: 
 
 Paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. 
 Collecting unemployment taxes from employers. 
 Assisting individuals in finding employment. 
 Finding employees for companies. 
 Collecting and disseminating state and federal employment statistics.  
 
The federal government maintains the federal unemployment Trust Fund 
in the United States Treasury, which contains individual UI accounts 
for each state.  
 
DEW staff are state employees, but DEW receives federal grant funds 
from USDOL for operational activities and expenses. USDOL oversees state 
programs to ensure compliance with federal laws. As of June 30, 2018, 
DEW operated with the following resources. 
 
 
Table 1.2: DEW Resources as of 





640  31  26  $191,338,735* 
 
* 99.7% federally funded through federal grants, 
appropriated by the General Assembly. 
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According to the website for SC Works, there are 51 SC Works Centers in 
the state, which are operated by contracted vendors. These centers provide 
reemployment services in 12 designated workforce areas. Since July 1, 
2011, local Workforce Development Boards select SC Works Center 
operators through a competitive bidding process. If the operator is a 
consortium of three or more SC Works Centers’ partners, the operator can 
be selected through a non-competitive process. DEW operated the majority 
of the workforce centers until 2011. According to the Legislative Audit 
Council’s review of the Workforce Investment Act Program in 2010, it was 
determined to be a conflict of interest for DEW to be an operator of a 
one-stop center, by law. DEW decided to stop contracting for either WIA or 
one-stop operators in local areas as of June 30, 2011. 
 
State Workforce Development Board members are appointed by the 
Governor and primarily comprised of business leaders, but also may include 
legislators, local elected officials, workforce partners, and representatives 
from community-based organizations. The board provides direction to 
DEW on workforce development issues to help ensure the operation of a 
quality and effective workforce system for the state. 
 
A memorandum of understanding (MOU), reviewed and renewed annually, 
is entered into by the local partner agencies in the workforce system in 
accordance with the federal Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act 
(WIOA). WIOA is a federal law that was signed in 2014 which superseded 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). In general, WIOA consolidated 
federal reemployment programs to facilitate coordination among the 
reemployment programs administered by the states. The MOU must be 
signed by a representative from each partner agency, and, in addition to 
general agreements, designates: 
 
 The responsibilities of the local Workforce Development Board. 
 The responsibilities of and services provided by each local partner. 
 An Infrastructure Funding Agreement (IFA) and budget to establish a 
plan to fund the services and operations through shared costs.  
 
The partner agencies provide services in their respective areas of expertise, 
and have representatives at the SC Works Centers for the convenience of 
customers (employers/jobseekers) who often are in need of multiple 
services. Of the MOUs we reviewed, examples of the local partner agencies 
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LOCAL WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 
Administers the local SC Works delivery system, including developing 
the MOU. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKFORCE 
Provides unemployment and employment services, trade adjustment 
assistance, Jobs for Veterans State Grants programs, and Migrant and 
Seasonal Farmworkers programs. 
  
LOCAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS 
Oversees the adult, dislocated worker, and youth programs. 
 
S.C. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT 
Assists persons with disabilities, with the exception of those who are 
blind. 
 
S.C. COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND 
Assists persons who are blind and visually impaired. 
 
S.C. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
Provides adult education and literacy activities. 
 
S.C. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
Provides food assistance under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), ensures the safety of those who cannot protect 
themselves, and assists families to achieve stability through child 
support, child care, financial, and other temporary benefits while 
unemployed. 
 
S.C. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 
Provides employment and training activities under the federal 
Community Services Block Grant. 
 
S.C. TECHNICAL COLLEGE SYSTEM 
Implements the mission of the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical 
Education Act of 2006 under WIOA to increase access to technical 
education programs.  
 
TELAMON 
Private telecommunications company to provide referrals and electronic 















The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) authorizes the Internal 
Revenue Service to collect an annual federal employer tax used to fund  
state workforce agencies. The federal tax covers the costs of administering 
the unemployment insurance and job service programs in all states. 
In addition, the federal tax pays one-half of the cost of extended 
unemployment benefits (during periods of high unemployment) and 
provides for a fund from which states may borrow, if necessary, to 
pay benefits. 
 
The FUTA tax is paid by employers and is currently 6.0% of the first  
$7,000 of taxable wages earned by employees. However, employers who 
pay the state unemployment tax on a timely basis receive a credit of up 
to 5.4% against the federal tax. Thus, the net federal tax rate is generally 
0.6% (6.0% - 5.4%), for a maximum tax of $42 per employee 
(0.006 x $7,000 = $42), per year.  
 
South Carolina State Tax 
Each state sets its own unemployment insurance tax rate. South Carolina’s 
state unemployment insurance tax (SUTA) is paid by employers on the first 
$14,000 of taxable wages earned by employees. Current tax rates range  
from 0.060% to 5.460% depending on the employer’s benefit ratio and tax 
rate class from 1 to 20 (see Assessing Unemployment Trust Fund Solvency). 
South Carolina uses a single tax table to determine an employer’s base tax 
and does not consider the business size or type. In FY 17-18, DEW collected 
$322,917,743 in UI taxes and paid UI benefits of $179,080,609, which is 
55% of the tax assessed. There is a class of employers who do not pay 
unemployment taxes. These employers, known as “reimbursable 
employers,” do not pay into the unemployment tax system, but pay the cost 














The U.S. Census Bureau, designated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
of USDOL, conducts a monthly survey known as the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) of approximately 60,000 households nationwide to determine 
the national unemployment rate. The survey includes households in every 
state and the District of Columbia with about 1,000 households selected in 
South Carolina. The employment status for the previous week of all 
household members who are age 16 or older is determined by the census 
interviewers. Individuals holding a job are classified as employed; 
individuals with no job, but available and actively seeking employment, 
would be classified as unemployed.  
 
The state’s unemployment rate is determined using:  
 
 The CPS; 
 Another survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor known 
as the Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey; and 
 State unemployment agency data. 
 
The CES survey produces data for all non-farm employment, women 
employees, and average hourly, weekly, and overtime earnings in 
manufacturing industries.  
 
The state’s unemployment rate is measured using two methods; the total 
unemployment rate—the most commonly used indicator of unemployment 
data used by economists and government officials, and the insured 
unemployment rate—an indicator of labor market conditions.  
 
 
South Carolina’s average annual unemployment rate has improved in 
recent years, falling slightly below the national rate. Chart 1.3 depicts 
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Chart 1.3 Average Annual 






*UI rates are based on the calendar year average. 
 




 South Carolina’s total unemployment rate ranged from 3.9% in  
January 2018 to 3.2%—its lowest point ever—in December 2018. 
 
South Carolina’s insured unemployment rate ranged from 1.1% in 
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Chart 1.4: South Carolina 2018 
Unemployment Rates  
 
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Department of Labor 
 
 
We also compared South Carolina’s total unemployment rate and rank to the 
national average and other southeastern states from 2014–2018. 
 
In 2018, South Carolina’s unemployment rate was 3.4% and was ranked 
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2014  2015  2016  2017  2018 
RANK  RATE  RANK  RATE  RANK  RATE  RANK  RATE  RANK  RATE 
SC  33  6.5%  38  6.0%  29  5.0%  26  4.3%  16  3.4% 
NC  29  6.3%  34  5.7%  33  5.1%  31  4.6%  26  3.9% 
TN  35  6.6%  32  5.6%  24  4.7%  16  3.7%  21  3.5% 
GA  44  7.1%  38  6.0%  39  5.4%  35  4.7%  26  3.9% 
FL  29  6.3%  31  5.5%  25  4.8%  24  4.2%  22  3.6% 
NATIONAL 
AVERAGE 
6.2%  5.3%  4.9%  4.4%  3.9% 
 








Table 1.6 reflects an overview of unemployment benefits. The average 
weekly claim in South Carolina as of January 31, 2019 was $255. A benefit 
year runs from the effective date of a claimant’s first or new claim, and each 
claimant must serve a waiting period of one week before benefits begin. 
When a claimant becomes reemployed and earns more than the weekly 
benefit amount, the claimant’s benefits end. If a claimant exhausts the 
maximum benefit amount before the end of the benefit year, a new initial 
claim for benefits cannot be filed during the same benefit year. In order to 
be eligible during a second benefit year, a claimant must have earned at 
least eight times the weekly benefit amount after the effective date of the 
first claim.  
 
Benefits are paid by unemployment taxes charged to South Carolina 
employers. Unemployment taxes paid by employers are based on a portion 
of the annual wages earned by employees—currently the first $14,000 of 
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$326  $255  20  15.27 Weeks 
 
*  Set by South Carolina law. 
**  As of January 31, 2019. 
*** Over the past 12 months, ending January 31, 2019. 
 







S.C. Code §41-35-110 states that in order for claimants to qualify for 
unemployment compensation, they must be registered for work, be able 
and available for work, and have been unemployed for a waiting period of 
one week. They also must be separated from their most recent employers 
through no fault of their own, and participate in reemployment services if 
they have been determined to likely exhaust their benefits. 
 
As of February 2013, DEW ceased providing in-person unemployment 
insurance assistance to the majority of claimants as part of a new delivery 
system implemented due to a lower state unemployment rate, a decrease in 
workload, and a decrease in federal funding. Claimants must make their 
initial claims for unemployment benefits online. DEW first reviews the 
claim to determine if the applicant qualifies monetarily. Claimants qualify 
monetarily by earning wages during the base period, which is four out of the 
last five completed quarters. DEW may also use an alternate base period, 
the four most recently completed calendar quarters, based on the 
effective date of the claim.  
 
Under the law since 2010, claimants must meet three requirements in order 
to establish a weekly benefit amount: 
 
1. Earn wages of at least $1,092 in covered employment during the 
high quarter of the claimant’s base period; 
2. Earn wages of at least $4,455 in covered employment during the 
claimant’s base period; AND 
3. Total base period wages must equal or exceed one and one-half times 
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After a claimant has been determined monetarily eligible, DEW determines 
if the individual meets other eligibility criteria needed to qualify for 
unemployment benefits. This consists primarily of ensuring that the worker 
has lost his/her job through no fault of his/her own. After the initial claim is 
filed, the employer is notified. Statements are taken from the applicant and 
the employer as to the reason for separation, and DEW issues an eligibility 
determination. Either party who disagrees with the determination may 








In order to continue receiving unemployment benefits, a claimant must 
contact DEW weekly by telephone or through DEW’s online claim system 
and answer several questions: 
 
• Did you work? 
• Did you quit a job, or were you dismissed from a job since 
you filed your claim? 
• Were you able to work, available for work, and looking for work 
as instructed by the claims office? 
 
With the implementation of SCUBI in September 2017, claimants are 
required to respond to eleven additional questions. State law requires 
claimants to actively seek work. The minimum requirement for job contacts, 
as determined by DEW and approved by the General Assembly, is two job 
searches per week. Both job searches must be conducted through DEW’s 
SC Works Online Services (SCWOS), which is an electronic portal for 
claimants to enter data related to benefit claims. Prior to May 26, 2017, 
four job searches per week were required, with at least one search being 
conducted through SCWOS. The job search requirements were stipulated in 
provisos issued by the General Assembly until the end of FY 16-17. 
However, as proposed by DEW, a change was made in Regulation 47-104 
effective May 2017 requiring two job searches per week through SCWOS, 
















DEW focuses on providing a variety of employment-related labor exchange 
services, including, but not limited to, job search assistance, job referral, 
and placement assistance for job seekers, reemployment services to 
unemployment insurance claimants, and recruitment services to employers 
with job openings. Services are delivered in one of three modes: 
 
 Self-assisted (in which the individual receives no staff assistance); 
 Basic core services; or 
 Intensive services.  
 
Depending on the needs of the labor market, other services such as job 
seeker assessments of skill levels, abilities and aptitudes, career guidance, 








The services offered to employers, in addition to referral of job seekers to 
available job openings, include such things as working with employers to 
develop job opportunities, recruiting assistance, transitional assistance, 
and business tax credits. Additionally, employers have access to space at 
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Computer Systems  
Review of DEW’s computer systems was not in the scope of our audit. 
However, DEW conducted walkthroughs in order for us to gain familiarity 
with their computer systems. The computer systems chosen for 
walkthroughs were: 
 
SOUTHEAST CONSORTIUM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
INITIATIVE (SCUBI) 
New system implemented in September 2017 used to file unemployment 
claims, resolve appeals, and improve UI program quality, accountability, 
performance, and integrity. 
 
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAX SYSTEM (SUITS) 
New system implemented in March 2018 used by businesses to pay the 
business’ unemployment tax. 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA WORKS ONLINE SYSTEM (SCWOS) 
Existing system used by claimants to find work and for employers to post 
jobs and find employees. 
 
Claimants, businesses, and DEW employees all use SCUBI and SCWOS, 
while only businesses and DEW employees use SUITS.  
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Chapter 2 
 






Section 112 of Act 146 of 2010 requires that we provide a detailed 
accounting of the revenues and expenditures of the South Carolina 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Trust Fund since 2000. Trust Fund taxes 
are used to pay for UI benefits to workers who qualified for unemployment 
in South Carolina. The UI Trust Fund (the Trust Fund) includes two 
components, which are set in state law. 
 
BASE RATE 
A charge to employers for payment of UI claims.. 
SOLVENCY SURCHARGE 
A surcharge to pay off the federal Trust Fund loans while there was an 
outstanding loan balance. Once the loan balance was paid in full in 
June 2015, the surcharge has been applied to rebuilding the Trust Fund. 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the status of the Trust Fund and state unemployment 
rate from FY 13-14 through FY 17-18, while Table 2.2 shows the detailed 
financial history of the Trust Fund from FY 00-01 through FY 17-18.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Status of the UI Trust 












13‐14    $54,858,638  $328,372,168   6.5% 
14‐15  $302,080,171   $216,457,413   6.0% 
15‐16  $567,908,686   $201,288,326   5.0% 
16‐17  $777,064,687   $195,228,061   4.3% 
17‐18  $963,056,453  $179,080,609  3.4% 
 
*  DEW did not provide information on the amount of benefits paid by 
reimbursable employers. 
 
** Based on the calendar year using the month of June, the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Sources: DEW and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
For the $179 million in total benefit payments made in FY 17-18, 
we requested that DEW provide the amount of benefits paid from 
state taxes on contributory employers in the state and the amount 
attributable to reimbursable employers who pay the actual cost of benefits 
paid to their employees and are not a part of the contributory tax system. 
DEW did not respond to our request, but had been able to provide the 
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Table 2.2 reflects all activity of the Trust Fund since FY 00-01, including 
federal, state, other states, and local government revenue and benefits paid 
















00‐01  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐  $783,127,019  ‐‐‐ 
01‐02  $375,147,580  $42,285,263  ($7,646,875)  $526,885,659  $666,027,328  ‐‐‐ 
02‐03  $371,048,320  $33,361,075  $30,302  $546,319,189  $524,147,836  ‐‐‐ 
03‐04  $366,629,987  $23,411,433  $40,404  $493,549,031  $420,680,629  ‐‐‐ 
04‐05  $313,147,518  $13,465,859  $4,303,918  $366,581,162  $385,016,762  ‐‐‐ 
05‐06  $332,208,460  $13,718,890  $0  $364,828,359  $366,115,753  ‐‐‐ 
06‐07  $338,470,410  $12,621,783  ($604,927)  $389,823,906  $326,779,113  ‐‐‐ 
07‐08  $341,698,171  $10,040,353  $0  $449,511,155  $229,006,482  ‐‐‐ 
08‐09  $783,340,333  $2,326,473  $386,917  $1,332,327,180  ($317,266,975)  $344,881,505 
09‐10  $1,583,830,508  $0  $0  $2,027,711,376  ($761,147,843)  $541,780,847 
10‐11  $2,344,115,627  $0  $0  $2,171,063,209  ($588,095,425)  $115,174,767 
    11‐12**  $1,208,925,058  $0  $0  $1,059,341,778  ($438,512,145)  ‐‐‐ 
    12‐13**  $852,370,532  $0  $0  $612,344,506  ($198,486,119)  ‐‐‐ 
13‐14  $592,597,473  $0  $10,880,548  $328,372,168  $54,858,638  ‐‐‐ 
14‐15  $470,402,516  $745,382  $7,468,952  $216,457,413  $302,080,171  ‐‐‐ 
15‐16  $446,794,448  $7,192,500  ($13,129,893)  $201,288,326  $567,908,686  ‐‐‐ 
16‐17  $394,228,932  $12,208,042  $2,052,912  $195,228,061  $777,064,687  ‐‐‐ 
17‐18  $349,069,857  $16,935,578  $933,060  $179,080,609  $963,056,453  ‐‐‐ 
 
*  Between-year adjustments consist of corrected balance forwards, immaterial transfers from the general fund, Reed Act 
proceeds, FUTA credit adjustments, and payments returned to the federal government. 
 
**  Includes General Assembly state budget appropriations of $146 million in FY 11-12 and $77 million in FY 12-13, which 
reduced taxes paid by contributory employers by 23% and 12%, respectively. 
 
***  Loans were obtained from the federal government to pay unemployment benefits because the UI Trust Fund was 
underfunded by employer contributions.  
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 During our review of revenues and expenditures from the audited financial 
statements for the Trust Fund for FY 16-17, we found the report recorded a 
weakness in accounting procedure. DEW management was not reviewing 
and reconciling the tax assessments receivable balance with the financial 
records throughout the year but was only making year-end adjustments. 
By not reviewing and reconciling the records on a monthly basis throughout 
the year, there is a greater chance the financial statements will be misstated. 
 
Federal Loans 
From late 2008 through early 2011, DEW obtained federal loans totaling 
approximately $1 billion to continue to provide unemployment benefits to 
claimants due to the high number of unemployment claims but has not 
received any federal loans since April 2011. Table 2.3 reflects the voluntary 
loan repayments beginning in 2011. The repayments have allowed the 
agency to avoid loss of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax 
credit since 2010 while continuing to maintain a sufficient balance to pay 
unemployment claims. DEW was obligated to repay the loans by S.C. Code 
§41-31-45(B), which states: 
 
For each calendar year during which the state 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund is in debt 
status, the department must estimate the amount of 
income necessary to pay benefits for that year, the 
amount of income necessary to avoid automatic 
FUTA credit reductions, and an amount of income 
necessary to repay all outstanding federal loans 
within five years. Additional estimates of interest 
costs shall be determined concurrently. 
 
Early Repayment of Federal Loans 
As of June 2015, all loans from the federal government had been repaid, 
earlier than the ending of the five-year repayment plan set by the 
General Assembly which became effective January 1, 2011, in S.C. Code 
§41-31-45(B). The loans were repaid in part through a one-time increase of 
$35.67 million in federal taxes for tax year 2010 due to South Carolina 
losing a portion of federal FUTA tax credit and DEW’s voluntary payments 
to the federal government totaling $468.82 million made between 2011 and 
2015. In the FY 15-16 audited financial statement report, DEW’s 
management claimed that the voluntary loan repayments resulted in 
approximately $12.5 million in interest savings for the state because the 
loans were paid in full ahead of schedule. DEW provided us with recreated 
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09/15/11  $115.20  $0.00  $115.20  Voluntary Payment 
11/07/11  68.70  68.20  0.50  FUTA Avoidance 
08/20/12  106.50  102.90  3.60  FUTA Avoidance 
05/31/13  144.02  140.00  4.02  FUTA Avoidance 
10/09/13  75.00  0.00  75.00  Voluntary Payment 
04/24/14  60.00  60.00  0.00  FUTA Avoidance 
09/02/14  126.00  126.00  0.00  FUTA Avoidance 
12/05/14  75.00  0.00  75.00  Voluntary Payment 
03/26/15  75.00  0.00  75.00  Voluntary Payment 
06/11/15  120.50  0.00  120.50  Voluntary Payment 
TOTAL  $965.92  $497.10  $468.82   
 
* FUTA avoidance payments made prior to November 9 each year avoided loss of the FUTA 
5.4% credit and saved interest costs. Additional amounts paid also led to an earlier loan 
payoff date. 
 
Sources: DEW; LAC Calculations 
 
 
Employers paid an interest surcharge during the years DEW had an 
outstanding federal loan balance which was required to be applied to the 
loan interest. Table 2.4 shows an example of what an employer would have 
to pay during calendar year 2014, including an interest surcharge, for the 
average tax contribution rate (rate class 12). 
 
 








*  The base rate is the amount charged for paying unemployment claims (benefits), 
loan repayments, and any amount left over placed in the UI Trust Fund for solvency.  
 
** DEW taxed employers 0.096% to pay interest on federal loans, contingency rate 
is always 0.060% (0.156% - 0.060% = 0.096%). 
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Although DEW claimed that the interest charges could not be paid using 
regular employer tax contributions, they could not provide us with the 
accounting records to show that it was paid from a separate fund other than 
the Trust Fund. DEW has stated that the Governor is required to submit a 
letter to the Secretary of Labor certifying that the interest payment was not 
from the Trust Fund.  
 
 Revenue 
Revenue for the Trust Fund includes a number of different components. 
 
Tax Revenue from Contributory Employers 
This is the primary source of funds for the payment of state-funded benefits. 
Prior to January 1, 2011, when the tax system was changed and designed to 
have tax collections equal benefit payments plus funds required for solvency 
goals, there had been a significant difference between the amount of taxes 
collected from contributory employers and the amount of the benefits paid, 
with benefits exceeding taxes collected (see Chart 2.5). This resulted in the 
state borrowing money from the federal government in order to pay state 
UI benefits during the economic decline of the Great Recession.  
 
Revenue from Reimbursable Employers 
Governments and non-profit organizations can choose the option to 
reimburse the UI Trust Fund for the actual costs of benefits paid to their 
employees. 
 
Interest Income from the United States Treasury 
The Trust Fund was not eligible to earn interest when outstanding loan 
balances were owed to the federal government. During the last quarter of 
FY 14-15 after the loans were fully repaid, the UI Trust Fund began earning 
interest income from the United States Treasury.  
 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) Tax Revenue 
The state lost a portion of the FUTA tax credit in 2010 because it was 
unable to repay all of its federal loans (see FUTA Credit). This caused the 
federal UI tax on employers to be increased from 0.8%, the rate that year, 
(subsequently changed to 0.6%) to 1.1% and resulted in $35 million in 
additional revenue, which was used to pay down the federal loans for 
FY 10-11. However, since that time before the loans were fully repaid, the 
state had been able to pay enough on the loans each year to avoid loss of the 
FUTA tax credit, resulting in the FUTA tax rate reverting to 0.6%. The 
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Federal Revenue 
The General Assembly appropriated $28.8 million in federal nonrecurring 
revenue for FY 15-16, $23.2 million for FY 16-17, and $23.3 million in 
FY 17-18 for the Southeast Consortium Unemployment Insurance Benefits 
Initiative (SCUBI) project. DEW primarily receives federal grant funding 
but must request spending authority from the state through the state’s 




Chart 2.5: Unemployment Tax 
Contributions and UI Benefits 
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 Expenditures 
Expenditures from the Trust Fund are made entirely from UI benefits paid to 
claimants. These benefits consist of: 
 
Regular UI Benefits 
This consists of the first 20 weeks of UI benefits, and these benefits are paid 
entirely by the state. 
 
Federal Extensions of UI Benefits 
The federal government provided additional benefits to claimants who 
exhausted the first 20 weeks of benefits through the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program, a temporary federal 
program. This program last offered an additional 29 weeks of benefits that 
expired on December 31, 2013. These benefits were paid entirely by federal 
funds and had no impact on the balance of the UI Trust Fund. 
 
Federal Benefits for Other Types of Claimants 
Federal funds are also used to pay 100% of benefits for certain claimants, 
such as ex-federal employees, ex-service members, and workers who have 
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We reviewed DEW’s process for designating unpaid taxes as uncollectible 
and found that the agency: 
 
 Misstated the uncollectible tax amount for FY 13-14. 
 DEW provided an aged accounts receivable report with its response to 
our draft report during the final days of the audit, but provided no 
documentation of procedures showing how it utilizes the report in its 
collection effort. 
 Does not include a projection for uncollectible taxes when determining 
the tax rates for an upcoming year. 
 
The FY 17-18 audit report of the unemployment compensation fund issued 
by the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) found incomplete records, 
improper computing of the allowance for doubtful (unlikely to be collected) 
accounts, and unrecognized revenue from the collection of bad debts. 
Audit reports issued by OSA prior to the FY 17-18 report did not find as 
many deficiencies (see Reports Issued by Other Agencies). 
 
In FY 16-17, DEW reported uncollectible taxes of $36.6 million owed to the 
Trust Fund by employers. This was an increase over the prior year’s 
$33.4 million, although tax rates had declined resulting in lower tax revenue 
from $446.8 million in FY 15-16 to $394.2 million in FY 16-17, a nearly 
12% decrease. DEW indicated cost savings for employer tax rates of 
13.9% between calendar years 2015 and 2016 and 9.1% between 
calendar years 2016 and 2017.  
 
We reviewed the uncollectible tax amounts from FY 13-14 through 
FY 17-18, which are cumulative, and found that the amounts of 
uncollectible taxes and the amounts written off have fluctuated over the 
past few years, as shown in Table 2.6. The amount of taxes written off by 
DEW may have been less if the agency had implemented better collection 
efforts (see Chart 2.8). 
 
We found unemployment rates decreased by: 
 
 48% (6.4% to 3.3%) from June 2014 to June 2018 
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From FY 15-16 to FY 16-17, uncollectible taxes increased by 10%, 
from $33.4 million to $36.6 million (see Table 2.6 and Chart 2.7). 
  
 
Table 2.6: Allowance for 
Doubtful Accounts and Amounts 
Written Off as Uncollectible, 














13‐14  $161,999,288  $36,955,064 ±  $3,834,066  6.4% 
14‐15  $162,233,383  $49,350,550 ±±  $4,226,967  6.0% 
15‐16  $145,808,939  $33,399,262 ±±±  $9,932,639  5.1% 
16‐17  $142,859,858  $36,613,827  $5,257,201  4.3% 
17‐18  $142,327,444  $29,373,688  **  3.3% 
 
*  Provided by DEW as amount is not listed separately in the audited financial statement 
report. 
 
**  DEW did not provide the FY 17-18 amount. 
 
±  DEW listed $12.8 million for allowance for doubtful accounts. During the FY 14-15 audit, 
the independent financial auditors discovered this was a mistake and corrected it to the 
proper amount of $37 million. 
 
±±  During FY 14-15, according to the independent financial auditors, a new method, 
recommended by USDOL, for calculating doubtful accounts resulted in an increase in the 
allowance by $1.8 million (included in the increase from FY 13-14). DEW was otherwise 
unable to provide information on the increase from $36.9 to $49.3 million. All benefit 
overpayment receivable balances over 451 days were deemed to be uncollectible without 
comparing to the prior year’s amounts.  
 
±±±  During FY 16-17, the independent financial auditors made an adjustment decreasing the 
allowance for doubtful accounts. This was necessary because the auditors concluded that 
DEW did not previously estimate this amount in accordance with policy, which was to 
compute the allowance for uncollectible accounts based on previous collection history.  
 
Sources: Audited Unemployment Compensation Fund Reports; USDOL; DEW 
 
 
The audited financial statements for FY 14-15 indicate DEW changed its 
method of estimating its allowance for doubtful accounts to what USDOL 
recommended and DEW management considers a more accurate method. 
That method is to consider all taxes not collected as of 451 days from the 
time it was assessed as uncollectible. However, DEW recently indicated that 
it uses historical data to determine the allowance for doubtful accounts, 
which conflicts with the notes in the audited financial statements. It is 
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There was an adjustment to the allowance for doubtful accounts in 
FY 15-16, with the financial auditors restating it from $57.9 million to 
$33.4 million in the FY 16-17 audit of the unemployment compensation 
fund. The adjustment was necessary because DEW had not computed the 
allowance according to the Trust Fund’s policy, which was to base the 
allowance on previous collection history for all outstanding account 
balances up to 24 months old. 
 
 
Chart 2.7: Uncollectible Taxes 
and Unemployment Rates, 
FY 13-14–FY 17-18 
 
 
Sources: DEW's audited financial statements; USDOL 
 
 
DEW’s collection efforts have historically been ineffective as has been 
indicated in its internal audit reports, failing reviews for at least the past 
seven years (see Taxpayer Services Reports). Audit reports issued by OSA 
and LAC have recommended that DEW utilize subsidiary records on a 
regular basis to improve collection efforts. DEW’s collection efforts were 
well below the national aggregate from calendars years 2014 through 2018, 
with DEW having a higher percentage of uncollectible receivables, as 
indicated in Chart 2.8.  
 
In LAC’s previous audit, we recommended DEW use an aged receivable 
report, a tracking and reporting system, to better identify and target tax debt 
before the amounts aged enough to lower the likelihood of collection. 
As debt ages, it becomes harder to collect. DEW provided an aged accounts 
receivable report attached to its response to our draft report. However, it is 
unclear how DEW uses the report in its collection effort because DEW 
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Chart 2.8: Percentage of 
Uncollectible Receivables, 
CY 2014–CY 2018  
 
 




 DEW attributed the increase in the amount of uncollectible taxes written off 
in FY 15-16 to the ending of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) program and a legislative change in 2011 from a reserve ratio to a 
benefit ratio, which effectively increased taxes to rebuild the Trust Fund. 
DEW has provided no documentation to corroborate this. We found that 
DEW’s explanation of the increase for the debt written off in FY 15-16 is 
inadequate for the following reasons: 
 
 Federal funds were used to pay extended benefits through the EUC 
program. Therefore, those funds would not have been relevant to the 
collections and policies for the Trust Fund and would not be related to 
the tax write-off amount. 
 Since CY 2011 when the tax system was changed from a reserve ratio to 
a benefit ratio, tax rates were highest in CY 2011, but stabilized in 
CYs 2013 and 2014. Those higher taxes likely resulted in higher 
uncollectible taxes in the years that followed. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that there were more uncollectible debts and write-offs as a 
result. However, DEW did not provide us with documentation supporting 
how much of the increase in write-offs of $4.2 million in FY 14-15 to 
$9.9 million in FY 15-16 were attributed to the increased taxes.  
 
DEW reported it incurred no debt from uncollectible taxes and does not 
consider uncollectible taxes when setting the tax rate for each 
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According to the agency’s audited financial statements, all assessments 
receivable over 24-months old are being classified as an allowance for 
uncollectible accounts. However, some receivables up to 10-years old, 
although classified as uncollectible accounts, could remain on the books as a 
receivable and the agency continues to pursue collection of them. The total 
net receivables as of June 30, 2018 amounted to $112,953,756. Although 
DEW is not permitted to continue collection efforts on a debt that has been 
written off, considering the large amount of uncollectible debt, more 
strategic collection efforts early on may decrease the amount of 
uncollectible taxes reaching the maximum collection period.  
 
The FY 17-18 audit report of the unemployment compensation fund issued 
by the OSA reported findings (material weaknesses—the most severe 
deficiency) for, among other things: 
 
 Incomplete accounting subsidiary records leading to the omission of 
significant balances due to employers. This condition exists because 
DEW’s accounting department is not reconciling subsidiary ledgers to the 
general ledger on a timely basis. This led to the understatement of 
contributions payable and the overstatement of assessments revenue, 
requiring an audit adjustment of $4,279,264. 
 Improper computing of the allowance for uncollectible accounts for 
assessments receivable and benefit overpayments by not ensuring it is 
based on historical collection rates and previous write-off history. This 
leads to the likelihood that the allowance is not accurately reflected as it 
more likely will include accounts that should not be deemed uncollectible 
and exclude accounts that should be deemed uncollectible.  
 Unrecognized revenue from the collection of bad debts which had 
previously been written off, leading to the overstatement of the allowance 
for assessments receivable and the understatement of bad debt recovery 
revenues, requiring an audit adjustment of $5,265,761.  
 
See also Reports Issued by Other Agencies. 
 
These misstatements resulted in management receiving incorrect 
information during the year and could have affected management 
decisions regarding how much tax revenue was needed in the future tax. 
These misstatements could have resulted in management misallocation of 
resources deployed in collecting the tax. Additionally, more labor may have 
been needed to more aggressively collect the taxes due or some labor could 
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DEW’s employer tax debt policy states that debt under $150 is deemed 
uncollectible six months after a notice of assessment (NOA) is sent to the 
employer. A tax lien is issued at the time of the NOA for tax debt over 
$150 and the tax is deemed uncollectible six months after the issuance of the 
tax lien. While reviewing DEW’s collection procedures, we found the 
procedures for employer tax debt refer to SCATS (South Carolina 
Automated Tax System), a computer system no longer used after the 
implementation of SUITS in March 2018. DEW acknowledged it is working 
to update the terminology and methodologies associated with the new 
system. Outdated procedures may contribute to the failure of collection 
efforts, leading to more debt being written off than would have been 
expected. 
 
In addition to its own collection efforts, DEW utilizes collection agencies 
and programs that are used to offset debts using tax refunds (the Treasury’s 
Offset Program and the Department of Revenue’s State Offset Debt). 
DEW provided the S.C. Code sections related to its procedures for writing 
off uncollectible debt, but provided no internal policies relating to debt 
write-offs. By law, the time period before a debt can be written off varies by 
the type of debt involved, as indicated in Table 2.9 
 
 
Table 2.9: Time Periods for Debt 
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1. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should reconcile 
assessments receivable subsidiary records to the financial records 
monthly to help ensure accurate financial reporting. 
 
2. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should maintain 
an updated subsidiary accounting ledger to reflect accurate balances due 
from employers. 
 
3. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should update its 
collection procedures to reflect the implementation of a new computer 
system for employer tax debt. 
 
4. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should ensure that 
it consistently uses its historical collection rates and write-off history to 
determine uncollectible debt. 
 
5. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should include 
revenue received from previously written-off debt as revenue in the 
year collected. 
 
6. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should analyze 
its tax receivable account each year for increases or decreases in order 
to determine if its collection efforts are effective and to identify 
deficiencies. 
 
7. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should use an 
aged accounts receivables report and review the balances routinely. 
 
8. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should include 
in its annual financial audit report the amount of uncollectible taxes 
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Chapter 3 
 
Contingency Assessment Funding 
 
 Section 112 of Act 146 of 2010 requires the LAC to evaluate the 
effectiveness of DEW’s efforts in assisting claimants in returning to work. 
The contingency assessment, payable by employers in addition to the tax 
employers pay to fund unemployment claims, is, by law, to be used to assist 
in returning claimants to work and furthering the agency’s reemployment 
goal.  
 
We encountered significant delays in receiving financial documentation 
we requested in order to complete our audit. The average turnaround 
for financial documentation was 51 days from request to receipt 
(see Scope Impairment). Additionally, audited financial statement reports 
for FY 16-17 and FY 17-18 have not been released as of June 2019, 
making the earlier report more than 12 months later than it has been 
released in at least the past 10 years.  
 
 
Overview  We reviewed contingency assessment revenues and expenses in order to 
determine the rate of growth of the funding and how funds were used. 
We reviewed DEW’s compliance with proviso 83.5 that stipulated 30% 
of the contingency assessment funds collected was to be used for certain, 
specific DEW services aimed at reemployment of unemployed claimants, 
such as the Wagner-Peyser program. We found: 
 
 Contingency assessment balance increased from $9.6 million in 
FY 12-13 to $26 million in FY 16-17. 
 The contingency assessment per employee, paid by employers, 
has doubled from $4.20 in 2010 to $8.40 since 2015, its final increase 
required by law, leading to increased contingency assessment revenue. 
 DEW did not provide documentation to show which reemployment 
services it funds with contingency assessment revenues. 
 DEW no longer performs some of the reemployment services it 
conducted in the past, such as seated meetings with all claimants and 
random verification of job contacts. However, DEW continues to conduct 
seated meetings for RESEA participants, which represent a very small 
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  A portion of the revenue collected from the contingency assessment 
was spent on collecting the assessment. 
 DEW could not demonstrate it was in compliance with the appropriations 
act provisos for FY 13-14 through FY 16-17 concerning how 
contingency assessment funds were to be spent. 
 We requested documentation from DEW for the planned use of the 
contingency assessment funds for the next two fiscal years, 
but received no response. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Contingency 
Assessment Revenue 
and Expenditures 














*  Obtained from DEW since the audited financial statements have not been released 
by the contracted accounting firm, issued through the Office of the State Auditor 
(see Reports Issued by Other Agencies). 
 
** UTD = unable to determine. Audited financial statements have not been released, 
and DEW did not respond to our requests for documentation. 
 




Contingency Assessment Fund Balance 
Contingency assessment revenue increased approximately 50% between 
FYs 12-13 and 16-17 (see Table 3.1). The contingency assessment balance 
increased from $9.6 million in FY 12-13 to $26 million in FY 16-17, 
as shown in Table 3.2. An independent consultant’s report stated that the 
General Assembly could repurpose the funds if the balance grows too large 
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Chart 3.2: Contingency 
Assessment Overview 

























*  Obtained from DEW since audited financial statements have not been released 
(see Reports Issued by Other Agencies).  
 
** UTD = unable to determine. Audited financial statements have not been released, 
and DEW did not respond to our requests for documentation. 
 
 




 Contingency Assessment  
S.C. Code §41-27-410 created the contingency assessment of 0.06% on the 
taxable wages paid by employers. The assessment is applied to the wages 
earned by employees each year up to the limit imposed by 
S.C. Code §41-27-380(B), the same taxable wage base as the Trust Fund, 
which was $14,000 in 2018. In 2015 the taxable wage base increased 
from $12,000 to $14,000, the maximum allowed by current law. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the impact of increased tax on employers as the 
contingency assessment per employee has doubled from $4.20 in 2010 to 
$8.40 since 2015, its final increase required by law, increasing the amount 
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Table 3.3: Taxable Wage Base for 
















2010  $7,000  0.06%  $4.20  ‐ 
2011  $10,000  0.06%  $6.00  $1.80 
2012–2014  $12,000  0.06%  $7.20  $3.00 
2015–2018  $14,000  0.06%  $8.40  $4.20 
 
Sources: S.C. Code §§41-27-380(B) and 41-27-410; LAC Analysis 
 
 





Expenditures from the contingency assessment fund averaged $8.7 million 
per year, ranging from $7.3 million to $11.4 million for FY 13-14 through 
FY 16-17. We could not report FY 17-18 data, because the audited financial 
report has not been issued (see Table 3.1). 
 
According to DEW officials during LAC’s 2014 audit, the contingency 
assessment was initially implemented in 1986 to offset cuts in federal funds. 
S.C. Code §41-33-710(B) specifies that the funds are to be used to: 
 
 Assist with the reemployment of unemployed workers. 
 Undertake a program or activity that furthers the goal of the department.  
 Supplement basic employment security services with special job search 
and claimant placement assistance. 
 Provide employment services, such as recruitment, screening, and referrals. 
 Provide otherwise unobtainable information and analysis to the Legislature 
and program managers about issues related to employment and 
unemployment. 
 
We find the law to be very broad since nearly any expenditure would fit the 
description, “undertake a program or activity that furthers the goal of the 
department… .”  
 
Per the law, the main purpose of the contingency assessment was to provide 
funds for programs and services designed to assist those needing help in 
obtaining employment. It appears that the funds spent were not for services and 
personnel directly related to reemployment but for other, unrelated expenses, 
including roof replacement, general maintenance, etc. The documentation the 
agency provided is not specific enough to determine whether the funds were 
used for reemployment services (see Use of Funds).  
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We obtained lists of contingency assessment expense transactions for 
FY 13-14 through FY 16-17 from FARS (Financial Accounting and 
Reporting system), DEW’s accounting system. The total expense balances 
agreed to the totals listed on DEW’s audited financial statement for the 
respective fiscal years. However, we could not verify the FY 16-17 
total amount as the financial audit report has not been released by the 
Office of the State Auditor. 
 
DEW initially provided the FARS expense transactions in hard copy form 
and, at a later date, in electronic format. We found the latter list of expenses 
had 31 more transactions than were on the hard copy list, although the total 
amount of expenditures agreed on both versions. This brings into question 
the accuracy of DEW’s records. We requested DEW provide an explanation, 
but we received no response. 
 
We requested DEW also provide us with the equivalent reports from the 
S.C. Enterprise Information System (SCEIS), state government’s accounting 
system, which DEW is required to use. The SCEIS reports provided by DEW 
for contingency assessment expenses did not match the FARS expense 
amounts for any of the years, being less by as much as $5 million in 
FY 15-16. For FY 16-17, the difference between the FARS and SCEIS 
contingency assessment expense records was just over $1.2 million, 
with SCEIS showing less expense. We requested DEW provide a 
reconciliation to account for the differences in the two accounts, 
but no explanation or documentation was provided. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether DEW is actually keying all expense transactions into SCEIS, 
as it is into FARS.  
 
Test of Expenditures 
We selected a sample of contingency assessment expenditures for FY 16-17 
to review for propriety and compliance with state law. We reviewed 44 
expenditure transactions totaling $7,605,873.84 for FY 16-17 out of total 
expenditures of $8,465,575. We categorized the expenditures for analysis in 
Table 3.4 (see also Chart 3.5). 
 
DEW did not provide responses to all of our requests for the year we selected 
for review. As a result, we found many of the expenditures appeared to be for 
a business purpose and might be related to reemployment services, but it is 
unclear. In many cases, we cannot be sure of the nature or purpose of the 
expense, as DEW did not provide the corroborating documents. 
 
We intended to review expenditures for additional years, but DEW’s slow 
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Employment Services  $258,382  Virtual OneStop maintenance and support.  L 
LAC Analysis: Appears to be an appropriate expense. 

























*  According to DEW, the agency currently provides grant funding for 15 schools and partial funding for 3 schools, but has operated in 
up to 28 schools since 2005. 
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 I –  Insufficient documentation provided by DEW; we were unable to make a determination of the appropriateness. 
 L –  Appears to be a legitimate business-use expense. 
 LD –  Appears to be a legitimate business-use expense. However, without sufficient corroborating documentation, we cannot conclude with 
certainty the appropriateness of the expense. 
 U –  Appears to be a legitimate expense, but it is unclear if the General Assembly intended contingency assessment funds to be used for this 
purpose. 




Sources: FARS, DEW, and LAC Analysis 
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In the sample reviewed above, we found a specific internal control issue. 
A DEW employee (A) signed another employee’s name (B) on Employee 
B’s signature title line on nine orders totaling $400,611 for workstations, 
computer equipment, building improvements, and two vehicles. Employee 
A wrote his own initials under the date. DEW explained that Employee A 
had signed on Employee B’s behalf as denoted by the initials, but provided 
no explanation or policy to support that this practice was acceptable.  
 
Although the purchases did not appear to be for personal use, this practice 
could be subject to abuse by not providing proper oversight over purchases.  
 
 


















Note:  Transactions not shown include a year-end adjustment of ($377,901) and an 
insurance refund of $28,227. See additional explanations of expenditures in Table 3.4. 
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There were provisos issued by the General Assembly from FY 11-12 
through FY 16-17, which stipulated how DEW was to spend 30% of 
contingency assessment funds, listed in Table 3.6. DEW stated that, 
pursuant to S.C. Code §41-33-710, it has continued to transfer 30% of the 
contingency assessment revenue to be used for eligibility reviews, random 
verification of job contacts, wage cross matches, and seated meetings with 
UI claimants.  
 
However, we found DEW no longer performs eligibility reviews for all 
claimants, and job searches are performed electronically in SCWOS. In 
2013, DEW began offering unemployment services only through call 
centers, no longer assisting claimants in-person at a physical location.  
 
 
Table 3.6: Provisos Relating 
to Agency Contingency 
Assessment Funds for 







































*  Records indicate the Governor vetoed Proviso Section 83.5; the veto was not overridden by 
the General Assembly. 
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Federal guidance letter TEGL 6-05 (Training and Employment Guidance 
Letter), issued by USDOL, states that the federal government prohibits 
states from paying the costs of collecting non-unemployment compensation 
taxes from federal grant funds. The contingency assessment is a 
non-unemployment compensation tax; therefore, federal funds cannot be 
used to collect the tax.  
 
DEW does not separate the costs of collecting the state unemployment 
insurance tax from the cost to collect the contingency assessment tax. 
Rather, DEW has developed a cost allocation plan to separate these 
costs in lieu of having the actual, direct costs. Currently, DEW’s cost 
allocation plan to collect the contingency assessment is paid from 
contingency assessment revenue based on the percentage of computer 
bytes utilized by each function within FARS, the agency’s accounting 
software. This plan has been approved by the USDOL. With the 
implementation of the State Unemployment Insurance Tax System 
(SUITS), DEW may need to reevaluate its methodology for the allocation 
of costs associated with the collection of the contingency assessment to 
determine if the methodology remains applicable.  
 
A portion of the revenue collected from the contingency assessment is 
spent on collecting the tax, amounting to approximately $1.8 million in 
FY 14-15, as shown in Chart 3.7. Although costs to collect the contingency 
assessment were on the decline after FY 11-12, collection costs were 
on the rise in FY 14-15 and may have increased even more if we had been 
able to include more recent data in our analysis. However, DEW did not 
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Chart 3.7: Costs to Collect 
Contingency Assessment for 








* DEW did not respond to our requests for cost data regarding FY 16-17 and FY 17-18. 
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DEW did not respond to our request for the planned use of the contingency 
assessment funds for the next two fiscal years. Therefore, we referred to 
LAC’s 2014 report to review how DEW had planned to spend its future 
contingency revenues. DEW’s planned use of contingency assessment 
funds totaled approximately $25.7 million as indicated in Table 3.8. 
 
 




















* DEW provided planned expenditures in its response to LAC’s draft report, 
which indicates upgrades to the Harper Building (used for appeal activities, 
not reemployment activities, see Use of Funds for approved expenses) and 
for other office and grounds upgrades (see Appendix D). 
** Proviso 83.6 is no longer applicable. 
 
Source: DEW (as reported in LAC’s 2014 report) 
 
 
Also in LAC’s 2014 report, DEW’s comments indicate that DEW 
depended on contingency assessment funds to purchase a generator for the 
claims information technology center, preventing a major disruption in 
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A bill, H 3648, was introduced in the S.C. House of Representatives in 
February 2017 to review the contingency assessment to determine if it should 
be maintained, eliminated, or reduced. The bill was referred to the 
Committee on Labor, Commerce, and Industry and was carried over to the 
2018 session without further action.  
 
DEW has the option to recommend to the General Assembly a change in the 
way in which the contingency assessment is assessed, which could reduce 
the related revenue received by DEW and help to ensure the fund balance 
does not grow larger than the General Assembly may have intended.  
 
By definition, the word contingency means an event (such as an emergency) 
that may, but is not certain, to occur. The contingency assessment fund could 
be utilized as an emergency fund to be used only for situations deemed to be 
an emergency as specified by the General Assembly. 
 
Decreased contingency assessment would provide some tax relief to 
employers, which may be helpful to all employers, but especially those who 
may be struggling financially. The effect of taxes on the business community 
is unknown but could negatively affect business expansions, promotions, 
pay increases, and the hiring of new employees.  
 
 




Options to reduce and control growth of the contingency assessment funds 
include: 
 
• Set the wage base to a different amount than the UI tax—back to 
$7,000 per year as it was from 1986 to 2010. 
• Set the wage base to a different amount than the UI tax—back to 
$7,000 per year, the amount it was in 2010 and tie future increases 
to an economic index, such as the consumer price index (CPI), a 
measure of the average change over time in prices paid by urban 
consumers for a market basket of goods and services. This would 
help ensure the funding keeps pace with inflation. 
• Set a low wage base, such as approximately $3,000 per year, in order 
to accumulate a small balance, and have some funds on hand as needed 
and request additional state funds from the Other Funds Oversight 
Committee as greater or emergency needs arise. The Other Funds 
Oversight Committee is a Joint Committee of the General Assembly 
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• Compare contingency assessment revenue growth with expense growth 
at the end of the fiscal year, and reduce the contingency assessment by 
the percentage that revenue exceeds expenses. This assumes the 
expenses are worthy and necessary.  
 
• Eliminate the contingency assessment and request additional state funds 
from the Other Funds Oversight Committee as needs arise or are 
predicted to arise. 
 
 
Use of Similar Funds 






According to the USDOL Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance 
Law report, 21 states do not have a contingency assessment or similar 
administrative tax. It also shows that a few states with contingency 
assessments or similar administrative (non-UI) taxes have implemented 
restrictions to the tax collections based on certain criteria. For example: 
 
 Mississippi suspends collection of the tax when the insured 
unemployment rate (based on the number of persons receiving 
unemployment insurance) is greater than 5.4% until the rate is less than 
4.5%.  
 Louisiana collects the tax when the Trust Fund balance is greater than 
$750 million.  
 Washington terminates the tax if federal funding increases. 
 Oregon collects the tax the 1st quarter of every odd-numbered year. 
 
The USDOL publication that lists these assessments does not specify 
whether these funds are used for reemployment services. The number of 
states without such taxes has declined slightly since LAC’s 2014 report of 
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9. The General Assembly should consider a method to reduce the growth 
of the contingency assessment fund balance. 
 
10. The General Assembly should consider amending S.C. Code 
§41-33-710(B) to be more specific in the spending restrictions for the 
contingency assessment funds.  
 
11. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should establish 
and implement policies to strengthen internal controls over purchasing.  
 
12. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should use the 
statewide accounting system, SCEIS, for all of its financial reporting. 
 
13. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should reevaluate 
its cost methodology for the collection of the contingency assessment 
and submit a new cost proposal to the U.S. Department of Labor upon 
fully implementing tax and accounting systems. 
 
14. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should compute 
the costs to collect the contingency assessment for the years since 
FY 14-15 and, if costs are excessive, should evaluate reasons for the 
increase. 
 
15. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should 
discontinue transferring 30% of the contingency assessment revenue to 
its general expense fund, as the proviso spending restriction for that 
portion is no longer in effect. 
 
16. The General Assembly should examine the contingency assessment to 
determine if the assessment should be maintained, eliminated, reduced, 
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Chapter 4 
 
Assessing Unemployment Insurance 
Trust Fund Solvency 
 
Attaining Solvency   We reviewed the South Carolina unemployment insurance tax contributions 
set by DEW to determine whether the agency’s plan for tax revenue, 
paid by employers, will allow it to comply with the legislative requirement 
of attaining solvency of the Trust Fund in a five-year period from 
calendar years 2016–2020. We also reviewed the tax tables to determine 
the proportionality of the tax rates and the method of tax setting, which is 
defined in the S.C. Code. Additionally, we compared South Carolina’s 
zero tax bracket to other states to determine how many states currently 
have a zero tax bracket, the reasons for such a tax bracket, and the 




 The tax rates appear to not be proportional from rate class 13 to rate 
class 20 (see Current Laws and Proportionality of the Tax Structure for 
discussion of rate classes). DEW cannot provide support for the 
relationship of the benefit ratio as to being in proportion to the tax in 
each rate class. Rate class 13 is the first significant disproportionate rate, 
and rate classes 14 through 19 are even more disproportionate when 
compared to the increases from rate classes 2 through 12. Rate class 20 
is required to be 5.4% by state law. 
 DEW did not explain how the General Assembly and Governor’s Office 
provide their input to DEW to determine the Trust Fund rebuild amounts 
per year. 
 South Carolina may have imposed unnecessarily high tax rates on 
employers in the early years during the five-year rebuild period without 
considering the effect of these rates on employers.  
 Ninety-nine percent of the required tax revenue was collected in the first 
three years of the five-year Trust Fund rebuild period. The pace of the 
revenue collected was faster than necessary in order to attain Trust Fund 
solvency by 2020. 
 DEW has one rate class, also referred to as a zero tax bracket, in which 
employers are not charged rates commensurate with the actual risk they 






 Chapter 4 




 Page 48  LAC/18-1-DEW  Department of Employment and Workforce 
Current Laws Pertaining 
to Tax Structure 
 
We found that, under South Carolina law, the tax rates charged employers 
by DEW may not be consistent throughout the rate classes 1 through 20. 
As of 2011, South Carolina implemented a 20-tier array tax structure in 
which there is a tax rate set for each tier. Rates are set based on estimates of: 
 
 How much revenue must be levied and collected in order to pay 
unemployment benefits (the base tax rate); and  
 How much revenue is necessary to replenish the Trust Fund reserve 
balance to a desired level (the solvency surcharge).  
 
DEW could not provide us with information as to whether the tax rates paid 
are disproportionately higher to one another, relative to the amount of 
benefits and solvency rebuild paid in each class. Those employers with 
higher benefit ratios are placed in higher rate classes because their claims 
payouts have been greater in the past. Therefore, employers in higher rate 
classes pose more risk for higher UI claims payout in the future, which leads 
to a higher tax rate.  
 
We found that tax rates are set relatively proportional to one another from 
classes 2 to 12. Table 4.1 demonstrates these rate classes are approximate 
10% to 12% higher than the one before it. Beginning with rate class 13, 
we see the first rate class that is more than relatively proportional to the 
class before it. Rate class 13, by law, is increased by 20% of the previous 
tax rate, rate class 12.  
 
Rate classes 14 through 19 are more disproportionate than rate class 13. 
This is because rate class 19 is set at a higher rate than rate class 20, which 
is never less than 5.4%. Rate classes 14 through 18 are all 90% of the 
following rate class, beginning with rate class 18 being set at 90% of rate 
class 19. Rate class 17 is 90% of rate class 18, etc.  
 
 It is unknown whether employers are paying more tax than what is 
necessary to cover paying unemployment claims for their employees. 
 It is likewise unknown whether the solvency tax is set at a rate that 
reflects the relative risk these rate class employers pose to solvency in 
the event of a future recession or if the solvency tax and resulting 
revenue is enough to cover their fair share of rebuilding the Trust Fund—
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This lack of clarity is because DEW could not provide us with 
unemployment claims paid, by rate class. Without claims paid by rate class, 
we could not complete an analysis to determine the proportionality of the 
taxes paid by the higher rate classes. We also could not determine if 
employers in certain rate classes should continue to contribute at the same 
rate to pay claims and replenish the Trust Fund.  
 
It would be beneficial for DEW to collect and keep track of this data to 
ensure equity between rate classes, that is, to determine whether certain 
rate classes are being disproportionally taxed in relation to their 
benefit payout and solvency contribution. 
 
If South Carolina is disproportionately taxing employers in the higher tax 
rate classes, it could have had, and may continue to have, an adverse effect 
on these employers. This could result in reduced capital available to 
employers to provide raises, expand operations, retain employees, etc. 
Increasing the number of rate classes may eliminate significant rate 
increases between classes.  
 
DEW has not reviewed the tax rates to determine if the tax structure 
is equitable; therefore, it could not make recommendations to the 
General Assembly regarding possible changes. Establishing a more 
equitable tax structure may prevent businesses from being taxed more 
than necessary. This may allow for all businesses to pay a fairer share 
of unemployment taxes. 
 
Table 4.1 illustrates: 
 
 Tax rates for each rate class in CY 2018. 
 Percentage increase between lower tax rate classes 2–12 reflect 
relatively proportional increases to one another of between 10% and 12%. 
 Tax rate increases in the higher rate classes when compared to rate 
class 13 (e.g. the percent increase between rate class 13 and 14 is 76%).  
 Tax rates for rate classes 15 through 20 range from 95% to 339% more 
than the tax rate for rate class 13. 
 A hypothetical scenario of the maximum amount an employer will pay 
for each employee per rate class, given that the employee is making 
at least $14,000 per year, the maximum amount of wages subject to 
unemployment tax. 
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Table 4.1: 2018 Tax Analysis—


















1  0%   N/A*  ‐‐‐  $0 
2  0.360%     N/A**  ‐‐‐  $ 50.40 
3  0.400%  11%  ‐‐‐  $ 56.00 
4  0.440%  10%  ‐‐‐  $ 61.60 
5  0.490%  11%  ‐‐‐  $ 68.60 
6  0.551%  12%  ‐‐‐  $ 77.14 
7  0.610%  11%  ‐‐‐  $ 85.40 
8  0.670%  10%  ‐‐‐  $ 93.80 
9  0.750%  12%  ‐‐‐  $105.00 
10  0.830%  11%  ‐‐‐  $116.20 
11  0.930%  12%  ‐‐‐  $130.20 
12  1.030%  11%  ‐‐‐  $144.20 
   13 ±  1.230%  19%  ‐‐‐  $172.20 
14  2.160%  76%    76%  $302.40 
15  2.400%  11%    95%  $336.00 
16  2.660%  11%  116%  $372.40 
17  2.960%  11%  141%  $414.40 
18  3.290%  11%  167%  $460.60 
19  3.650%  11%  197%  $511.00 
20  5.400%  48%  339%  $756.00 
 
* Since this is the first rate class, there is no previous class for comparison. 
 
** Since rate class 1 is zero, the percentage increase between rate classes 1 and 2 
cannot be quantified. 
 
± S.C. Code §41-31-50(2)(b)(iv) requires rate class 13 to be set at 120% of rate class 12. 
In this year, this reflects a 19% increase over rate class 12. 
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Loan Repayments,  
Trust Fund Solvency,  
and Trust Fund Rebuild  
 
According to state regulation, the Trust Fund goal was to achieve solvency 
within a five-year period, between 2016–2020. Calendar year 2016 was the 
first year that a solvency surcharge was levied on employers for rebuilding 
the Trust Fund. According to USDOL, “…planning to rebuild the Trust 
Fund in no more than 5 years is probably a prudent amount of time,” 
because the average interval between the 12 recessions since 1945 has been 
5 years.  
 
In June 2015, South Carolina repaid its federal Trust Fund loan and began to 
rebuild the Trust Fund ahead of schedule to ensure the rebuild was met 
within the timeframe set by law and regulation. The 2015 tax rates were set 
in 2014 for loan repayments and benefits. Funds remaining after benefits 
and loans were paid were used to rebuild the Trust Fund. The solvency 
surcharge is imposed on contributory employers in each year that the 
Trust Fund is insolvent and does not meet the fund adequacy target. 
Only employers in rate class 1 are not required to pay the solvency 
surcharge. 
 
Table 4.2 depicts the historical projected and actual benefit and solvency 
surcharge amounts, along with the total taxes collected and benefits paid, 
by calendar year from 2014–2019. DEW sets the tax rates for each 
component of the Trust Fund separately.  
 
DEW must annually calculate the income necessary to pay benefits and 
reach the Trust Fund adequacy target for the unemployment Trust Fund to 
pay for unemployment claims during the next recession, as depicted in 
Table 4.2. According to a DEW official, the agency obtains taxable wage 
data for the most recently completed year from its tax database and 
compares that amount to its prior tax year estimate. The agency then 
considers that in the determination of income necessary for the next tax 
year. DEW also obtains unemployment rate estimates from the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and guidance on using historical wage 
growth from USDOL’s financial handbook. These data are used to 
determine the projected benefit (base rate) cost per year for South Carolina.  
 
According to a DEW official, the General Assembly and Governor’s Office 
staff have input in setting the Trust Fund rebuild plan amount. However, 
DEW did not provide the rationale behind how the General Assembly and 
Governor’s staff make recommendations and contribute in determining 
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Table 4.2: Benefits and Solvency 
Rebuild Contributions Needed— 
























2019  $205   $58  Not Available*  Not Available* 
2018  $185    $130   Not Available*        $133 ** 
2017  $220    $120  $338  $177  
2016  $192    $142  $334   $182 
2015  $223           $180 ***  $397  $184 
2014  $290           $170 ***  $429  $206  
 
* DEW stated that both of these figures will not be available until the release of the 
FY 18-19 and FY 19-20 annual Trust Fund assessment reports in October of each year.   
 
**  Benefits paid as of October 2018. 
 
*** In 2014 and 2015, there was a surcharge to repay outstanding federal loans. 
This surcharge was in effect until 2016, when the loan repayment surcharge was 
converted to a solvency surcharge to replenish the Trust Fund.  
 
Sources:  DEW Tax Rate Source Documentation 
and DEW Annual Trust Fund Assessment Reports 
 
 
The level of rebuild is set by S.C. Regulation 47-501, and is defined in 
terms of an Average High Cost Multiple (AHCM) of 1.0, which indicates 
that a state has reserves equivalent to one year of average recession level 
benefits.  This level should be sufficient to fund benefits during a 
“moderate” recession for one year. For South Carolina’s Trust Fund, 
that amount is projected to be $965,300,000 in 2020 (see Table 4.3). 
 
In a 1996 report, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 
(ACUC) recommended the AHCM as the measure of the solvency level of 
the UI Trust Fund. The ACUC was established by federal law and was 
responsible for evaluating the unemployment compensation programs and 
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The ACUC recommended that state UI trust funds be maintained at a level 
equal to an AHCM of 1.0. The USDOL has adopted and agreed with the 
ACUC’s recommendation. In 2010, a subcommittee of the House Ways and 
Means Committee asked the Lucas Group, a government solutions 
consulting firm, to review the South Carolina unemployment insurance 
system and address the ways to restore the Unemployment Insurance Trust 
Fund to solvency. The Lucas Group agreed with both ACUC’s and 
USDOL’s recommendation of an AHCM of 1.0.  Lucas Group and USDOL 
generally advocate for a rebuild within a five-year period.  
 
If the desired amount is not accumulated in the Trust Fund when the next 
recession hits, then the state will be required to find money to pay benefits 
once the Trust Fund is exhausted or if the recession is of longer duration or 
more severe than a moderate recession. Other funding will likely be 
required to pay unemployment benefits. 
  
According to DEW, in order to minimize interest costs, DEW made loan 
repayments to the federal government as aggressively as possible in order 
to avoid a loss of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) credit, 
and to pay off the loans quicker, while balancing the need to lower taxes. 
Once the loan was repaid, leftover tax collections from the 2015 tax rates 
contributed to the rebuild. The official rebuild period began in 2016 with a 
balance of $307 million and will continue through 2020. 
 
In 2017, for that year’s tax rate, DEW received legislative feedback that 
advocated for a faster rebuild process and agreed with DEW’s benefit 
projection option that added $20 million to the Trust Fund rebuild, and still 
maintained an average tax cut of 12%. However, legislative involvement in 
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Trust Fund Solvency 
Rate of Rebuild 
 
DEW did not implement a “smoothed,” or evenly graduated, solvency plan 
and has been ahead of schedule in replenishing the Trust Fund, more than 
necessary. Once the federal loans were paid off in 2015 using the funds 
from the Trust Fund surcharge, the proceeds were converted to replenishing 
the Trust Fund before the plan to start the rebuild in 2016.  
 
The lack of a smoothed solvency method resulted in an overly-robust 
tax rate for employers, who may have been charged more than necessary. 
Ninety-nine percent (99%) of the required tax revenue was collected in the 
first three years of the five-year Trust Fund rebuild.  
 
While the law does not require that a smoothed solvency method to raise 
enough revenue to replenish the Trust Fund within five years, USDOL 
recommends rebuilding the Trust Fund in no more than five years. 
Collecting the majority of the Trust Fund balance necessary during the first 
three years may negatively affect some businesses. Some businesses may 
operate on thin profit margins, and extra taxes placed on them during certain 
years may have affected whether they continue to stay in business, or 
experience other adverse effects such as the inability to expand their 
operations, give raises, purchase equipment, etc. DEW and other state 
agencies do not track employers who went out of business during this time 
and the reasons why.  
 
Chart 4.3 depicts the actual versus smoothed Trust Fund amounts as of 
June of each year, the year-to-year Trust Fund increase, and solvency levels 
between FY 14-15 to FY 19-20. We chose to measure at the end of June 
each year because this conforms to DEW’s annual Trust Fund assessment 
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Chart 4.3: Actual Versus Smoothed Trust Fund Amount and Target Balance by Fiscal Year 
(in millions) 
 
  The Trust Fund balance in this chart is based on the federal TreasuryDirect.gov figures, which uses a 
cash method of accounting. We used these source balances because DEW uses this source in calculating 
Trust Fund solvency levels in their Trust Fund Annual Assessment reports. DEW’s audited financials, 
created using the accrual method of accounting, lists a balance of approximately $963 million at fiscal year-end 
June 2018. DEW appears to be understating the solvency status using this method.  
 
 Each number on the Smoothed Target line represents an annual increase in the solvency level by 15.3%. 
DEW began the rebuild period with a leftover balance from the loan repayment surcharge of $175 million 
(approximately 24% of the AHCM solvency level). Thus, a 15.3% increase in solvency level over the next 
five years would be needed to reach the target solvency level of 100%.  
 
 AHCM (Average High Cost Multiple) of 1.0 is the amount of Trust Fund reserves that would be required 
to withstand a “moderate” recession. The target balance increases as projected wages increase. 
Wage increases bring a potential commensurate increase in unemployment benefits.  
 
*  2019 and 2020 are projections. 
 
**   This represents the Trust Fund balance at the beginning of the regulatory rebuild period in January 2016. 
 
 
Sources: TreasuryDirect.gov; USDOL’s 2016 State Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Solvency Report; 
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 Table 4.4 also shows how much more in taxes DEW collected during the 
actual rebuild period, which was accomplished in an accelerated manner 
compared to the amount in taxes that could have been collected under the 
smoothed method of Trust Fund rebuild. In the smoothed solvency scenario, 




Table 4.4: Trust Fund Solvency 
Rebuild—Actual Taxes 
Collected Compared to Taxes 
that Would Have Been 
Levied for a Smoothed 



















 In June of 2015, DEW could have recognized that it was ahead of schedule 
in replenishing the Trust Fund and could have adjusted the 2016 taxes 
accordingly, since those tax notices were sent in November of 2015. 
Although the taxes have decreased, implementing a smoothed path 
toward solvency could have allowed for lower taxes in the earlier years 
of the rebuild, even more than in Table 4.5.  
 
 











* 2014 is the base calculation, as it is the first year that 
compares the amount of cost savings from 2014 and 2015.  
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Table 4.6 shows that, in 2018, South Carolina contributes more to the Trust 
Fund rebuild per dollar compared to Georgia and the national average while 
North Carolina contributes the most.  
 
 
Table 4.6: 2018 Amount of 
Benefits and Trust Fund 
Rebuild Paid for  
















 As of June 30, 2018, the Trust Fund balance equaled approximately 
$870,154,660, with an AHCM of 99%. At this rate, the Trust Fund only has 
to collect $95.1 million to reach its target AHCM of 1.0 (which is equivalent 
to $965,300,000). This shows that the Trust Fund was replenished faster 
than necessary. 
 
Under the “smoothed” solvency approach, Trust Fund solvency levels could 
have increased by approximately 15.3 percentage points each year, in order 
to replenish the Trust Fund and reach an AHCM of 1.0 by 2020, instead of 
increasing the Trust Fund solvency level by approximately 35.2, 22.5, and 
17.8 percentage points for 2016–2018, respectively. 
 
Alternate Smoothed Solvency Method 
DEW could have implemented another method, not depicted on the chart, by 
collecting 20% each year of the balance needed to reach solvency by 2020. 
Since DEW had already accumulated approximately $307 million in the 
Trust Fund as of January 1, 2016, DEW could have collected $131,660,000 
each year for five years, resulting in the target balance of approximately 
$965 million. Therefore, taxes would have been lower in the first three years 
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Placing Employers into Rate Classes in South Carolina 
State law defines how the tax rates are structured and how employers 
are placed into rate classes. Annually, DEW must calculate a contribution 
rate based upon each qualified employer’s experience rating, expressed 
as a benefit ratio. An experience rating is determined based on the amount 
of unemployment claims that an employer has. Employers in rate 
classes 13–20 have more experience, or greater unemployment claims.  
 
State law requires that each employer’s base rate for the 12 months 
commencing January 1 of any calendar year be determined on the basis of 
its record up through June 30 of the preceding calendar year. New 
employers without 12 consecutive months of coverage after becoming liable 
for contributions are placed in rate class 12. After the employer completes 
12 months of coverage, its base rate is then computed based upon its record 
of unemployment (as are all other existing employers) and is placed in the 
rate class category according to the calculated benefit ratio, for the next 
tax cycle. 
 
The benefit ratio is used to determine into which tax rate class the employer 
will be grouped, along with other employers with similar benefit ratios.  
The S.C. Code §41-31-5(1)(b) calculates a benefit ratio as:  
 
 
To determine an employer’s benefit ratio rank, DEW must list all 
employers from lowest to highest benefit ratios and divide the list into 
classes ranked 1 through 20 as provided by law in S.C. Code §41-31-50.   
 
All businesses with the same benefit ratio must be assigned to the same rate 
class. Approximately 5% of the total taxable wages are placed into each rate 
class, excluding employers with less than 12 months of accomplished 
liability. The businesses with a benefit ratio of zero are assigned to 
rate class 1, which makes this rate class account for a greater amount of 
taxable wages, and the remaining taxable wages are distributed as evenly as 
possible among the other 19 rate classes, given the restriction that 
employers with identical benefit ratios are assigned to the same rate class. 
This accounts for approximately 23% of taxable wages classified in 
rate class 1 and approximately 4% of taxable wages placed in the other 
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Placement of New Employers in Rate Class 12 
DEW has not documented the rationale as to why new employers are placed 
in rate class 12. According to a DEW official, the General Assembly was 
responsible for deciding that rate class 12 would be where new employers 
are placed after listening to testimony from multiple stakeholders, including 
businessmen, claimant advocates, and state agencies. 
 
Table 4.7 depicts South Carolina’s increase in the taxable wage base, 
which is the amount of each worker’s wages subject to unemployment 
insurance taxation, from 2012 to current. In 2015, the taxable wage base 
increased $2,000, from $12,000 to $14,000.  
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How Tax Rates Are Set By Law 
S.C. Code §41-31-50 explains how rate classes are determined. 
Table 4.2 depicts the amount of revenue, or taxes, raised each 





Table 4.8: Formulas to Calculate 
















*  Calculation example: 
 Required Revenue = $315 million  
 $315 million ÷ Taxable Wages = $25,263,075,481  
 Multiply Average Statewide Tax Rate of 1.25% x 20 = 0.25  
 Subtract 0.25 – 0.054 ÷19 = 1.03% (base rate for rate class 12) 
 
** Most disproportionate tax rate class. 
 
Sources: DEW Tax Rate Calculations and S.C. Code of Laws 
 
 
Tax rates are calculated based on anticipated revenue for the following year. 
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Comparing South Carolina to Other States 
To provide information to the General Assembly, we compared 
South Carolina’s tax rate structure to seven other states that annually 
calculate tax rates and use a benefit ratio method to place employers. 
 
We found: 
 Five of the states have zero tax brackets, including South Carolina. 
 The taxable wage base varies from as low as $9,000 in Texas and 
Michigan to as high as $49,800 in Washington. 
 Three states, including South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington, 
have tax rate tables and rate class tiers. 
 In South Carolina, new employers are placed in rate class 12 
(the average tax rate), whereas in other states, employers pay a 
specific rate or are assigned a predetermined tax rate based on 
their industry.  
 The amount of time it takes for employers to become “experienced” 
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VT  No  No  $15,600  5 *  21  Pay a rate of 1%  At least 2 years 

















* In VT, the highest tax rate schedule applies when the economy is the least favorable.  
 
** MI uses a flat rate of 2.7% to place new employers for the first 2 years of liability. 
The 3rd year of liability formula is calculated by adding 1/3 of the Chargeable Benefits Component (CBC) + 1.8%.  The 4th year of liability formula is 
calculated by adding 2/3 of the CBC + 1%.  For the 5th year and beyond, the liability formula is calculated by adding the CBC + ABC (Account 
Building Component) + NBC (Nonchargeable Benefits Component).  
 
CBC = 60 months of benefits paid/60 months of taxable payroll 
ABC = (required reserve)-(actual reserve) x 0.5/total payroll for 12 months ending last June 30 
NBC = 1% for all contributing employers, but can be as low as 0.1% for employers with no benefit charges against their account in 9 years.  
 
*** The remaining states without formal tax tables and rate tiers have their own variation of tax rate formulas use to place employers. 
 
 
Sources: USDOL’s 2018 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws; state unemployment insurance departments’ current tax structure 
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States with zero tax brackets throughout 
the business cycle.
States with zero tax brackets only during 
periods of economic expansion.
States without a zero tax bracket.
Zero Tax 





The zero tax bracket refers to the lowest tax rate class, in which employers 
are categorized and do not pay Trust Fund taxes. The zero tax bracket is also 
referred to as rate class 1 and is the lowest rate class for the Trust Fund 
unemployment insurance tax. In South Carolina, rate class 1 employers do 
not contribute toward unemployment insurance, including benefits and 
solvency surcharge, as designed by law. Independent of the unemployment 
insurance tax, all employers in every rate class are subject to a contingency 
assessment tax of 0.06%, which is added to the base rate and solvency 
surcharge to fund DEW operations. The maximum cost per employee 
in rate class 1 is $8.40, the tax on one employee with wages of $14,000 
or more annually (see Chapter 6).  
 
We found that the zero tax bracket is not implemented in the majority 
of the states. According to the 2018 Comparison of State Unemployment 
Insurance Laws, published annually by USDOL, less than half of the states 
have a zero tax bracket in their tax structure. Twenty-one states have a 
zero tax bracket during periods of economic expansion, whereas eleven of 
those states have a zero tax bracket throughout the business cycle. 
 
Map 4.10 depicts the states with zero tax brackets. 
 
 
Map 4.10: States with Zero Tax 
























Source: USDOL’s 2018 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws 
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Rationale for Rate Class 1 Employers Being Taxed 
Employers placed in rate class 1 are so classified as a result of not having 
had any unemployment claims paid on their behalf. Employers in this rate 
class may not always be able to avoid layoffs and reductions in force; 
when that occurs, unemployment for their employees will be paid for from 
other employers’ contributions, in the first year the unemployment occurs, 
as those in rate class 1 have made no contributions to the unemployment 
fund. Further, if rate class 1 employers continue to experience unfortunate 
business developments, they may go out of business, and this could occur 
before they contribute any taxes to the unemployment compensation fund. 
Thus, other employers have effectively subsidized these employers and 
borne the burden of paying claims for employees who were not their own. 
All employers have a risk of reducing their number of employees, and 
insurance concepts generally make risk assessments. Eliminating the zero 
tax bracket may lead to a more equitable tax rate structure because all 






17. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and the 
General Assembly should consider eliminating the zero tax bracket.  
 
18. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and the 
General Assembly should make the tax rates and the tax structure more 
equitable for all rate classes, proportionate to the risk presented by 
employers, and should increase the number of rate classes to eliminate 
significant rate increases between classes. 
 
19. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and the 
General Assembly should collect data on revenue amounts collected 
and unemployment claims paid by rate class, each year. 
 
20. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and the 
General Assembly should consider the implementation of a 
smoothed solvency method in the future, should the Trust Fund 
need to be replenished.  
 
21. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce and the 
General Assembly should consider the impact on employers prior to 
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Trust Fund Tax 
Levied 
 
We conducted an analysis as information for the General Assembly to 
determine the ratio of the contingency assessment tax levied to the 
amount of Trust Fund tax levied between CYs 2015–2019. We found 
that for every dollar of contingency tax levied, employers were taxed from 
$0 for rate class 1 up to $100, the highest amount, for rate class 20 in 
CY 2015. Other observations include: 
 
 In 2019, for every dollar of contingency tax levied, the following amounts 
were levied for the Trust Fund: 
o Rate class 1 employers—$0. 
o Rate class 12 employers—$14.  
o Rate class 20 employers—$90 (see Table 4.11). 
 Rate class 20 is considerably higher than rate class 19 in most years, 
because rate class 20 is required by law to be a minimum of 5.4%. 
 As the amount of tax needed has decreased each year, all rate class rates 
decreased, except 1 and 20. The tax rate for class 19 has continued to 
decrease, but 20 has remained stable between CYs 2016–2019. 
 
In addition to the levied amounts discussed above, we also calculated the 
ratio of actual contingency expenses paid each year from that account to 
Trust Fund expenses each year.  
 
TRUST FUND ACTUAL EXPENSE 
Amount of funds used from the Trust Fund to pay 
unemployment benefits. 
CONTINGENCY EXPENSE 
Amount of funds spent for the purpose of reemploying 
South Carolinians.  
 
We found that for every dollar spent on contingency assessment expenses, 
$5, the lowest amount, through $100, the highest amount, was contributed 
to the Trust Fund from rate classes 2–20 for CY 2015 through CY 2019. 
Both of these fund accounts accumulate and carry a balance, and those 
balances are not included in the calculation the ratio of expenses of 
contingency expenditures to Trust Fund expenditures. 
 
In addition, Proviso 97.4 for FY 18-19 states that the lesser of 2% or 
$200,000 of the Unemployment Compensation fund balance shall be paid 
out annually to the Office of the Comptroller General to recover the 
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We calculated the ratio of dollars levied for the contingency tax to the 
dollars levied for the Trust Fund in CY 2019, with emphasis on rate classes 
1, 10, 12, 13, 19, and 20. These rate classes were selected for comparison 
because they provide a relatively broad range snapshot of the variance in 
taxes levied through the whole array of tax rates. Also, rate class 12 is the 
average tax rate, as set by law. See Appendix A for the ratio of contingency 
taxes levied to Trust Fund taxes levied for all rate classes. See also Table 
4.11 for the ratios by rate class for CYs 2015 through 2019. 
 
In calculating the levied tax amounts in Table 4.11, we assumed that all 
employees were taxed on $14,000. There may be instances where this is 
not the case, and would occur when an employee did not earn a full 
$14,000 during the calendar year because the employee: 
 
 Had a relatively low paying job. 
 Left employment during the year. 
 Began working for the company late in the calendar year.  
 
Table 4.11 contains the dollar amounts levied for the contingency tax 
versus the dollar amounts levied for the Trust Fund, for CYs 2015–2019, 
for six of the rate classes. For CYs 2015–2019, we also compared the 
ratio between the total contingency assessment revenue versus the 
total Trust Fund tax.  
 
 
Table 4.11: Ratios by Rate Class 







2019  2018  2017  2016  2015 
    1*  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
  2  $1  $5  $6  $7  $8  $9 
10  $1  $11  $14  $16  $18  $20 
12  $1  $14  $17  $20  $22  $25 
13  $1  $16  $21  $23  $27  $48 
19  $1  $50  $61  $67  $73  $90 
20  $1  $90  $90  $90  $90      $100** 
 
*  Rate class 1 employers pay no Trust Fund tax; however, it is subject to the contingency 
assessment tax of 0.06%.  
 
** Total taxes were higher in CY 2015; Trust Fund tax rate for rate class 20 was 5.97%, 
which is greater than the minimum state requirement of 5.4%, S.C. Code §41-31-50(1)(c). 
All years except 2015 were taxed at the minimum rate for rate class 20.  
 
Sources: DEW Contribution Tables and LAC Calculations 
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Table 4.12: Total Contingency 
Versus Total Trust Fund Tax, 
2015–2017 
 
  2017  2016  2015 
Total Contingency  $13,760,040  $13,251,762  $11,917,331 
Total Trust Fund Tax  $338,042,259  $334,214,688  $396,958,404 
Rounded Ratio  $1:$25  $1:$25  $1:$33 
 
Note: The audited financial statements for FY 16-17 have not been released.  
 
Sources:  DEW’s Audited Financial Statements, DEW’s Annual Trust Fund Assessment   








We reviewed the notification process that DEW uses to notify the 
General Assembly of the status of the Trust Fund and DEW operations. 
The process uses two annual reports that are required by state law, the 
South Carolina Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund Annual Assessment 
and the Management and Trust Fund Review of the Department of 
Employment and Workforce. We reviewed these reports for the past five 
years and found: 
 
 Legislative staff and government officials indicated DEW’s reports 
do not stand out from other reports and might be noticed more if they 
were designed differently. 
 The Trust Fund line graphs that depict the financial status of the 
unemployment Trust Fund are often listed on the last page of the report. 
 They do not contain a glossary of DEW acronyms. 
 DEW’s use of italics for reporting financial numbers within the reports 
was not always easy to read. 
 DEW reports the cash or estimates of the Trust Fund balance versus the 
actual balance from the audited financial statements. In the 2017 report, 
this variance in reporting was $97 million. 
 One report combining all the critical information from the two reports 
that are provided to the General Assembly may be more meaningful and 
less material for state officials and staff to read.  
 
Section 112 of Act 146 of 2010 requires that we “…determine the adequacy 
of the process for notifying state officials of the financial status of the 
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S.C. Code §41-29-280 requires that, no later than January 15 of every year, 
DEW must submit to the Governor and the General Assembly an 
annual report on the administration and operation of DEW and the 
unemployment Trust Fund.  
 
S.C. Code §41-33-45 requires that by October 1 of every year, DEW 
submit a report on the unemployment Trust Fund (which must include a 
five-year trend line within it) to the Governor, the General Assembly, 
and the DEW Review Committee (a committee created by S.C. Code 
§41-27-700 to evaluate DEW’s performance). 
 
We reviewed all of the January and October DEW reports since 2014 and 
found that the reports were meeting state law requirements, including the 
required trend lines. These reports are sent to: 
 
 Governor’s Office 
 President of Senate Pro Tempore 
 Speaker of the House 
 Clerk of the Senate 
 Clerk of the House 
 Senate Labor, Commerce, and Industry Committee 
 House Labor, Commerce, and Industry Committee 
 DEW Review Committee 
 
Many of the state officials have staff whose responsibility it is to review 
the report and keep the state officials informed of important material 
contained in the reports. We also reviewed the notification process by 
DEW to state officials and their staff and found that DEW has been 
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However, we found ways to improve the reports. We also received some 
criticism of the reports upon contacting all of the state officials who are 
required to receive the DEW reports to verify receipt, including the 
following: 
 
 One mentioned that they receive so many reports that it would be in 
DEW’s best interest if it could make the reports stand out, such as adding 
more color, larger fonts on the cover page, etc.  
 The Trust Fund trend line graphs are often on the last page of the agency’s 
reports. Locating the graphs on the first page of the report would be 
better.  
 Officials’ staff stated that a glossary of acronyms used by DEW in the 
reports would be helpful. 
 
We also found the Trust Fund balance reported in DEW’s annual reports 
was from Trust Fund bank account statements from June of each fiscal year 
rather than from the audited financial statements. The bank account 
statements may have been the most accurate numbers available for DEW at 
the time it began to put the report together, but once the Office of the State 
Auditor completed the audited financial statements each fiscal year, those 
numbers should have been used to replace the bank account statement 
numbers before the reports were published in October and January of the 
following year. 
 
For example, the October 2018 Trust Fund report submitted by DEW was 
underreported by $98,916,248 and lists the Trust Fund balance for FY 16-17 
as $678,148,439, whereas the Office of the State Auditor’s report for  
FY 16-17 shows the Trust Fund balance as $777,064,687. 
 
Finally, both the January and October DEW reports since 2014 are similar 
and contain much of the same information; however, they also contain 
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Table 4.13: Comparison Between 


















Source: LAC Comparison of DEW Reports 
 
 
A combined report could be more meaningful than providing two reports to 
the General Assembly within three months of each other, and if all critical 
data elements are included in a single report, there is one less report for 
legislators and staff to read. This may help the report stand out and allow 
DEW to focus on making one annual report that is most informational and 
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Other States  
We reviewed other states’ unemployment Trust Fund reports for comparison 
to DEW’s reports. By seeking insight from external sources and including 
more information in the agency’s reports, DEW could ensure that our state’s 
decision makers have as much reliable information as possible. 
 
Tennessee 
Tennessee collaborates with the Director for Business & Economic 
Research at the University of Tennessee by requesting the professor’s 
unemployment Trust Fund projections for the upcoming 18 months. The 
professor’s projections are then compared to the projections made by the 
Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s projections 
to develop the most accurate projections possible. 
 
Virginia 
Virginia Employment Commission’s unemployment Trust Fund report 
found several items included in the report, not included in DEW’s report, 
that could be helpful to our state officials. The Virginia report contains: 
 
 A chart showing a three-year trend of unemployment exhaustion rates for 
Virginia claimants. This statistic measures a percentage of claimants that 
received all of the unemployment benefits they were entitled to without 
finding a job. 
 A comparison of Virginia to four neighboring states and the District of 
Columbia in terms of unemployment Trust Fund balance, average tax 
rates, and weekly benefit amounts, etc. 
 Virginia’s and its neighbors’ average unemployment tax costs per 
employee for paying unemployment claims and replenishing the Trust 
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22. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should work 
to make the agency’s required reports to state officials regarding 
the unemployment Trust Fund standout from other similar reports. 
 
23. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should move 
the Trust Fund trend line graphs in the agency’s reports to the 
first page of the reports. 
 
24. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should continue 
to use the Trust Fund cash balance for its reporting of balance in its 
annual Trust Fund report, and also report the financial statement balance 
as a footnote to the reporting.  
 
25. The General Assembly should amend state law to require the 
Department of Employment and Workforce to submit one annual report 
on the unemployment Trust Fund and the agency per year in a month of 
its choice. 
 
26. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should consider 
obtaining outside unemployment Trust Fund projections from an 
independent third party. 
 
27. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should incorporate 
into its reports information including, but not limited to:  
 
 List of acronyms used in the report. 
 Trend of unemployment exhaustion rates. 
 Comparison between South Carolina and neighboring states. 
 Average cost, per employee, for unemployment insurance taxes 
to include both the amount to pay unemployment claims and the 
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Chapter 5 
 





USDOL requires that DEW report a variety of performance measures to 
gauge the effectiveness of DEW’s unemployment insurance programs. 
USDOL requires reported performance measures of timeliness and quality 
of claims paid, and claims appeals adjudicated. We reviewed DEW’s UI 
performance measures for the three quarters beginning October 2017 and 
ending September 2018 (following the implementation of SCUBI), and 
found that DEW failed to meet performance measure thresholds for: 
 
 Nonmonetary determination quality. 
 First payment promptness. 
 Nonmonetary determination time lapse. 
 
Prior to the implementation of SCUBI, DEW met performance measures 
for all but one category (nonmonetary determination time lapse) from 
October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2017. According to DEW, 
performance measure declines since 2017 are due to the transition to 
SCUBI. DEW states that these measures are expected to improve going 
forward (see below). We also found that DEW: 
 
 Does not have an adequate system in place to ensure that federal 
performance measures for unemployment insurance are met.   
 Does not have an internal, comprehensive action plan that provides 
analysis of performance measure issues and remedial actions.  
 Does not have specific training in place that prioritizes meeting federal 
performance measures. 
 Did not document potential savings resulting from the implementation of 
SCUBI despite stating that savings would be realized in its FY 18-19 




DEW’s performance measures for UI programs are mandated by USDOL. 
Generally, the federal measures look at the timeliness of adjudicating and 
processing unemployment claims and the quality of the eligibility 
determinations of the claims. The measures relate to the performance of 
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≥80%  97.5%  100%  90.4%  94.7%  84.2% 
 
* Nonmonetary determinations involve situations in which claimants have qualified for UI benefits based on wages earned but have potential issues 
that could affect their benefits, such as being separated for misconduct or failing to search for work. 
 
** Nonseparation issues involve situations in which a claimant’s benefits may be impacted by issues that do not involve his separation from 
employment, such as failing to search for work while receiving benefits. 
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 As shown in Table 5.1, from the period October 1, 2017 to September 30, 
2018, DEW met four of the core measures and did not meet three measures. 
However, for the 3rd quarter of 2018, DEW failed to meet only one 
performance measure, which pertained to the quality of nonmonetary 
separation determinations. Although DEW met six of the measures for the 
3rd quarter, it saw a decline in performance for four of the measures.  
 
SCUBI, DEW’s new UI system, was implemented beginning in 
September 2017 and continues to be in use. We asked DEW for 
explanations as to why it failed to meet the performance measures it did, 
for each measure, before and during the implementation of SCUBI, 
and asked for written documentation to support those reasons.  
 
DEW mostly attributed the “misses” to extra workload created SCUBI’s 
triggers for detecting and deterring improper payments. DEW provided a 
report showing an increase in the adjudication workload for non-separation 
cases. Nonseparation cases involve situations in which a claimant’s benefits 
may be impacted by issues that do not involve his separation from 
employment, such as failing to search for work while receiving benefits.  
The workload report did show an increase in non-separation adjudications 
from 3,924 cases in October 2017 to 13,169 cases in November 2017. 
The workload remained over 6,000 cases per month from March to October 
2018. 
 
Although DEW demonstrated an increase in non-separation adjudication 
workload, it did not provide documentation showing that the workload 
increase was a result of SCUBI’s integrity triggers or further explanation 
when asked. Additionally, there was no documentation provided regarding 
DEW’s workload for separation decisions. 
 
In their response, DEW also stated that it attempts to reach federal 
performance measure thresholds by using a daily reporting structure to 
monitor caseload and adjust resources as necessary to continue to meet its 
measures. However, as noted, DEW was unable to provide documentation 
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Analysis and Commentary 
on Meeting Performance 
Measures 
 
We asked DEW for the reasons for the fluctuations in its performance 
measures. Below we have listed, for each performance measure, 
DEW’s stated reason for missing the standard, the documentation it 
provided, and the written explanation it provided. Although DEW has given 
us explanations and remedies for its performance issues, DEW has been 
unable to provide documentation to back up those explanations and remedial 
actions. A narrative explanation without documentation provides no basis 
upon which to apply audit procedures to test assertions, through 
documentation analysis, used to support or refute the narrative.  
 
First Payment Promptness 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 






DEW provided documentation of an increase in workload for non-
separation adjudication workload. DEW stated that adjustments to this 
increase in workload will allow the agency to meet this measure. 
However, DEW did not provide information on what adjustments were 
made. There was a decline in performance from 90% in the 2nd quarter 
2018 to 88.6% in the 3rd quarter. 
 
DEW stated that it attempts to reach federal performance level thresholds by 
using a daily reporting structure to monitor caseload and adjust resources as 
necessary to continue to meet its measures. However, DEW did not provide 
us with documentation of this system when asked. 
 
Nonmonetary Determination Time Lapse 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 




Workload report  
 
EXPLANATION 
DEW stated that it expects to meet this measure in the future due to 
adjustments to the SCUBI system, though the nature of those adjustments 
was not provided to us when asked. DEW met this measure in the most 
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Separation Determination Quality 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 




Workload report  
 
EXPLANATION 
DEW provided documentation for an increase in workload for non-
separation adjudication workload. However, DEW did not provide 
information on adjustments made in response to the workload. DEW has 
failed to meet this measure for the last two quarters. 
 
Nonseparation Determination Quality 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 







DEW provided documentation for an increase in workload for non-
separation adjudication workload. However, DEW did not provide 
information on adjustments made in response to the workload. DEW has 
met the standard for this measure for the last two quarters, but its 
performance declined from 92.6% for the quarter ending June 30, 2018 to 
75% for the quarter ending September 30, 2018. 
 
Lower Authority Appeals Quality 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 







DEW’s lower authority appeals quality score went from 100% in the 
3rd quarter of 2017 to 85% in the 4th quarter. It then went back up to 100% 
for the 1st quarter of 2018, dropped to 84.2% in the 2nd quarter, and went 
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DEW provided documentation for an increase in workload for non-
separation adjudication workload. However, DEW did not provide 
information on adjustments made in response to the workload.  
 
One process change made by DEW to improve lower authority appeals 
quality is by “bundling” appeals. When filing an appeal, the claimant may 
select multiple issues to appeal. Each issue filed creates a separate appeal, 
which could result in multiple hearings for the same case. During audit 
fieldwork, DEW stated that they attempt to avoid multiple hearings by 
manually bundling appeals into one hearing. In their initial response to our 
draft, DEW stated that they now bundle the appeals, but DEW did not 
provide documentation that automatic bundling takes place. Automating the 
bundling process could help speed up the review process and improve  
quality. 
 
Average Age of Lower Authority Appeals 
REASON PROVIDED BY DEW 







DEW experienced wide fluctuations in the average age of lower authority 
appeals. DEW met the federal standard of 30 days for the period of 
October 1, 2017 to September 30, 2018. However, quarterly results varied 
widely, with an average age of 10.6 days for the 2nd quarter of 2017 and a 
high of 50 days for the 1st quarter of 2018.  
 
 
DEW again stated that the fluctuations were a result of an increase of 
workload due to SCUBI’s fraud detection triggers. DEW claimed that it 
made adjustments to remedy the increased workload, but did not describe 
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Action Plans to Improve 
Performance 
 
We asked DEW to provide us with specific action plans for improving 
performance measures. DEW did not provide us with internal action plans 
that specify the methods it is using to meet its federal performance 
measures. DEW and other state unemployment agencies are required to 
submit annual corrective action plans (CAP) to USDOL that explain the 
steps taken to meet federal measures. Although the CAP is helpful in 
broadly explaining performance measure issues, it does not provide 
specifics on how the performance will be improved and guidance for 
DEW employees.  
 
A comprehensive internal performance improvement plan could specify 
federal performance areas needing improvement, reasons for failures or 
declines in performance, and guidance to employees for meeting the 
performance standard. Additionally, such plans could be reviewed 
periodically to ensure that their proposals have been implemented and 
were effective in improving performance. 
 
DEW stated that it attempts to reach federal performance level thresholds by 
using a daily reporting structure to monitor caseload and adjust resources as 
necessary to continue to meet its measures. However, DEW did not provide 
us with documentation of this system. Documenting this system and 
resource allocation could ensure that resources are effectively utilized to 





Regarding Training to 
Improve Performance 
 
In 2014, DEW contracted with a consultant for $349,632 to review its 
processes, resulting in a recommendation that DEW implement training 
programs that emphasize meeting federal performance measures and that 
these programs be updated frequently. We asked DEW whether it has such 
targeted training programs, and DEW did not provide us with evidence that 
it has training specifically geared towards meeting federal performance 
measures. DEW has not given any reason for not following up on this 
recommendation. Training DEW staff on the importance of meeting 
federal performance measures and periodically updating that training can 
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Recommendations  28. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should implement 
a comprehensive performance improvement plan for meeting federal 
unemployment performance standards that includes but is not limited to: 
 
 Reasons for performance failures or declines. 
 Specifics on how it will meet and improve its federal performance 
for unemployment insurance. 
 Guidance to employees on how to implement the provisions of the 
plan. 
 A review of the previous performance improvement plan and 
whether it has been implemented and successful. 
 
29. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should document 
daily reporting structures to monitor caseloads and resource adjustments 
in order to meet federal performance standards. 
 
30. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should document 
the impact of systems changes to workload and steps taken to ensure 
those changes positively impact federal unemployment performance. 
 
31. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should develop a 
system for manually combining multiple appeal issues that arise from 
the same claim. 
 
32. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should document 
potential savings resulting from the implementation of the SCUBI 
system.  
 
33. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should implement 
training programs that emphasize meeting federal unemployment 
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We were directed by South Carolina law to review operations of the benefit 
eligibility process, of which discharges for cause are a part. We found: 
 
 The law regarding whether a claimant is discharged for cause is unclear, 
which can lead to inconsistency regarding determinations on whether to 
impose a disqualification, and increases the appeal workload. 
 The law is unclear as to how many weeks of disqualification should be 
imposed if a claimant is determined to have been discharged for cause. 
 DEW has not provided guidance for adjudication personnel in defining 
appropriate disqualification based on previous rulings regarding 
disqualification for cause.  
 
The S.C. Code allows for the disqualification of claimants from receiving 
UI benefits who are discharged for misconduct, gross misconduct, or cause 
in the following manner: 
 
 Claimants discharged for misconduct are required to be completely 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 
S.C. Code §41-35-120(2)(a). 
 Claimants discharged for gross misconduct are indefinitely disqualified 
from receiving benefits and must go back to work and earn eight times 
their weekly benefit amount before they can requalify. 
S.C. Code §41-35-120(4). 
 Claimants discharged for cause other than misconduct must be partially 
disqualified for at least 5 and no more than 19 weeks. 
S.C. Code §41-35-120(2)(b). 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the different types of disqualification and penalties. 
 
If a claimant is determined not to be at fault (e.g. lost his job due to a 
reduction in force), the claimant will be found eligible for benefits. 
Most states either hold claimants ineligible due to misconduct or eligible 
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Table 5.2: Unemployment Benefits Disqualification Summary 
 































































* Examples of misconduct could include such things as chronic unexcused absenteeism, inappropriate behavior towards coworkers, 
breaking company rules, and fighting on the job. 
 
** An individual may become eligible for UI benefits in 12 months under the alternate base period, which is comprised of the four most recently 
completed calendar quarters. This is used when one cannot qualify under the standard base period. Under the standard base period, it may 
take claimants up to 15 months to become monetarily eligible.  
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 It is unclear why there is a statutory difference between the penalties 
for misconduct and gross misconduct. Even though the term 
“gross misconduct” implies worse misconduct than regular misconduct, the 
penalty for gross misconduct is less than the penalty for regular misconduct. 
An individual disqualified for gross misconduct can go back to work and 
requalify for benefits by earning eight times his weekly benefit amount 
(however it long it takes to earn this amount of wage), whereas an 
individual disqualified for regular misconduct is disqualified for at least 
the claim year. 
 
 
Criteria Unclear for 
Discharges for Cause 
Other Than Misconduct 
 
There are insufficient criteria for determining whether a claimant was 
discharged for cause for behavior that does not rise to the level of the other 
misconduct categories, both misconduct, or gross misconduct, as listed 
below: 
 
 The law does not clearly define what discharge for cause is, yet requires 
that an individual discharged for cause be held partially ineligible for 
no less than 5 nor more than 19 weeks. 
 DEW’s guidance for its employees to follow regarding making a 
discharge for cause determination is unclear. 
 DEW does not track what types of disqualifications get reversed most 
often (misconduct, for cause, gross misconduct, etc.).  
 
Based on our review, approximately 66% of reversals that occurred during 
the appeals process to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) involved 
disagreements between the appellate tiers regarding terminations for cause. 
 
S.C. Code §41-35-120 states that an individual discharged for cause other 
than misconduct must be found partially ineligible for unemployment 
insurance. The period of ineligibility must begin with the effective date of 
the request and continue not less than 5 nor more than the next 19 weeks, 
in addition to the waiting period. A corresponding and mandatory reduction 
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Although the law requires that an individual discharged for cause must be 
held partially ineligible, the law does not clearly define what discharge for 
cause is. S.C. Regulation 47-100 defines discharge for cause as: 
 
…. conduct that demonstrates a level of fault of the 
employee but does not rise to the level of deliberate 
disregard for the standards of behavior which the 
employer has the right to expect of his or her 
employee. Fault includes those acts or omissions of 
employees over which an employee exercised 
reasonable control and which violate reasonable 
requirements of the job. 
 
This potentially causes disagreements between the different adjudication 
levels, which results in certain claimants ultimately found ineligible 
receiving overpayments and other claimants ultimately found eligible 
whose payments are delayed. 
 
Although the law and regulation define discharge for cause as fault not 
rising to the level of misconduct, it is difficult to gauge what that level of 
fault is without further guidance. Neither provides examples of terminations 
for cause, unlike the definitions and explanations of misconduct and gross 
misconduct.   
 
In guidance dated 2012, DEW expressed a desire to provide such guidance 
beyond the definitions in the statute and regulation, once an ample number 
of discharge for-cause cases were adjudicated. However, our review 




For Cause Appeals  
Claimants and employers have the right to appeal determinations at various 
levels: 
 
 The initial determination, as a result of an employer discharge of the 
employee, which is made by a first-line DEW adjudicator. 
 The appeal tribunal, in which a DEW administrative officer makes a 
determination after conducting a hearing and examining relevant 
evidence. 
 The appellate panel, in which a board of review examines the record of 
the tribunal to make a determination. 
 The ALC, which is a separate court that examines decisions appealed 
from the appellate panel. 
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Adjudicators are instructed to ask UI division management if they have 
questions as to whether someone was discharged for cause other than 
misconduct. However, written guidance for discharge for cause, including 
examples of previous adjudications, could allow for greater efficiency and 
accuracy. Employees could refer to clear, uniform, written guidance instead 
of asking management for clarification or limit the amount of questions. 
The guidance could be revised if case law on at least discharge for cause 
is updated.  
 
The lack of guidance regarding discharges for cause may result in initial 
determinations being ruled incorrect on appeal and confusion as to whether 
an individual was discharged for cause, for misconduct, or through no fault 
of his own (such as lack of work).  
 
We reviewed 50 decisions of the ALC that have been published since 
January 2017. We reviewed these decisions in part because we were not 
provided access to benefit, timeliness and quality (BTQ) reviews. The 
decisions we reviewed dealt with instances in which there was disagreement 
on the reason for an individual’s separation from employment.  
 
In our review, we found: 
 
 18 cases (36%) were overturned at some point during the appeals process 
due to disagreements between the initial adjudicator, appellate tribunal, 
appellate panel, and/or the ALC as to whether an individual was 
discharged for cause.  
 Decisions involving terminations for cause that were overturned occurred 
at all levels of appeal.  
 The number of overturned decisions involving a discharge for cause may 
be a result of the lack of clear guidance on the subject.  
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 In one case that was not overturned, the adjudicator held that the claimant 
was discharged for cause. The ALC upheld the lower authority’s decision 
that the claimant was discharged for cause, but in the body of the opinion 
stated that the claimant was discharged for misconduct, which is different 
than a discharge for cause. The ALC thus partially disqualified the claimant 
for 16 weeks. The fact that the ALC simultaneously held that a claimant 
was discharged for misconduct and penalized him for a discharge for cause 
illustrates possible confusion regarding the difference between discharges 
for cause and discharges for misconduct, necessitating clarification in the 
law. 
 
The number of reversals and disagreements between the different levels of 
adjudication suggests that there is not sufficient guidance regarding what 
differentiates discharges for cause from discharges for misconduct or 
discharges through no fault of the claimant.  In some cases, it is not clear as 
to why one level held that a claimant was discharged for misconduct and 
another level held that a claimant was discharged for cause other than 
misconduct.  
 
In their response to our report, DEW stated that differences in evidence 
heard between the initial adjudication and the appeals tribunal are a reason 
for the reversals and modifications regarding terminations for cause. 
Although several cases involved the appeals tribunal reversing the initial 
adjudicator, 14 out of 18 decisions involved the appellate panel or 
Administrative Law Court also reversing lower authorities’ decisions. 
Clearer guidance in laws and regulations and clearer internal guidance at 
DEW could provide more consistency regarding cases of discharge for 
cause.  
 
Additionally, DEW does not keep statistics on reversal rates for the specific 
categories, such as the percentage of misconduct decisions overturned by the 
appellate panel. Such statistics could help DEW pinpoint the reasons that 
specific types of decisions that are frequently reversed on appeal, which 
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Length of Disqualifications  
DEW has nearly completely left out the use of the disqualification range of 
11 to 15 weeks for disqualifications for cause in favor of using 
disqualifications of 1 to 10 and 16 to 19 weeks. DEW policy allows only 
for individuals discharged due to medical absenteeism to be disqualified in 
the 5- to 10-week range, and nearly all other discharges for cause must be 
disqualified in the 16- to 19-week range. 
 
Currently, claimants who are discharged for cause must be disqualified 
from receiving benefits for 5 to 19 weeks pursuant to S.C. Code 
§41-35-120(2)(b). However, the statute does not clarify how the range of 
disqualification weeks is to be determined. We received conflicting 
information from DEW regarding how it applies the statute in 
determining where the penalty falls within the range prescribed by law.  
 
DEW has not given a rationale for why absenteeism for medical reasons 
should be disqualified in the 5- to 10-week range, why other reasons for 
disqualification should be placed in the 16- to 19-week range, or why no 
discharges for cause be penalized in the 11- to 15-week range. These 
parameters within the 5- to 19-week range are internal DEW policies and 
are not prescribed in statute or regulation. 
 
DEW provided us with an interoffice communication regarding 
disqualification parameters for discharges for cause. These parameters were 
put forth by DEW in July 2012 and are summarized in Table 5.4. 
 
 
Table 5.4: DEW Policy Regarding 
Weeks of Disqualification for 







* DEW disqualifies individuals terminated for cause for the 11- to 15-week range 
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As shown in Table 5.4, DEW’s only internal parameters for disqualifying 
claimants is to provide for a 5-10 week range of penalties for claimants 
discharged for cause related to medical reasons and 16–19 weeks for all 
other reasons. DEW has no other disqualification parameters; for example, 
there are no parameters to determine whether an individual should receive a 
disqualification of 6 or 10 weeks for a discharge for cause for medical 
reasons.  
 
A DEW official stated that DEW administers disqualifications on a 
case-by-case basis. The official stated that determining the disqualification 
period for discharges for cause is subjective. DEW could utilize the 
11- to 15-week disqualification range for less-serious, non-medical 
absenteeism cases that might currently be penalized in the 16- to 19-week 
range. 
 
DEW provided us with the disqualification range for discharges for cause 
from 2014 to January through September of 2017. Table 5.5 suggests that 
DEW is largely using the disqualification ranges of 5 to 10 weeks 
(almost 24% of decisions) and the disqualification ranges of 16 to 19 weeks 
(almost 76% of decisions). Fewer than 1% of claimants are disqualified for 
11 to 15 weeks. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Instances of 




2014  2015  2016  2017* 
5  799  957  824  445 
6  48  30  28  17 
7  88  75  56  63 
8  70  50  48  40 
9  6  4  3  1 
10  184  292  291  218 
11  0  3  3  2 
12  11  1  0  1 
13  1  6  1  2 
14  7  3  1  0 
15  2  0  2  1 
16  2428  3037  2648  1668 
17  836  838  797  596 
18  579  366  350  227 
19  87  86  100  47 
TOTAL  5,146  5,748  5,152  3,328 
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34. The General Assembly should consider revising S.C. Code §41-35-120 
to clarify the definition of a discharge for cause. 
 
35. The General Assembly should consider clarifying the law regarding 
the differences in penalties between disqualifications for misconduct 
and gross misconduct.  
 
36. The General Assembly should consider amending S.C. Code 
§41-35-120 to give more clarity to what disqualification ranges 
should be imposed for disqualifications for cause.  
 
37. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should submit 
regulations to the General Assembly that clarify the difference 
between discharges for cause versus other types of discharge. 
 
38. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should track 
the number of cases overturned at each appellate level relating to 
discharges for cause, discharges for misconduct, and discharges for 
gross misconduct. 
 
39. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should provide 
clearer guidance to its employees regarding the difference between 
discharges for cause versus other types of discharge, taking into 
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Data Validation  We reviewed DEW’s performance measures as a part of our objective of 
determining DEW’s operations effectiveness. During our review, 
we found that DEW: 
  
 Consistently failed to meet the data validation requirements of USDOL. 
Data validation problems can negatively impact the ability of DEW 
to manage its unemployment benefit programs. 
 Provides unspecific reasons year-after-year, as to its analysis of why 
it failed some of its data validation standards. 
 Does not create detailed action plans, submitted to USDOL, to signal 
to USDOL what deficiencies DEW plans to address in the data validation 
process. 
 Has not provided the LAC with documentation on pass/fail 
documentation to identify which data elements failed and which passed in 
the current program year.  
 May be underreporting or over reporting certain data, such as 
unemployment claims processed, which could result in the agency 
being overfunded or underfunded for that activity.  
 
Data validation is a procedure used by USDOL to verify the accuracy of 
unemployment insurance reports submitted to USDOL by state 
unemployment agencies, including DEW. According to USDOL, the data 
submitted for the validation process helps determine allocation of 
administrative funding (funding the agency may receive in the future), 
fund utilization (for what purpose the funds are spent), and state 
performance. For example, data submitted on the volume of claims helps 
to determine how much federal funding is allocated to DEW’s claims 
processing programs. Likewise, data regarding performance measures help 
determine what areas require improvement at DEW and help to determine 
proper allocation of resources. Without validated data, these decisions are 
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USDOL’s data validation procedures require states to submit 
unemployment insurance data for specific data populations on a monthly 
and quarterly basis. In the data validation process, DEW conducts data 
validation with software provided by USDOL. After  conducting the data 
validation process, the results are submitted by DEW to USDOL. Due to the 
structure of the validating software, USDOL has indicated that data 
manipulation is rare and any such issues must be resolved.  
 
DEW’s data validation results are shown in Table 5.6. The table reflects 
that it failed the overall data validation process for the last three years. The 
individual elements’ pass/fail status is on the table. Failing data validation 
could have numerous negative effects. For example, inaccurate data could 
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Table 5.6: Results of 
Unemployment Benefits 
State Quality Service Plans 





















Weeks Claimed  F  F  P 
Interstate and intrastate weeks of 
unemployment benefits claimed. 





F  F  F  New claims reported. 
Additional Claims  F  F  P  Additional initial claims. 






Lower Appeals Filed  P  F  P  Number of lower authority appeals filed. 
Higher Appeals Filed  P  P  P 
Number of higher authority appeals 
filed. 
Lower Appeals Decided  F  F  F 
Number of lower authority appeals 
decisions rendered. 
Higher Appeals Decided  P  P  P 
Number of higher authority appeals 
decisions rendered. 
Lower Appeals Aging  P  F  F 
The average age of lower authority 
appeals reported. 





P  F  F  Detection of benefit overpayments. 
Overpayment 
Reconciliation 
F  F  F  Overpayments recovered and reconciled. 















Overall Data Validation  F  F  F   
 
* For the purposes of this table, failing grades include instances in which DEW did not submit 
data validation reports to USDOL. Passing grades include instances in which DEW passed 







 Chapter 5 




 Page 94  LAC/18-1-DEW  Department of Employment and Workforce 
 For example, if DEW reports 1,000 first payments during a month through 
the data validation software, DEW must: 
 
 Produce a file containing the 1,000 first payments, including relevant 
characteristics of the transaction such as the mail date and claimant 
Social Security Number.  
 Use validation software to reconstruct the numbers to ensure that the 
data reported to the national UI database and the validation file match.  
 Validate a sample of the data by tracing the data from its source in the 
original claims files to ensure a “match.” This process ensures that the 
data counts, such as weeks of unemployment payments made, and final 
payments, etc., reported by the agency to USDOL, is accurate and that 
the data elements in that data (i.e. the original claims files) are correctly 
classified.  
 
The data validation sample will examine the sample validation with the 
reported validation counts to see if they match. If there is a variance of ±2% 
between the populations, the sample will have failed data validation.  
States that fail data validation or do not submit data for validation must 
address those problems in the annual State Quality Service Plan (SQSP). 
The SQSP is a performance and grant document submitted by states to 
USDOL. In the SQSP, state workforce agencies, including DEW, explain 
performance deficiencies such as missed performance measure goals and 
data validation problems. The SQSPs created by DEW that we reviewed 
include brief, undetailed corrective action plans to address the performance 
deficiencies.  
 
For its FY 17-18 SQSP, DEW failed data validation by not submitting data 
validation criteria for 10 of 15 unemployment benefit data populations and 
for the unemployment benefit module relating to benefit, timeliness, and 
quality reviews. Data validation problems could negatively impact the 
ability of DEW to effectively manage its unemployment benefit programs. 
For example, if the age of appeals cases is not validated, it is difficult to 
determine whether additional resources are necessary to ensure that case 
aging of appeals meet federal performance measures. Likewise, if the 
amount of overpayments data is not validated, it is difficult to determine 
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Lack of Action Plans  
We reviewed DEW’s last five State Quality Service Plans (SQSP) 
submitted to USDOL. In the FY 17-18 SQSP, DEW provided a brief 
discussion of its data validation issues. That discussion almost exclusively 
attributed data validation problems at DEW to the implementation of the 
SCUBI benefits system. In the SQSP, DEW stated that, upon the full 
implementation of SCUBI, it will devote more resources to the data 
validation process. However, DEW has failed data validation every year 
since Federal Fiscal Year 2014, several years before the implementation of 
SCUBI. In previous SQSPs, DEW did not cite SCUBI transition as a reason 
for failing validation. For example, in the SQSP for 2014, DEW stated that 
unspecific “data extraction errors” and limited staffing resulted in validation 
failures. Table 5.7 includes explanations from DEW in its previous SQSPs 
for why it failed data validation.  
 
 
Table 5.7: Reasons for 



















Source: USDOL State Quality Service Plans 
 
 
Although DEW’s SQSPs over the years provide some explanation for its 
data validation issues pursuant to USDOL’s prescribed format, they do not 
provide a comprehensive explanation for data validation problems or an 
action plan for how it will address the problems. It does not include detailed 
timelines for when the issues are expected to be addressed for each 
population. Additionally, although the FY 17-18 SQSP generally discusses 
DEW’s data validation issues, it does not provide details on specific data 
populations, such as the number of final payments and timeliness of 
payments. A separate, comprehensive action plan would provide a useful 
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We asked whether DEW has a comprehensive data validation action plan 
with timelines for completion and did not receive a response. 
A comprehensive action plan could include the following information 
for meeting data validation requirements for each data population: 
 
 Implementation of specific process improvements for each validation 
element. 
 Personnel responsibilities for meeting validation for each population. 
 Specifics on IT improvements and how those improvements will affect 
each data validation population.  
 
According to a DEW official, DEW has passed data validation for 9 data 
populations for calendar year 2018. However, DEW has not answered our 
request for documentation showing passage and failure of data validation in 
2018. Although DEW has submitted its SQSPs to USDOL for at least the 
last five years, we were not provided with a comprehensive internal plan for 
addressing data validation for 2018 when requested.  
 
The lack of proper data validation increases the likelihood of inaccurate 
data being produced by DEW. Inaccurate data could result in numerous 
problems. For example, the inability to validate the number of initial claims 
filed could result in inaccurate data. If the number of claims is less than 
what is being reported, DEW programs dealing with claims could be 
overfunded. Conversely, if the number of claims is more than what is being 
reported, DEW programs dealing with claims could be underfunded. 
 
Also, without the validation of DEW’s figures regarding the on-time 
payment of benefits, the agency could be missing its timeliness standards, 
yet reporting the standards as met. Thus, DEW might not have accurate data 
on the resources needed to address performance issues. A comprehensive 
data validation plan that is properly implemented could allow DEW to 
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40. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should implement 
controls to ensure that required federal reports are properly submitted 
and meet federal data validation standards. 
 
41. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should develop 
and implement an internal master plan to ensure that it fulfills 
federal data validation standards. The master plan should include, 
at a minimum: 
 
 Specific reasons for validation failures for each relevant 
population. 
 Specific process improvements to address validation failures for 
each relevant population. 
 Timelines for passing validation for each population. 






We reviewed DEW’s requirement for unemployment claimants’ 
job searches, which is one of the stipulations for unemployed 
South Carolinians, otherwise eligible, to receive unemployment benefits.  
 
We found that DEW did not research the effect that changing the 
work search requirement from four to two searches might have on the 
amount of unemployment benefits paid and on the amount of time it takes 
for claimants to be reemployed.  
 




The General Assembly mandated, through Budget Proviso 83.6, 
that claimants be required to complete four job searches per week and that 
one of those job searches had to be within South Carolina Works Online 
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FY 16-17 
DEW sought a change to the proviso that would have required all four 
job searches be completed in SCWOS. However, through amendments to 
the proviso, the requirement to perform a job search through SCWOS 
was removed, and claimants would have been allowed to perform job 
searches through any method they chose. This proviso was vetoed by the 
Governor and sustained by the General Assembly. 
 
2017 
According to agency officials, as a compromise, DEW proposed S.C. 
Regulation 47-104, which required two job searches each week with both 
being conducted within SCWOS. This regulation became effective May 26, 
2017. 
 
When filing for UI, the claimant is required to also register in the SCWOS. 
This system is used by claimants to look for jobs, employers to post jobs, 
employers to look for employees, and DEW staff for agency functions. 
Much like other work search websites (such as Indeed.com, Monster.com, 
etc.), SCWOS users can search by specific types of jobs (such as 
accounting, electrical, welding, etc.) or general jobs to return a greater 
number of possible employment opportunities. 
 
Table 5.8 shows the number of overall job searches and SCWOS job 
searches required for unemployment claimants for FY 13-14 through 
FY 17-18, as well as South Carolina’s unemployment rate for calendar years 


















* S.C. Regulation 47-104, which required two job searches conducted within SCWOS 
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DEW stated that it has not researched the effect on the state’s 
unemployment rate of requiring claimants to perform two job searches 
instead of four job searches. By not monitoring the effect that the number 
of job searches required for claimants has on the amount of time 
unemployment claimants spend on unemployment, DEW may not have the 
data to determine if there is a correlation between unemployment and job 
searches during worsening economic times when unemployment is higher. 
 
A requirement of being on unemployment in all states is that the claimant 
look for work. However, all states have flexibility in how this requirement 
is enforced. States determine: 
 
 Number of job searches claimants are required to perform. 
 What counts as a job search.  
o Some states count actions such as attending a job fair or taking a 
civil service test as a job search.  
 States decide how their agencies will verify the claimant’s job search.  
o Eligibility reviews, either online, by telephone, random audit, etc. 
 
 
Table 5.9 compares South Carolina’s required number of job searches to 
neighboring states. Also included are the states’ unemployment rates, for 
informational purposes, since every state’s economy is different. 
 
 
Table 5.9: Neighboring States’  
Job Search Requirements and 
Unemployment Rates 


























* Depends on when the claimant initially filed for unemployment. 
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Counting South Carolina, three of the six states have changed the number of 
job searches required by unemployment claimants within the last couple of 
years. South Carolina and North Carolina reduced their job search 
requirements, while Florida increased its job search requirement. Based on 
the information obtained on other states’ job searches, there does not appear 
to be a correlation between job search requirements and the unemployment 
rate.  
 
DEW verifies that claimants are looking for work by requiring claimants to 
perform two job searches in SCWOS per week. Although claimants are 
required to search for jobs, they are not required to apply for any jobs in 
their search. DEW states that in many cases it is unable to verify that 
someone has actually applied for a job because the claimant usually has to 
complete the job application either in person at the business or on the 
company’s own website. DEW also stated that the business community has 
indicated to the agency that it does not want to be put into the position of 
having to verify whether an individual has applied for a job or not. 
 
If a claimant fails to search for two jobs within SCWOS during a given 
week, then the SCWOS system flags SCUBI to tell that system to withhold 
the claimant’s unemployment benefits for that week. Benefits are stopped 
until the claimant searches for work. This occurs whether a claimant files for 






42. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should monitor 
and research the effect that the number of job searches required for 
unemployment claimants has on claimants’ length of time spent on 
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In its FY 18-19 agency budget request, presented to the General Assembly, 
DEW stated that SCUBI “…will yield a potential savings of approximately 
$5,646mm [sic].” However, DEW did not provide documentation of how 
that number was derived in the budget plan. We asked DEW for 
documentation of how the SCUBI savings amount was derived and did not 
receive a response. 
 
DEW’s FY 19-20 agency budget plan contained some detail on potential 
savings. It noted that the projected savings resulting from SCUBI 
implementation in its first year would equal $865,000. DEW stated that 
the savings would be derived from hours saved through the automation of 
claims processes. However, it did not contain an explanation for its 
estimated savings from the FY 18-19 report. Without accurately 
documenting potential savings, it is difficult to assess whether 
investments in SCUBI have resulted in projected savings.   
 
 
Recommendation  43. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should thoroughly 
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One of the functions of DEW is to facilitate the reemployment of 
individuals who are searching for work. In our review of how DEW puts 
people back to work and assists all job seekers and what DEW reports to 
USDOL, we found: 
 
 The performance measures used by DEW do not capture the effectiveness 
of its reemployment programs. The federal Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) found that the performance measures used for employment 
programs do not capture effectiveness of the programs and noted that 
impact studies can help measure program outcomes.  
 Unlike in the past, DEW’s Reemployment Services and Eligibility 
Assessments (RESEA) program’s federal rules do not require comparison 
of the outcomes of program participants to non-participants with similar 
barriers to employment to measure effectiveness. In our last audit, 
we found that participants in RESEA’s predecessor program received 
UI benefits longer than non-participants. 
 DEW does not have specific training for its employees who provide 
services for the RESEA program. 
 DEW did not provide documentation to show that it has tested its 
profiling model for selecting claimants to participate in the RESEA 
program to ensure that those claimants are the claimants most likely to 
exhaust their unemployment benefits. The USDOL Inspector General 
has noted this issue with the RESEA program. 
 DEW did not provide documentation to show that claimants who failed 
to report to required RESEA program meetings were disqualified from 
receiving UI benefits. 
 Due to the USDOL’s attempts to implement a performance measure 
statistical adjustment model that adjusts state performance measures to 
account for local conditions, DEW’s employment performance measures 
have not been finalized. 
 
DEW runs the Wagner-Peyser program, which is the federal government’s 
job services program. The Wagner-Peyser program provides for job 
matching and job training services, such as skills assessments, career 
guidance, etc. DEW also runs veterans’ reemployment programs and 
reemployment programs dealing with the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
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 Additionally, DEW runs the RESEA program, which is designed to get 
claimants most likely to use up all of their unemployment benefits back to 
work quicker. RESEA also serves individuals who receive Unemployment 
Compensation for Ex-servicemembers (UCX). Table 6.1 provides 
information about each program.  
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Summary  
For the purposes of determining how DEW has assisted unemployed 
individuals, the primary performance measures used by DEW for these 
programs are: 
 
 Employment rate for participants in the 2nd quarter after their exit from the 
program. This measure identifies how many participants who obtained 
DEW services were employed in the 2nd quarter after completing DEW’s 
service program.  
 Employment rate for participants in the 4th quarter after their exit from the 
program. This measure identifies how many participants who obtained 
DEW services were employed in the 4th quarter after completing DEW’s 
service program. 
 Median earnings for participants in the 2nd quarter after their exit from the 
program. This measure identifies median earnings of participants in the 
2nd quarter after their exit from DEW’s service programs. 
 
DEW negotiates with USDOL to agree to performance goals for its 
employment programs. These negotiations take into account factors such as 
past performance, local economic conditions, and goals for continual 
improvement. DEW has tracked and reported performance measures for the 
Wagner-Peyser program regarding claimants employed after exit and wages 
after exit since at least 2011.  
 
The veterans and TAA programs have also adopted those measures. 
Since those measures have been newly adopted for the veterans program, 
there is no baseline for the first year as part of WIOA. Based on program 
performances nationwide for these measures, baselines performance goals 
for the veterans program will be negotiated in the future. For the TAA 
program, we have compared South Carolina’s statistics to the national 
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USDOL Statistical 
Adjustment Model  
 
According to USDOL officials, it is currently working on a statistical 
adjustment model for state employment performance measures. 
This model will allow USDOL to adjust state employment performance 
measures to account for various factors in a state’s economy that may 
affect the setting of the standard and the ongoing measurement and 
reporting of the performance.  
 
Further, this adjustment model does not create new performance measures; 
it simply adjusts performance measures to account for differences in states’ 
unique economic circumstances. Because this model is not yet complete, 
USDOL has not been determining whether states have passed or failed their 
performance measures. A USDOL official commented that states will be 




Table 6.2: Wagner-Peyser 
Performance Measures,  
Program Year 2017 


















* Due to the U.S. Department of Labor’s lack of an updated Statistical Adjustment Model, 
these measures are not final. 
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Table 6.3: Veterans’ Services 
Performance Measures 


















* These measures were newly implemented under the WIOA program. These measures’ 
baselines will be determined in the future (TBD). 
 
Sources: USDOL and DEW 
 
 
Table 6.4: Trade Adjustment 
Assistance Performance 

















Sources: USDOL and DEW  
 
 
Although the lag in DEW’s performance measures limits the ability to gauge 
DEW’s performance, a USDOL official said that some states have 
implemented models that allow them to adjust their performance measure 
trends to anticipate USDOL’s adjustment model. DEW has not attempted 
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In addition to there being a lag in the finalization of DEW’s most recent 
federal performance measures, the performance measures currently used 
by USDOL, and thus DEW, do not measure the actual impact of DEW’s 
employment programs. The measures regarding the employment rates in the 
second and 4th quarters after exit and earnings have the following problems:  
 
  DEW’s measure of the employment rates for participants in the second 
and 4th quarters after exit for program participants captures the number of 
participants that enter employment but does not capture whether DEW’s 
reemployment programs directly contributed to a participant entering 
employment.  
o A claimant who uses DEW’s SCWOS job search engine who obtained 
a job through other means would still be counted as entering 
employment for performance measure purposes.  
 The measures do not show whether an individual has retained 
employment, only whether they are working after exiting the program.  
o An individual who is employed in the 4th quarter after exit may have 
only recently gotten the job, so it is not known whether that individual 
has been able to keep the job. 
o Whether a program participant is able to keep a job after exiting the 
program is a useful measure of program effectiveness that is not 
currently being captured.  
 
Although the current performance measures have shortcomings regarding 
gauging program effectiveness, the current measures can be helpful in 
other ways: 
 
 The measures could be an indicator of the overall economy without 
reflecting on the actual effectiveness of the reemployment services 
themselves. 
 The measures could be an indicator of problems in the data reported, 
identify a problem with the services provided, or show the need for other 
or additional services. For example, a significant decrease in the 
percentage of participants who obtain employment in the second and 
4th quarter after exiting the program during a strong economy could 
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An impact study could be used to gauge the actual impact of DEW’s 
reemployment programs, which would address the shortcomings of the 
current performance measures, with more precision than even the new 
statistical adjustment model. An impact study assesses the net effect of a 
program by comparing outcomes with an estimate of what would have 
happened in the absence of a program.  
 
An example of an impact study could compare the outcomes of DEW 
employment service participants with those of nonparticipants by using a 
randomly assigned comparison group. Such a study would isolate the impact 
of DEW’s reemployment services program from factors such as independent 
job search efforts.  
 
In its review of USDOL’s performance measures for reemployment 
programs, the federal Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that 
impact studies are considered by many researchers to be the best method of 
determining the extent to which a program is causing participant outcomes. 










One reemployment program currently used by DEW is the federally funded 
RESEA program. Claimants unemployed due to a reduction in force who 
are identified through a profiling model as most likely to exhaust their 
unemployment benefits are required to participate in the RESEA program. 
The program also serves ex-service members who are receiving 
unemployment compensation. RESEA requires the selected claimants to 
participate in a series of services in order to facilitate their reemployment as 
quickly as possible. RESEA services include meetings at workforce centers, 
development of employment plans, and job referrals. If a claimant is 
selected for the RESEA program, he is required to participate or potentially 
lose his eligibility for benefits. 
 
Activities required to be provided by the RESEA program include: 
 
 Enrollment in the Wagner-Peyser program. 
 Provision of assistance for a claimant to develop and implement an 
individual reemployment plan. 
 Providing information and access to services such as resume writing 
assistance, skills assessments, and labor market information. 
 Providing referrals to specific reemployment services and training 
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We found that the RESEA program does not have performance measures 
that effectively gauge the program’s effectiveness. Like the measures for 
Wagner-Peyser services, the current performance measures used by the 
RESEA program examine the employment status of individuals who 
participated in the program. However, as noted by the USDOL Inspector 
General in a 2017 report, the RESEA performance measures do not compare 
RESEA participant outcomes to outcomes of other claimants with similar 
barriers to employment or specifically assess the impact of the RESEA 
program.  
 
The USDOL Inspector General noted that, although the RESEA program 
was transitioning to measure the employment rate and average wages of 
RESEA participants, it did not have a plan to compare its results to other 
claimant outcomes. Thus, with the current measures, it is unknown whether 
a claimant’s outcome through participation in RESEA is better than if the 
claimant did not participate in RESEA at all.  
 
In the past, the USDOL required states to have a comparison group for 
participants in the RESEA program’s predecessor program, the 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) program. The program 
compared claimants who participated in the REA program with 
unemployment insurance recipients who had similar characteristics that did 
not receive REA services. However, USDOL has since waived the 
requirement for a comparison group. The lack of a comparison group makes 
it difficult to determine whether the program is effective. 
 
In our 2014 review of DEW, we examined the performance of the RESEA 
program’s predecessor REA program. A comparison study found instances 
in which program participants from March 31, 2010 to  March 31, 2012 had 
longer unemployment durations than individuals in the comparison group 
who did not receive the intensive services. Only one quarter saw REA 
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Table 6.5: Average Weeks to 
Reemployment and 
Average Duration of UI Benefits 
for REA Participants and 






















Sources: DEW and USDOL 
 
 
Given that the RESEA program’s predecessor program saw claimants who 
got intensive services received UI for longer than those who did not, 
it would be prudent to examine the RESEA program’s effectiveness through 
a comparison group study. These comparison groups should have 
comparable skills, work history, education, etc. This could ensure that the 




Lack of Training Materials  
We also found that training materials specifically tailored for the RESEA 
program have not been developed. In response to our request for training 
materials, we received instructions for creating an individual employment 
plan and instructions for attaching job resumes to work referrals. These 
materials were created generally for DEW employees and do not 
specifically instruct RESEA employees.  
 
Given that RESEA program participants are identified as being most likely 
to exhaust benefits, specialized training for DEW employees who work with 
that population is necessary. Training and instructional materials designed 
specifically for RESEA program employees could help ensure that claimants 
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Profiling System  
We asked DEW for information on its profiling system for selecting 
claimants most likely to exhaust benefits. Although DEW provided us with 
some information on the profiling model for the RESEA system, DEW did 
not provide documentation for us to verify its claims. We were not provided 
with a policy for how the profiling model works, how many claimants are 
selected, or examples of profiling scores when asked. Without a formal, 
written policy and records supporting whether the agency is using the proper 
methodology and selecting the right participants, DEW might not be 
selecting the proper claimants for participation in RESEA. 
 
According to DEW, claimants are graded on their likelihood to exhaust 
benefits based on the following factors: 
 
 Weekly benefit amount. 
 How long they had their last jobs. 
 How long between their separation dates and when they filed their claims. 
 The unemployment rate in the county of residence. 
 The ratio of their weekly benefit amounts to their prior wage rates. 
 The number of weeks of unemployment for which they were eligible. 
 Their previous occupations and industry. 
 
According to DEW, individuals receive a score on a scale from 0 to 0.99, 
and RESEA offices fill their appointment schedules with individuals most 
likely to exhaust benefits. However, as noted above, we did not receive 
information with which we could confirm that this system is used to profile 
claimants through documentation. Additionally, we did not receive 
confirmation from DEW that it has conducted tests to ensure that its current 
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Missed Appointments  
Pursuant to federal law, claimants who are selected for the RESEA program 
are required to participate in the program. Federal RESEA requirements 
state that claimants who fail to participate in the program may have their 
eligibility adjudicated unless they miss their RESEA appointment for 
“good reason” (such as a scheduled job interview). We found that: 
 
 In the 1st quarter of 2018, 439 claimants who failed to report to their 
RESEA appointments were not disqualified from receiving UI benefits. 
Since the average total benefits paid per claimant in that quarter was 
$3,079, those claimants received approximately $1,351,681 in benefits. 
 For the 4th quarter of 2017, 129 claimants who failed to report to their 
RESEA appointments were not disqualified from receiving UI benefits. 
Since the average total benefits paid per claimant in that quarter was 
$3,064, those claimants received approximately $395,256 in benefits. 
 
In their response to our audit report draft, DEW stated that approximately 
$143,000 would have been withheld from the claimants who missed RESEA 
appointments. However, DEW did not provide documentation showing the 
amount of benefits that were withheld. When asked for an explanation as to 
why these individuals were not disqualified from receiving benefits, 
DEW noted that a claimant may remain qualified despite not participating 
in RESEA if he had a scheduled job interview, lived more than 50 miles 
from a workforce center, or obtained employment before his scheduled 
appointment.  
 
However, DEW did not provide a copy of a policy stating the specific 
reasons for allowing claimants to remain eligible despite failing to report 
when asked. Additionally, DEW did not provide a listing of the specific 
reasons why the individuals remained eligible when asked, so we were not 
able to verify whether those individuals should have remained eligible. 
Thus, it is possible that individuals who should be disqualified are 
improperly receiving benefits and DEW may be out of compliance with 
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44. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should consider 
implementing an adjustment model to estimate its achievement of 
federal performance measures. 
 
45. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should conduct 
an impact study to assess the effectiveness of its employment service 
programs. 
 
46. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should conduct a 
study that examines the duration of benefits of Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessment program participants with that of a 
comparison group. 
 
47. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should track the 
employment retention rate of claimants who have exited its 
employment service programs. 
 
48. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should improve 
training materials for employees who conduct the Reemployment 
Services and Eligibility Assessment program. 
 
49. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should document 
how claimants are selected for the Reemployment Services and 
Eligibility Assessment Program and implement a written policy for 
selecting participants for this program. 
 
50. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should review its 
profiling model for selecting claimants for the Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessment Program to ensure that its profiling model 
accurately selects claimants most likely to exhaust their benefits. 
 
51. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should comply 
with federal law regarding the disqualification of individuals from 
receiving unemployment benefits who fail to report to Reemployment 
Services and Eligibility Assistance Program appointments. 
 
52. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should have a 
written policy specifying the circumstances for individuals to remain 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits despite missing their 
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment appointments. 
 
53. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should verify that 
the reasons for individuals remaining eligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits despite missing Reemployment Services and 
Eligibility Assessment appointments are valid. 
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Reemployment 
Services and 
Rapid Response  
 
As part of our requirement to review DEW’s reemployment services, 
provided for in statute, we reviewed the Rapid Response services to 
determine whether DEW was effective at channeling information to 
companies and employees regarding reemployment services offered to help 
dislocated workers find jobs. DEW’s Rapid Response services are meant to 
channel information to employees being affected by pending layoffs in 
order to help them get new jobs as quickly as possible. We focused on how 
DEW channeled information to companies and employees who were laid off 
from the V.C. Summer Nuclear Plant and MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility 
closings. We found: 
 
 DEW does not track outcome and performance data related to the 
Rapid Response services, as required by federal guidelines. 
 DEW did not have a policy in place that would have provided guidance 
to DEW personnel on how to deliver services to companies experiencing 
layoffs during the time of the most highly publicized layoffs in 
South Carolina that we reviewed. 
 DEW’s response to layoffs do not consistently adhere to its 
Rapid Response protocol, available on its website, when channeling 
services to companies and dislocated workers.   
 
 
Tracking Outcomes and  
Establishing Policy 
 
DEW does not track outcome and performance data, related to the 
Rapid Response services provided, as required by federal guidelines. 
As a result, DEW cannot measure whether its efforts to channel information 
on reemployment services to company management and dislocated workers 
are effective at putting people back to work. Without this information, 
DEW also cannot measure if changes need to be made to improve the 
program.   
 
The federal guidelines state that the operators responsible for carrying out 
Rapid Response are required to track outcome and performance data, along 
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According to a DEW official, DEW does not track the following: 
 
 Number of employees who received new jobs after receiving 
reemployment services, and how long it took them to receive new jobs. 
 Number of employees who were unemployed that live in South Carolina 
or out-of-state. 
 Number of employees who received unemployment insurance after the 
closings. 
 The exact amount that has been expended from the unemployment 
Trust Fund to pay for claims. 
 
The federal guidelines for Rapid Response outcome and performance data 
are broad, and interpretation is left up to the discretion of the state program 
operators. DEW has stated it has recently delivered a rapid response 
guidance manual on February 28, 2019 to local office staff. However, this 
manual was not provided to us during the audit. It is beneficial for outcome 
and performance data to be tracked to determine if people are becoming 
reemployed from the services channeled through the program. 
 
An internal policy, stating the specific outcomes desired within an 
established timeframe, may be more useful than following broad federal 
guidelines. An internal policy can specify the types of outcomes and 
performance data necessary to determine if the program is successful at 
helping people obtain the services needed to find new jobs. 
 
 








Part of the Rapid Response services is to refer affected employees to 
SCWOS and to hold employee group orientation sessions on-site prior to the 
initial layoff to prepare dislocated workers for job search activity. The goal 
of Rapid Response is to help dislocated workers find jobs and offer training. 
 
According to DEW’s Rapid Response protocol, found on its website, when 
plant closings and layoffs occur and affect 50 or more employees, DEW’s 
Dislocated Worker Unit (DWU) goes into action for various reasons, 
including, but not limited to, plant relocation, bankruptcy, company 
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The DWU contacts an employer to offer and coordinate Rapid Response 
services when an employer voluntarily notifies a local SC Works Center or 
DWU, when the DWU learns of such an event, or when it receives a 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) from the 
employer. A WARN offers protection to workers by requiring employers to 
provide notice 60 days in advance of covered plant closings and mass 
layoffs, a federal requirement. Exceptions to the 60-day rule include: 
 
 Faltering company, which applies to plant closings. 
 Unforeseeable business circumstances. 
 Natural disaster. 
 
From there, a management meeting is required to be held with DEW and the 
company’s management staff to discuss topics such as the anticipated layoff 
schedule and reemployment services. Following the management meeting, 
the Rapid Response team is supposed to inform the affected workers of 
available reemployment services, such as resume writing, interviewing 
skills, basic computer skills, and financial workshops. The team also 
prepares them for job search activity in an onsite employee group 
orientation session, which is held prior to the first layoff.  
 
DEW also creates Rapid Response reports for each company involved in a 
layoff or closing, which cite the following information: 
 
 Date and location of the layoff. 
 Reason for the layoff. 
 Type of event (i.e., layoff, closure, etc.). 
 Number of workers affected by the layoff. 
 Group orientation schedule dates. 
 Number of individuals that attended each group orientation. 
 Workers’ demographic information. 
 Notes, including the date that DEW received the company’s WARN 
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The timeline of DEW’s response to the layoffs does not consistently adhere 
to Rapid Response protocol. Although DEW does not have a formal 
Rapid Response policy, it does have an explanation of the protocol 
personnel should follow on its website. This protocol was not consistently 
followed for the VC Summer Nuclear Plant and the MOX Project closings. 
We chose to examine these closings because they were two of the most 
prominent, recent mass layoff events. 
 
VC Summer Nuclear Plant Closing  
Four companies issued WARN notices due to the closing of the VC Summer 
Nuclear Plant, between July 31, 2017 and January 23, 2018. Westinghouse 
(nuclear energy) was the general contractor of the VC Summer Nuclear 
Plant Project. The other companies working on the project included SCANA 
(electric and natural gas public utility company), Fluor (engineering), and 
CB&I (engineering).  
 
Table 6.6 depicts the dates that DEW received the WARN notices,  
the dates of DEW’s response, as well as the dates of management meetings, 
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SCANA  7‐31‐17  7‐31‐17  8‐2‐17  2  No Record  No Record  9‐30‐17 
FLUOR 
CORPORATION 


























I  JENKINSVILLE  8‐3‐17  8‐7‐17  8‐7‐17  Same Day  No Record  No Record  7‐31‐17 










*  WARN standard—DEW is supposed to contact the company as quickly as possible after the receipt of the WARN. 
Other states, such as North Carolina and Tennessee, have 48 hours to contact the company.  
 
**  Management meeting standard— A meeting with the company’s management staff is held after the WARN 
process, but there is no standard timeframe. DEW has not provided documentation to show why these 
management meetings were not held. 
 
***  Group orientation standard—Group orientation is held after the management meeting, based on an agreed-upon 
schedule and is held on-site prior to the first layoff, but there is no standard timeframe. DEW has not provided 
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 Management Meetings 
Management meetings were not documented as being held, and additional 
documentation was not provided to show the minutes from the 
Westinghouse-Rock Hill and CB&I Services-Laurens meetings.  
Management meetings are meant to give an opportunity to the Dislocated 
Worker’s Unit (DWU) to explain to the affected companies the benefits of 
early intervention assistance, describe available reemployment services, 
and schedule a group orientation for the affected employees.  Management 
meetings are held at the discretion of the employer.  However, we do not 
know if the meetings that were not held were due to the company’s 
management’s decision, or were not documented.  Without management 
meetings, the ability of DEW to work with affected companies to put forth 
an effective Rapid Response is hindered.   
 
Group Orientations 
There were two instances of group orientations that were either held more 
than 30 days after the layoff date or on the same day as the layoff. Part of 
the goal of group orientations is to provide employees a chance to search for 
work and otherwise get acclimated to DEW’s services prior to being laid 
off. Group orientations are held at the discretion of the employer.  However, 
we do not know if these group orientations reflected on Table 6.6 were not 
held due to the company’s management’s decisions or were just not 
documented.  By not having orientations prior to the first layoffs, employees 
lose their chance at a head start on their job searches, which could hinder 
their reemployment efforts.  
 
CB&I Areva MOX Services, LLC (MOX Project) Closing 
Two companies issued WARN notices due to the MOX Project closing on 
November 8, 2018: CB&I (engineering) and Orano (a global nuclear fuel 
cycle company). The MOX Project was contracted by the U.S. National 
Nuclear Security Administration to design, build, and operate a fuel 
fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site in Aiken.   
 
Table 6.7 depicts the dates that DEW received the WARN notices, the dates 
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*  WARN standard—DEW is supposed to contact the company as quickly as possible after the receipt of 
the WARN. Other states, such as North Carolina and Tennessee, have 48 hours to contact the 
company.  
 
**  Management meeting standard— A meeting with the company’s management staff is held after the 
WARN process, but there is no standard timeframe. 
 
***  Group orientation standard—Group orientation is held after the management meeting, based on an 
agreed-upon schedule and is held on-site prior to the first layoff, but there is no standard timeframe.  
 
 




 According to DEW’s event timeline, the agency contacted both of the 
companies involved in the layoffs within 24 hours after the WARN notices 
were received. 
 
The group orientations were held prior to the beginning of the layoffs for 
CB&I and Orano. DEW also offered management meetings to be held with 
CB&I and Orano officials, but a DEW official stated that the only 
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MOX Project’s 
Assessment of DEW’s 
Rapid Response Services  
 
 
We contacted companies involved in the VC Summer and MOX layoffs to 
determine their opinions on DEW’s response to the layoff, and we received 
a response from MOX. A MOX official rated DEW at a 5, on a scale of 
1-10, with 10 being the best response to the layoffs, and 1 being the worst 
response. The official stated that customer service issues marred the first 
phone conversation between DEW and MOX because DEW was pressuring 
the company to give information about their employees that the company 
could not yet provide. However, the official noted that there was one DEW 
employee in particular that MOX thought was very helpful. Besides that, 
the MOX official stated that DEW was responsive in its efforts. 
 
We asked DEW whether the agency has a policy in place to guide 
Rapid Response activities throughout the process. DEW stated that it is 
currently developing a Rapid Response manual. Having a written policy 
manual may help ensure that the Rapid Response process is conducted in 
an optimal manner.   
 
 
Record Keeping of Rapid 
Response Activities 
We found discrepancies in DEW’s recordkeeping.  We found: 
 
 The events in DEW’s timelines were not entered contemporaneously to 
when they occurred.  
 Several instances of inaccurate recording of data. 
 
When we asked DEW why the timelines contained inaccurate and missing 
entries, the agency did not respond to our inquiry.  Instead, the agency 
provided us with updated timelines, with the corrections made.  We have no 
assurance that this data is accurate since it was previously omitted from the 
original documented timeline. We could not determine that DEW has 
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SC Works Regional 
Workshop Calendars 
 
DEW did not upload its October 2018 Midlands regional workshop calendar 
in a timely manner.  As of October 9, 2018, the October Midlands regional 
workshop calendar was not posted on DEW’s website to replace the 
September calendar.  These calendars list the dates and times of free events 
offered each month, to prepare dislocated workers for finding new jobs.  
Some of the events offered include resume writing, interviewing skills, and 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) information sessions. 
 
This could have a real effect on jobseekers during the period between 
October 1st and October 9th, as dislocated workers may not have had access 
to events offered during that time.  This can delay them in obtaining the 
proper resources needed for re-employment.  Jobseekers may become 
discouraged if the workshop calendars are not available in a timely manner. 
 
 
Recommendations  54. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should track 
outcome and performance data, related to the Rapid Response services, 
as required by federal guidelines. 
 
55. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should establish 
its own policy manual and method, stating how to implement Rapid 
Response services within an established timeframe, in order to help 
reemploy dislocated workers.  
 
56. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should ensure 
that, when carrying out Rapid Response services, the protocols taken 
to provide these services are documented and delivered consistently. 
This includes for both official and unofficial protocols and policies, 
including but not limited to: 
 
 Management meetings with companies that receive Rapid Response 
services.   
 Group orientation sessions with affected employees prior to layoffs 
when possible. 
 
57. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should ensure 
that an agency official is responsible for checking the event timelines 
and agency documentation for errors by establishing internal controls, 
in order to improve its recordkeeping process. 
 
58. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should ensure 
that all new regional workshop calendars are posted on the website by 
the first day of every month.      
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SC Works Centers 
 
 
During our review of DEW, we were informed that specific audits of the 
SC Works Centers were not conducted. The SC Works Centers are facilities 
operated throughout the state to provide reemployment services. 
However, the Restructuring & Seven-Year Plan submitted by DEW in 
April 2015 states that DEW’s Audit Services department (internal audit) 
conducts audits and reviews including: 
 
• Operational audits of Workforce Center processes. 
• Financial monitoring reviews of Workforce Centers.  
This could be misleading as a reader may perceive that DEW actually 
conducts audits of the SC Works Centers. 
 
DEW does not track intake data at the workforce centers, although 
customers are initially asked what program they will be using when they 
enter a workforce center. By tracking and monitoring specific services 
provided to individual customers, DEW could better measure its 
effectiveness at assisting customers in finding employment. 
 
 
Recommendations  59. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should ensure 
accuracy in its reporting function.  
 
60. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should track 
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Chapter 7 
 
Overpayments, Collections, and Fraud 
 
 Section 112 of Act 146 of 2010 requires the LAC to examine ways to make 
the unemployment insurance program at the DEW more efficient and 
legally compliant. One aspect of the UI program that increases the 
efficiency and legality of the program is the discovery and recollection 
of improper UI overpayments.  
 
We found that, while the state’s unemployment rate has decreased 34% 
from 6.5% in 2014 to 4.3% in 2017, DEW has had much larger decreases 
in its efforts to identify, and thus collect, overpayments. DEW has no 
documentation or meaningful analysis to demonstrate why these decreases 
have occurred. These decreases include: 
 
 93% in fraud overpayment cases identified from FY 14-15 to FY 17-18. 
 46% in non-fraud overpayment cases identified from FY 14-15 to 
FY 17-18. 
 65% in fraud alerts identified by its main in-house fraud software system 
from calendar years 2014 to 2017. 
 67% in non-fraud alerts identified by its main in-house fraud software 
system from calendar years 2014 to 2017. 
 
We also found that DEW is not: 
 
 Using all fraud computer systems available to it that could improve 
or enhance its identification and collection of overpayment efforts. 
 Consistently answering its fraud hotline and does not have a method 
for callers to leave a message (e.g. a voicemail system). 
 Meeting federal guidelines regarding the agency’s improper payment rate. 
 Publicizing the names of persons convicted of fraud as a deterrent to 
unemployment fraudulent activity. 
 Aggressively prosecuting individuals involved in fraudulent 
overpayments having prosecuted only two cases in the past four years, 
with the last one occurring in FY 16-17. 
 
We also found that DEW is paying a full-time temporary grant position for 
an individual to investigate fraud cases, resulting in only two cases 
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Overpayments occur when claimants receiving unemployment benefits gain 
employment, but do not inform DEW and continue to receive their benefits. 
Claimants are required to stop filing for benefits upon reemployment with 
earnings in excess of their weekly benefit amount. Overpayments may also 
be the result of unreported or under-reported earnings. Some overpayments 
are the result of a lack of understanding on behalf of claimants, while others 
are the result of deliberate fraud.  
 
DEW has several methods to discover overpayments. These include: 
 
 A proprietary fraud algorithm called Barts Fraud X (from private 
company OnPoint Technology, Inc.) runs within DEW’s unemployment 
system (SCUBI). 
 Computer interfaces/cross matches with several government and private 
company databases, listed below. 
 Audit Command Language (ACL) computer program—although agency 
officials stated that this program was rarely used, see page 112. 
 DEW also receives tips via an online portal on its website, email, phone, 
and via mail (this is a small percentage of the leads that DEW receives). 
 
Also, DEW has several computer interfaces to try and discover when one of 
the agency’s claimants has begun a new job. These computer interfaces and 
when they are run include: 
 
 Federal New Hire Database (weekly). 
 State New Hire Database (real time hits). 
 Appriss, Inc., a private company cross match performed on 
presently-incarcerated individuals (weekly). 
 Wage Demand, a cross match of wage information reported by employers 
(run five times a year on wages reported the previous quarter). 
 Social Security Administration (real time). 
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When overpayments are discovered, DEW sends the claimant a letter 
informing them of the overpayment (whether fraudulent or non-fraudulent). 
Claimants are allowed 10 business days from the date of the mailing to 
appeal the overpayment to DEW. Once a decision is reached, claimants can 
repay overpayments through a variety of voluntary and involuntary ways.  
 
These methods include: 
 
 Voluntary payment plan. 
 Voluntary wage withholdings. 
 Involuntary wage withholdings. 
 Involuntary South Carolina state income tax refund confiscation. 
 Involuntary federal income tax refund confiscation. 
 
Voluntary payments stem from a claimant’s acknowledgement and 
agreement that there was an overpayment, and the claimant agrees to 
repay the debt. When a claimant does not agree to repay the overpayment, 
DEW takes action to force collection by the means listed above. 
 
Use of these voluntary and involuntary collection efforts enabled DEW 
to recover several million dollars each year until FY 17-18 of overpaid 
UI claims (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). 
 
DEW classifies overpayments into two categories: non-fraud and fraud. 
Non-fraudulent overpayments are usually the result of an error by the 
claimant whereas fraudulent overpayments are intentionally collected. 
Both non-fraudulent and fraudulent overpayments are subject to the same 
recovery efforts by DEW. Both have seen a decrease in the number and 
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Non-Fraud Overpayments  
Table 7.1 shows the number and amounts of non-fraud overpayments that 
DEW identified for FY 14-15 through FY 17-18. Over this time period, the 
quantity of non-fraudulent overpayments identified by DEW has decreased 
46%, while the state’s unemployment rate has only decreased by 45% over 
this same time period. 
 
 












Source: DEW’s Quarterly Reports to USDOL 
 
 
Fraud Overpayments  
Overpayments of unemployment benefits are considered fraudulent when an 
individual intentionally seeks to receive unemployment insurance knowing 
he/she is not entitled to it. DEW investigators make this determination based 
on claimants either making false statements or intentionally failing to report 
material facts. S.C. Code §41-41-45 requires DEW to add a 33% penalty to 













14‐15  13,436  $9,933,776  ‐‐‐ 
15‐16   8,317  $6,977,036  ‐38% 
16‐17   5,459  $5,429,615  ‐34% 
17‐18   954  $1,298,993  ‐81% 
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Table 7.2 shows the number and amounts of fraudulent overpayments that 
DEW discovered from FY 14-15 through FY 17-18. Over this time period, 
the quantity of fraudulent overpayments identified by DEW has decreased 
93%, which indicates that the number of cases identified most currently 
reported for FY 17-18 is just 7% (954) of what it was in FY 14-15 (13,436), 
while the state’s unemployment rate has decreased by 45% over this same 
time period. It is possible that there is a correlation between the 
unemployment rate and fraud, however, there could be other factors that 
influence these data. 
 
 
Chart 7.3: Fraud Cases Compared 
With S.C. Unemployment Rate 
as of June of Each Year 
 
 
Unemployment rate reported as of June of each year. 
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According to DEW, the reduction in fraud cases was a result of the agency’s 
more effective case management system within SCUBI, by using 
technology and resource allocation. However, DEW could not or did not 
provide us with any of the following: 
 
 Workload reports. 
 Reports showing more overpayment potential cases identified. 
 Documentation of how the better technology works. 
 Documentation of an increase in personnel engaged in identifying and 
stopping overpayments.  
 Data or documentation showing any efforts the agency made to 
accomplish the goal in its strategic plan to meet or exceed USDOL’s 
measures on improper payment rates. 
 
It is not clear what types of technology and resource allocations the agency 
could be referring to without more information from the agency. 
 
DEW reported a large decline in detected fraudulent unemployment 
overpayments was reported for FY 17-18, the year after SCUBI 
implementation.  
 
We identified the following technology and resource utilization items that 
might have influenced the ability of DEW to identify fraud overpayments: 
 
 The implementation of SCUBI and its interface with the BARTS Fraud X 
algorithm. Implementation of new system processes often experience 
operational issues or “bugs” or other integration problems affecting 
system accuracy and output.  
 Changes to how fraud is discovered. All automated alerts have to be 
investigated by a human being and proven to show intent to defraud, 
as a result of updated USDOL guidance to the states. 
 Less emphasis on overpayments and fraud by the agency. 
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DEW has its own collection unit located within the agency that seeks to 
collect debts owed to the agency. If DEW has been unable to recover the 
overpayment in the specified time, the debt is written off as uncollectible. 
Also, DEW has the option to waive the debt if it is not a result of fraud. 
The waiver can occur shortly after the overpayment is determined to be 
non-fraud.  
 




Table 7.4: Rules for Writing Off 






*The written request from the claimant is required and it must be received within 10 days of the 
notice of determination.  
 
Sources: DEW and S.C. Code 
 
 
In order for a claimant to receive a waiver from DEW: 
 
 Overpayment cannot have been a result of fraud.  
 Overpayment had to be made through no fault of the claimant. A no fault 
overpayment would be the result of an agency or employer error. 
 Recovery of the overpayment would have to create a financial hardship on 
the claimant. In considering whether a claimant qualifies for a hardship 
waiver, DEW considers the claimant’s monthly income and monthly 
expenses. 
 
Claimants have to apply for waivers from DEW. Once DEW receives all 
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Table 7.5 shows the amount of non-fraudulent overpayments recovered, 
waived, and written off by DEW for FY 14-15 through FY 17-18 as 
reported to USDOL. 
 
 
Table 7.5: Non-Fraud 
Overpayments Recovered,  
Waived and Written Off, 






14‐15  $4,962,503  $85,717  $262,056 
15‐16  $5,174,203  $64,335  $3,736 
16‐17  $3,555,082  $76,340  $5,136 
17‐18  $1,772,390  $60,009  $1,219 
 
Source: DEW’s Quarterly Reports to USDOL 
 
 
Table 7.6 shows the amount of fraudulent overpayments recovered and 
written off by DEW for FY 14-15 through FY 17-18. 
 
 
Table 7.6: Fraud Overpayments 
Recovered and Written Off, 
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DEW’s only explanation for the large fraud and non-fraud write-offs was 
that those debts were established prior to FY 14-15. This is consistent with 
the significant decrease in number of cases identified, as are listed in 
Table 7.2, which resulted in a decrease from 13,436 in FY 14-15 to 954 
in FY 17-18. DEW wrote the debts off according to the S.C. Code  
§41-41-40(A)(5) which states: 
 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
no action to enforce recovery or recoupment of any 
overpayment may begin after five years from the date 
of the final determination for nonfraudulent 
overpayments nor after eight years from the date of 








In 2014, DEW paid a consultant approximately $700,000 to examine 
agency overpayment recovery efforts. DEW hired the consultant through 
its use of an emergency procurement, which is questionable. 
 
S.C. Regulation 19-445.2110 states that an emergency procurement may be 
used in a “situation which creates a threat to public health, welfare, or safety 
such as may arise by reason of floods, epidemics, riots, equipment failures, 
fire loss, or other such reason....” DEW’s need for assistance regarding ways 
to reduce overpayments does not meet the regulatory definition of an 
emergency. 
 
Among the recommendations that the private consultant recommended was 
that the agency be restructured, and that a new division, the Organizational 
Integrity Division (OID), be created to emphasize finding and collecting 
overpayments, including fraudulent overpayments. The agency implemented 
this recommendation in 2014 and had an OID, which included the Fraud, 
Investigation, Recovery, and Enforcement (FIRE) unit. OID operated for 
approximately two years. The information on Tables 7.5 and 7.6 tend to 
suggest that more fraud was identified and recovered when OID was in 
operation.   
 
DEW management disbanded this division approximately three years ago 
and placed the FIRE unit back under the unemployment insurance division 
at the agency. According to agency officials, the division was disbanded in 
order to put investigators closer to the UI program and to emphasize that 
everyone at the agency is involved in the detection of overpayments and 
fraud. We requested DEW provide us with more information concerning the 
changes in agency structure, the number of employees, and when the 
agency’s structure was changed, but it did not provide such data. 
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During the period OID was in existence, it was awarded a federal grant for 
$150,000 (plus $10,000 provided by DEW) to purchase a computer program 
called Audit Command Language (ACL). A former agency official stated 
that ACL could allow DEW employees to look for trends and anomalies and 
engage in largescale data mining in efforts to combat fraud and 
overpayments.  However, according to agency officials, this program is 
rarely, if ever, used. According to a former DEW official, by not fully 
utilizing the ACL program, DEW may have impaired its collection efforts. 
By not using this program, DEW might not be availing itself of all tools to 
reduce overpayments. Should USDOL audit for grant compliance, DEW’s 
lack of use of ACL may be questioned. 
 
 




DEW’s fraud alerts and the resulting overpayments discovered through its 
in-house computer systems (SCUBI and Fraud X) have decreased 
dramatically over the last four years. The SCUBI computer system and 
Fraud X computer algorithm work together to locate possible alerts of 
claimant overpayments. These alerts are investigated to determine if they 
are valid. 
 
Table 7.7 shows the number of overpayments and the related dollar 
amounts, by year, while Chart 7.8 shows the number of overpayments in 




Table 7.7: Overpayments 
Discovered by Internal 
Computer System 
 
  FRAUD  NON‐FRAUD  TOTAL 
NUMBER  AMOUNT  NUMBER  AMOUNT  NUMBER  AMOUNT 
2014  251  $517,393  156  $51,246  407  $568,639 
2015  328  695,120  124  45,565  452  740,685 
2016  299  468,602  160  62,909  459  531,511 
2017  88  165,348  51  36,615  139  201,963 







 Chapter 7 




 Page 135  LAC/18-1-DEW  Department of Employment and Workforce 
Chart 7.8: Overpayments 
Discovered by Internal Computer 
System Compared With 
S.C. Unemployment Rate 
 
*The UI rate is based on the calendar year average 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
 
 The number of overpayments identified by DEW’s systems decreased 65% 
from 2014 to 2017 while the number of non-fraudulent overpayments 
decreased 67% over the same period. Over that same period, 
South Carolina’s unemployment rate dropped from 6.5% to 4.3%,  
a 34% difference. The drop in unemployment may not be solely responsible 
for the drop in cases flagged for investigation by DEW for potential 
overpayment and/or fraud. Chart 7.8 shows South Carolina’s unemployment 
rate from 2014 to 2017. 
 
DEW stated that the decrease in overpayments established, as well as the 
decrease in dollar amounts in 2017, was due to an effective case 
management system within SCUBI, the use of technology, and resource 
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Fraud Hotline  In addition to DEW’s computer system alerts, DEW obtains tips on potential 
fraud from other sources, such as claimant submissions on DEW’s online 
portal, emails, and letters. However, we did not test DEW’s online portal, 
email, and letter system as we would not have been able to remain 
anonymous as auditors.  
 
DEW has a fraud hotline which individuals can call if they have information 
on someone committing UI fraud. We called DEW’s fraud hotline over the 
course of our audit and found that the phone line was not always answered, 
and no option to leave a message was available. We found: 
 
 After five calls were made during normal business hours, one call was not 
answered after several rings. 
 After five calls were made after normal business hours, the hotline was 
not answered any of those times.  
 In the six times the phone was not answered, there was no option to leave 
a message or directions to otherwise report the potential fraudulent 
activity.  
 
Without setting up the agency’s fraud hotline with the ability to take 
voicemail messages, DEW could miss the opportunity to receive 







The USDOL requires states to be under 10% on improper payments 
(i.e., overpayment rate plus underpayment rate, then subtracting 
overpayments recovered) within each federal fiscal year. The improper 
payment rate is determined by using a quality control statistical survey 
used to identify errors and support corrective action in each state’s 
unemployment program. The survey is administered by DEW’s Benefit 
Accuracy Measurement (BAM) staff. DEW has been over 10% on 
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Table 7.9: DEW’s Improper 
Payment Rate as Reported to 
USDOL, 2014-2017 
 
CY 2014  CY 2015  CY 2016  CY 2017 





DEW could not provide a reasonable explanation for its failure to meet the 
federal standards, but stated that it was currently taking corrective action to 
fix the issue, such as improving the agency’s messaging to claimants and 
employers (for example, the alerts within DEW’s computer system 






In order for a claimant to be prosecuted for fraud, they must receive over 
$2,000 in fraudulent overpayments or have some other substantial factor 
involved in the fraud case (such as fictitious employment). According to 
agency officials, DEW staff have referred 166 cases to the agency’s office 
of general counsel for consideration of prosecution over the last four state 
fiscal years. However, DEW has only prosecuted two of those claimants 
for fraud.  
 
The agency stated that prosecuting individuals for fraud is a lot of effort 
(investigating, going to court proceedings, etc.), and that if the individual is 
found guilty and put on probation that it is harder for the agency to collect 
the money that is owed to the agency. Once a claimant is on probation, 
DEW cannot use any of the other collection methods (such as wage 




The agency also stated that a class-action lawsuit in Michigan (filed in 
2015) regarding automated computer system fraud alerts resulted in USDOL 
providing guidance to states’ employment agencies that they must not create 
and send overpayment letters without investigative human intervention.  
 
DEW stated it hired an individual in January 2016 to help investigate cases 
in conformity with the USDOL guidance (see below), as well as assist in 
prosecuting fraud cases. DEW has presented no evidence that this individual 
works on identifying and pursuing overpayments, short of those being 
determined to be fraud. It is the function of the FIRE group to identify and 
pursue overpayments. After FIRE personnel determine that there is fraud, 
the fraud cases are pursued.  
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Table 7.10 shows the number of prosecutions made by DEW for FY 14-15 
through FY 17-18. 
 
 
Table 7.10: Number of Cases 
Referred for Prosecution by DEW, 











Source: DEW’s Quarterly Reports to USDOL 
 
 
The agency suggests that it would rather focus its efforts on collecting the 
money owed to the agency through federal and state tax refund intercepts, 
wage withholdings, payment plans, etc., rather than prosecute fraud cases.  
 
However, the lack of prosecutions could possibly have the effect of 
incentivizing individuals to commit fraud, as the absence of public notices 
of fraud prosecutions might result in the public thinking that: 
 
 If they commit fraud, it might not be discovered, and if fraud was 
discovered, there may be no penalty and only repayment would be 
required.  
 The individual would know that they would not be faced with any sort 




During our 2010 audit, A Management Review of the S.C. Employment 
Security Commission (the predecessor of DEW), we found that that the 
agency had stopped prosecuting fraudulent overpayments. In our 2012 
report A Management Review of the Department of Employment and 
Workforce, we found that DEW had referred 80 cases to the Office of the 
Attorney General. Currently, the agency has reverted back to not 
prosecuting fraudulent cases. 
 
Along with DEW’s lack of prosecutions, the agency no longer publicizes 
fraud cases. The agency used to list individuals who committed fraud and 
the amounts of the individual’s fraud on one of its webpages on the agency’s 
website. However, the agency no longer does this. If the agency was to once 
again list fraud cases on its website, this could deter individuals from 
committing UI fraud in the future. 
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Fraud Investigator  
As mentioned, DEW employs an individual to perform investigations. 
The individual has been at DEW since 2016. The employee verifies 
probable cause, obtains search warrants, and subpoenas individuals. 
However, given that DEW has only prosecuted 2 of 166 individuals for 
fraud over the last four years, it is unclear if this is the best possible use of 
this employee.  
 
 
Recommendations  61. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should comply 
with state law regarding the use of emergency procurements. 
 
62. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should use the 
fraud finding computer programs that it purchased. 
 
63. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should change 
the agency’s fraud hotline to allow the ability for an informant to 
leave a message during and after normal business hours. 
 
64. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should increase 
its focus on discovering and collecting overpayments back to previous 
levels commensurate with the level of unemployment. 
 
65. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should increase its 
prosecutions of individuals committing unemployment insurance fraud. 
 
66. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should list 
individuals committing unemployment insurance on the agency’s 
website. 
 
67. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should evaluate 
the agency’s use of a fraud investigator to verify if it is the best use of 
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Chapter 8 
 
Management and Administrative Processes 
 





We reviewed DEW’s use of FARS, its financial accounting software, 
pertaining to its recording contingency assessment expenses and found: 
 
 DEW did not have a reconciliation between FARS and SCEIS to 
demonstrate all the expense and revenue transactions that were 
entered into FARS were also entered into SCEIS. 
 No explanation for FARS and SCEIS’ records not matching. 
 Neither FARS nor SCEIS could give the current balance of the 
contingency assessment fund.  
 FARS is the financial accounting system that DEW has audited by an 
independent accounting firm, which conflicts with SCEIS’ status as the 
state’s official accounting system. 
 FARS costs millions to maintain, but DEW could not identify the 
actual cost to maintain the system with any specificity. 
 DEW could not provide analysis comparing the cost of using FARS and 
the cost of buying and using Microsoft Dynamics® AX, a software 
package that would allow DEW to eliminate double accounting entries to 
provide SCEIS the necessary data.  
 DEW is out of compliance with fully using SCEIS, and has not sought 
a computerized solution since 2016. 
 
Use of SCEIS and FARS 
We were asked to review DEW’s use of contingency funds (see Use of 
Funds). We obtained a listing of DEW’s financial records from FARS 
pertaining to these expenses in order to test the expenses for propriety. 
We found DEW uses FARS for its auditable accounts and SCEIS because it 
is the official state accounting system, which DEW is required to use. 
However, we found SCEIS records did not match FARS data as shown in 
Table 8.1. DEW stated the amounts do not agree, by fund, because SCEIS 
does not have the ability to allocate indirect costs per federal guidelines.  
 
An agency official also stated that FARS and SCEIS records do not match 
and that FARS is a better indicator of the current financial information. 
It is unclear why SCEIS’ records do not match FARS’ records. FARS tracks 
indirect costs associated with federal grants, but contingency assessment 
funds are not federal grant funds. No further explanation was provided by 
DEW. DEW recently hired an employee to perform a reconciliation between 
FARS and SCEIS, but did not provide a response to our request for more 
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 At least since FY 15-16, DEW has indicated in budgetary records submitted 
to the General Assembly that the FARS system is reconciled to SCEIS. 
However, DEW is currently making manual adjustments to correct the fund 
level variances and implementing procedures to balance SCEIS and FARS 
fund-level amounts.  
 
 
Table 8.1: FARS and SCEIS 
Contingency Assessment 
Expenditures, 




FISCAL YEAR  FARS  SCEIS  DIFFERENCE 
13‐14  $7,811,736*  $2,578,428  $5,233,308 
14‐15  $7,322,424*  $3,602,599  $3,719,825 
15‐16  $11,380,654*  $6,359,052  $5,021,602 
  16‐17      $8,465,575**  $7,254,346  $1,211,229 
 
*   Audited financial statements. DEW did not respond to our request for FY 17-18 amounts. 
 
**  Unaudited amount. 
 
Sources: DEW, Comptroller General, LAC Calculations 
 
 
No Separate Tracking 
of FARS Indirect 
Grant Costs  
 
DEW implemented FARS software in the 1970s, making it an older 
application that is costly to maintain. An agency official stated that FARS 
costs millions to maintain; however, DEW management informed us that 
FARS costs are not tracked separately within the mainframe, and it cannot 
supply those costs. Therefore, DEW cannot provide a cost comparison 
between keeping FARS and having the SCEIS team build a customized 
financial software module that will allow it to use SCEIS for its grant 
financial requirements for USDOL reporting.  
 
However, DEW provided documentation showing the planned use of 
$2.2 million of federal funds for upgrading the mainframe server for FARS 
from FY 12-13 through FY 16-17. A customized module in SCEIS would 
decrease the likelihood of errors by eliminating the keying of double 
accounting entries and would eliminate mainframe costs. It would also 
allow DEW the ability to provide current, accurate financial records as it 
could not provide the current balance of the contingency assessment fund 
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Agency Not Compliant 









S.C. Code §11-53-20 requires state agencies, with certain exceptions, to use 
SCEIS. SCEIS was designed to standardize business processes for 
cost-effectiveness and efficiency. However, DEW also uses FARS for its 
financial accounting. DEW explored the possibility of replacing FARS and 
requested approval from the Office of the Comptroller General to purchase 
Microsoft Dynamics® AX software. This software would correct SCEIS’ 
deficiencies in tracking federal grant funding. DEW’s request was denied 
in late 2016 because it was not consistent with SCEIS’ objective of 
maintaining one shared enterprise-wide system. The denial letter explained 
that the SCEIS team is committed to building a comparable program, 
tailored to DEW’s specific needs, and suggested that DEW submit a project 
request to the SCEIS Executive Oversight Committee that handles software 
changes in SCEIS. DEW has not pursued any changes to its financial 
software after receiving the denial in 2016 for the purchase of the 
Microsoft® product. 
 
The Department of Administration (DOA) documented the estimated costs 
of approximately $1.7 million to add Microsoft Dynamics® AX software to 
SCEIS. DOA also made a comparison between Microsoft Dynamics® AX 
and the module SCEIS would create which showed that SCEIS would have 
comparable functionality, but would require additional information from 
DEW.  
 
A DEW official voiced concerns over the costs involved with the tailored 
program from DOA and, with it being a state agency, felt there would be no 
legal recourse if the work was not acceptable. DEW continues to be out of 
compliance with having all its financial transactions input to SCEIS to 
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68. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should submit 
a project request to the SCEIS Executive Oversight Committee 
to collaborate on a solution for the replacement of the 
Financial Accounting and Reporting System. 
 
69. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should enter all 
contingency assessment-related transactions into SCEIS. 
 
70. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should complete 
a monthly reconciliation of all contingency-related accounting 
transactions between FARS and SCEIS to ensure the accuracy of 
transactions entered into each system.  
 
71. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should produce 
a balance for the contingency assessment, both monthly and annually, 
for the use of its management staff, outside auditors, and reporting to 
the Legislature.  
 
72. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should comply 
with state law S.C. Code §11-53-20, which requires most agencies 
to use SCEIS, for all of its financial recordkeeping.  
 
 
Human Resources  We reviewed human resources at the Department of Employment and 
Workforce (DEW) to evaluate hiring practices and employee turnover, 
particularly in executive positions. We also reviewed the internal audit 
function. We found: 
 
 Organizational changes to executive positions were made over the past 
six years, reducing the number of assistance executive directors from 
eight to five. 
 DEW does not formally and regularly track employee turnover, but 
provided the employee turnover rates for FY 10-11 through FY 17-18.  
 The internal audit function at DEW does not report to the proper 
authority, which should be the Executive Director. 
 DEW’s internal audit department, consisting of three positions, has had 
no employees since December 2018. The three employees resigned 
during the previous two months. 
 There were omissions and outdated information in employment data 
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Employee Turnover  
Although DEW stated it does not regularly track employee turnover, the 
human resources department provided employee turnover rates for FY 10-11 
through FY 17-18 upon our inquiry. We found that turnover rates were 
highest in FY 12-13, when DEW had a major reduction in force, at 41% and 
in FY 17-18 at 19% as shown in Table 8.2. 
 
DEW does not analyze the data it has regarding employee turnover. 
Therefore, it remains unaware if it has a turnover problem. By accumulating 
and analyzing employee turnover data, DEW would be in a position to take 
corrective action, which may lead to preventing the loss of institutional 
knowledge. This has been a concern, as noted in a report by an independent 
consultant contracted by DEW (see Reports Issued by Other Agencies).  
 
 





















*  DEW had a major reduction in workforce in FY 12-13 due to budgetary constraints. 
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We reviewed executive turnover at DEW and found there was a pattern of 
organizational changes over a short period. Since FY 10-11, there have been 
four executive directors, excluding interim directors. DEW’s current 
Executive Director was appointed by the Governor in April 2019; the 
previous Executive Director left the position in December 2018. 
We reviewed executive staff positions, other than the Executive Director, 
from FY 10-11 to FY 17-18 and found that 59% had held the position no 
more than five years, as shown in Table 8.3 and Chart 8.4, which has 
contributed to a lack of institutional knowledge. 
 
DEW made changes to its organizational structure throughout the past six 
years, reducing the number of assistant executive directors (AED) from 
eight to five and transferring those duties to other areas. DEW attributed the 
changes to a desire for the agency to have mission divisions for workforce 
and unemployment, administrative services, and legal services and to align 
with the overall reduction in agency staff.  
 
We reviewed the reductions and found staffing was reduced by 
294 employees between November 2012 and June 2013, with the UI 
division losing 127 employees and the Reemployment division losing 
121 employees. The three AED positions eliminated included: 
 
INTERNAL AUDIT 
Now under the finance and assurance department (see Internal Audit 
Function Independence). 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING 
Moved to the workforce and economic development division that was later 




After the resignation of the AED, DEW stated there was concern that the 
division had become too segmented and had lost sight of core 
unemployment knowledge. The FIRE (Fraud, Investigation, Recover, 
and Enforcement) and BAM (Benefits Accuracy Measurement) units were 
returned to the UI division; CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) 
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While we could not determine the impact of these changes, it is known that 
organizational changes have advantages and disadvantages. 
 
 
Table 8.3: Executive Staff 

























* A new Executive Director began at the end of FY 12-13. 
 
Sources: Department of Administration and LAC Analysis 
 
 
Chart 8.4: Executive Staff Years 
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We were informed that the internal audit department was not given 
sufficient authority to audit, hindering the ability to effectively perform the 
job. We found that the organizational placement of the internal audit 
function within DEW does not report to the proper authority, which should 
be the Executive Director. The internal audit manager reports to the chief 
financial officer, the same person who is over the employee 
administratively. The reporting relationship affects internal audit’s 
independence and scope of work. The organizational placement of the audit 
activity should have sufficient safeguards to prevent interference with 
internal audit’s ability to perform its work and report the results objectively. 
Without independence, the internal audit function loses effectiveness. 
 
DEW internal auditors had conducted a risk assessment for 2017, but the 
internal audits conducted had been only those that were mandated by 
USDOL—the risk assessment had not been the basis for determining which 
internal audits to conduct, as it should have been. Normally, internal 
auditors conduct risk assessments and assign a level of risk—high, medium, 
or low—to each area and focus on auditing areas with the most risk. 
The internal audits identified two areas with very high risk, however, 
internal audits of these areas were not conducted. 
 
Near the end of 2018, there were no employees in the internal audit 
department at DEW. The five positions were vacated between August 1, 
2018, through November 1, 2018. The vacancies remained as of 













We requested DEW employment records from the S.C. Department of 
Administration (DOA) for FY 09-10 through FY 17-18, which DOA pulled 
from SCEIS. We found there were some errors and omissions in 
employment data DEW entered into SCEIS. A representative from DOA 
stated its records indicate data as it is entered by DEW. We found examples 
of omitted hire dates and a former employee listed as having a supervisor 
hired after the employee’s departure. Without accurate and complete data 
entered by DEW, the credibility of state employment records maintained in 
SCEIS is compromised. Finding inaccuracies and omissions within a small 
amount of data brings into question whether DEW may have also submitted 
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73. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should track 
and monitor employee turnover.  
 
74. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should carefully 
analyze and document the impact of major organizational changes. 
 
75. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should fully 
staff and support its internal audit department. 
 
76. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should have the 
internal audit manager report directly to the Executive Directive. 
 
77. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should submit 











We reviewed reports issued by other state, federal, and private agencies 
regarding the Department of Employment and Workforce. We found: 
 
 The FY 16-17 report of DEW’s financial statements had not been released 
by the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) as of June 2019, and is the latest 
audit report in at least the past ten years. 
 The FY 17-18 OSA’s audit report of the unemployment compensation 
fund (the Trust Fund) identified six material weaknesses. In prior years, 
only one material weakness was identified and none had been identified 
in the prior three years. 
 DEW had not fully implemented two recommendations made in the 
OSA’s FY 16-17 audit report of the Trust Fund by OSA. 
 The tax collections function has failed Tax Performance System (TPS) 
review since 2011, requiring DEW to have a corrective action plan each 
year since 2013. 
 DEW’s responses in the TPS corrective action plan for each area were 
very similar to each other and were general in nature with no specific 
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 USDOL, in examining DEW’s review of its TPS, could not conclude that 
DEW had performed the review correctly. This is because USDOL 
indicated DEW could not provide the appropriate documents and 
personnel appeared to lack understanding of the review process.  
 A mid-2018 report of DEW by an independent consulting firm had several 
findings and recommendations for improvement of financial operations. 
However, DEW has not implemented the recommendations and has stated 
that it has no interest in doing so in the future. 
 
 
State Auditor Reports  
OSA conducts annual audits of DEW, using staff or a contracted public 
accounting agency, and releases two separate audit reports: 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FUND 
AGENCY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 
There are two categories which are used by auditors to determine the impact 
a finding may have: 
 
Material Weakness 
A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control, such that 
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s 
financial statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a 
timely basis. It is a severe form of finding identified by auditors. 
 
Significant Deficiency 
A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control that is 
less severe than a material weakness yet important enough to merit 
attention by those charged with governance. 
 
Delay in FY 16-17 Financial Statement Audit Report 
As of June 2019, the audit report of DEW’s FY 16-17 financial statements 
had not been released, which is nearly two years after the end of the 
fiscal year. Based on prior audit release dates, it is feasible that the 
FY 17-18 report on the audited financial statements could have been 










 Chapter 8 




 Page 151  LAC/18-1-DEW  Department of Employment and Workforce 
Table 8.5 illustrates that all of the release dates for audits completed in the 
last ten years have all been released within 11 months of the end of the 
fiscal year under review. It is unclear why the FY 16-17 financial statement 
audit has taken nearly two years and is still not issued. Employee turnover in 
DEW’s finance department may also have contributed to the delay in the 
completion of the financial audit. We saw no evidence that the auditors 




Table 8:5: Release Dates for 
State Auditor’s Reports on 




























*  The FY 16-17 report on the audited financial statements 
had not been published as of June 2019.  
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 Review of Trust Fund Audit Reports 
In reviewing the contracted CPA firm’s audit of DEW’s Trust Fund, 
we found that the FY 17-18 audit report of the Trust Fund identified 
six material weaknesses, whereas there had only been one material 
weakness identified in FY 16-17 and none in the three years prior as 
shown in Table 8.6.  
 
The FY 17-18 audit of the unemployment Trust Fund found that two 
recommendations identified in the FY 16-17 audit report had not been 
fully implemented by DEW: 
 
 In FY 16-17, the allowance for uncollectible accounts was not estimated 
in accordance with policy (material weakness) causing the allowance to 
be underestimated by $32,637,005. The FY 17-18 report indicates that 
DEW had computed the allowance based on the policy, yet it was 
overstated by $5,265,761 due to bad debt recoveries during the year. 
Therefore, DEW management agreed to accept the state auditor’s 
recommendation to revise the policy and compute the allowance based on 
historical collection rates and write-off history.  
 
o Underestimating the allowance may result in DEW having less 
revenue available than was collected for UI taxes during the year and 
may cause DEW to run short of funds needed to pay UI claims, 
having to depend on the Trust Fund reserve to cover shortages. 
The allowance for uncollectible accounts reduces the total receivables 
(revenue) reported to reflect only the amounts expected to be paid, 
so if it is understated, then revenue is overstated.  
 
 The general ledger did not have a subsidiary ledger function, leading to 
year-end adjustments (significant deficiency), which means that 
assessments receivable are not being evaluated for accuracy and to 
determine the collectability of employer debt before year-end. 
 
o An accounts receivable subsidiary ledger shows the account status 
and amounts owed by each employer or claimant at any point in time. 
Without referring to an updated accounts receivable subsidiary ledger 
throughout the year, DEW is not able to adequately track employer 
UI tax payments and claimant reimbursement payments which are due 
in order to determine the length of time debt has remained unpaid. 
Using the length of time a debt has remained unpaid and attempting to 
collect the debt sooner rather than later may allow DEW to see an 
increase in revenue collected and a decrease in the amount of debt 
written off as uncollectible. The longer a debt is unpaid, the more 
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Number of Material Weaknesses (MW)   6  1  0  0  0 







































      X   
 
*  Accounts that have been deemed to be uncollectible are not written off on a consistent basis. 
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United States 
Department of Labor 
Report on the Tax 
Performance System 
 
The TPS program is part of UI Performs, a comprehensive performance 
system in which federal reviewers annually assess whether state 
employment agencies are accurate in handling their processes of benefit 
charging to employers, collections of taxes owed, contributions assessed, 
etc. (see measurements below).  
 
The USDOL conducted a required monitoring review of DEW’s TPS 
program for calendar year 2015, which was originally completed by DEW 
internal audit staff, as is the normal procedure. USDOL’s policy is to 
conduct a monitoring review every four years. The federal review team was 
able to confirm the accuracy of DEW’s reviews in two areas, but was unable 
to confirm accuracy in several other areas as shown in Table 8.7.   
 
DEW could not provide the necessary documentation in some cases and, 
most concerning to the federal review team, DEW’s reviewers appeared to 
lack understanding of the processes for the TPS review.  Therefore, USDOL 
could not conclude that DEW had properly conducted the TPS review or 
that the state’s unemployment insurance tax system was running as 
effectively and efficiently as possible. The review team’s report, issued 
February 2018 by USDOL, requested that DEW provide a response within 
45 days of receipt; however, DEW did not provide a response until nearly a 
year later, on January 18, 2019. DEW’s responses for each area were very 
similar to each other and were general in nature with no specific actions that 
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Table 8.7: Monitoring Review of 
DEW’s 2015 TPS Program by the 















































*   Includes three sub-areas: New, Successor, and Inactive employers. 
 
**  The Collections function has failed TPS review since 2011, requiring DEW to have a 
corrective action plan each year since 2013 (after three consecutive years of failing, a 
corrective action plan is required until a passing score is received).  
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Independent Consultant 
Report on Financial 
Forecasting 
 
DEW hired an independent consulting firm, Iknow LLC, in late 2017 at a 
cost of approximately $10,000 to evaluate the agency’s financial forecasting 
tools and processes. Table 8.7 summarizes the findings from the 
consultant’s report issued in May. The consultants noted the following:  
 
 DEW used an Excel spreadsheet to prepare its cash flow forecasts on a 
monthly basis, a manual process which is time-consuming and subject to 
error.  
 DEW’s former director implemented the practice of management 
reporting binders for output reports, but admitted to not fully 
understanding all reports due to the complexity of some reporting metrics. 
 DEW management cited concerns with large variations that had been 
experienced with the monthly projections which contributed to a lack of 
confidence in the accuracy.  
 
The consultant advised DEW that commercial, off-the-shelf forecasting 
software should not be purchased until DEW had conducted modeling and 
forecasting requirements and recommended that DEW: 
 
 Conduct a business analysis/research project to: 
o Identify causes of expense variability; 
o Define the optimal kinds of approaches for the various expense 
categories; 
o Build a prototype using Microsoft Excel® and run the prototype for 
approximately six months to assess and refine the models; 
o Prepare detailed recommendations for implementation; 
o Develop comprehensive documentation which will create standardized 
DEW policies and practices for forecasting. 
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The consultant concluded that the variability in DEW’s financial forecasting 
was caused by lack of appropriate models and incorrect simplifying 
assumptions as they were not detailed enough. Upon our inquiry of the 
status of implementation or planned implementation of the 
recommendations, DEW informed us that no actions had been taken on the 
recommendations in the consultant’s report by stating: 
A brief [management] meeting was held to discuss 
the report, but the report failed to provide any 
information that was not already known by 
management. Because there were no value added 
recommendations in the report, none have been 
implemented. 
 
However, it appears the Iknow report had valid recommendations to assist 
DEW in being better prepared to select forecasting software that would best 
suit its needs. The scope of work DEW included in its request for quotes, 
indicates that DEW was concerned with its financial forecasting process and 
was seeking assistance for improvement. The scope of work for the project 
included: 
 
 Meet with executive management and staff to gain an understanding of 
DEW’s cash forecasting and other executive financial reporting needs. 
 Review the current cash forecasting and other executive financial 
reporting tools and processes in order to gain an understanding of the 
approaches taken and the information provided relative to the executive 
reporting needs identified. 
 Evaluate the tools, methods, techniques, and assumptions currently 
applied in the forecasting and executive financial processes used by DEW 
and develop best practices recommendations that DEW should consider in 
an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of those processes. 
 
DEW’s response that there was no value-added information indicates the 
agency was aware of the steps needed to be taken to best determine what 
financial forecasting model it needed, but it appears DEW was not able to 
complete those steps without the assistance of a consultant. However, 
DEW has provided no indication it has taken any of the steps or has any 
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*  Without having processes documented, the high employee turnover in the Finance 
Department in the 18 months prior to the review led to a lack of institutional memory. 
 




Upon review of various reports of DEW, there are recurring themes of a 
failure to provide requested documentation, a lack of documentation, and 
concerns with its operating effectiveness and efficiency. DEW management 
has not been proactive in implementing recommendations presented by 
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78. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should evaluate 
its revenue forecasting and determine if it is a critical component of its 
financial operation. 
 
79. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should implement 
recommendations from the Iknow report if it has determined revenue 
forecasting to be a critical need, and should implement the remaining 
recommendations from the FY 16-17 Office of the State Auditor’s audit 








We reviewed DEW’s participation in conducting tax performance system 
(TPS) audits, a review required by USDOL that the agency performs. 
We found that: 
 
 DEW staff were told by management not to provide responses to a 2017 
annual audit report of the TPS conducted by DEW’s internal audit staff, 
the results of which are reported to USDOL. 
 USDOL performed a monitoring review of DEW’s 2015 annual TPS 
report and could not confirm its accuracy in five of the seven areas 
reviewed (see Reports issued by Other Agencies). The monitoring review 
is conducted every four years by USDOL as part of its oversight efforts. 
 One of the thirteen areas did not pass the review of the 2017 TPS. 
 Collections has not passed an annual internal audit evaluation since 2011, 
requiring corrective plans since 2013.  
 
Table 8.9 identifies the areas the agency is required by USDOL to include in 






 Chapter 8 




 Page 160  LAC/18-1-DEW  Department of Employment and Workforce 






















*  Collections area has not passed an annual TPS internal audit evaluation since 2011, 
requiring corrective plans since 2013. 
 
Source: DEW’s 2017 Annual TPS Report 
 
 
We reviewed the final report and found that each management 
response was vague and had been repeated throughout the audit report. 
Although the auditors made 17 distinct recommendations, DEW made 
only 7 vague, uniform responses, with an additional sentence in the response 
for the collections area and no response for the report delinquency area. 
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Table 8.10: Example of TPS Recommendations 
 


































































































































































* Collections area has not passed an annual TPS internal audit evaluation since 2011, requiring corrective plans since 2013. 
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 We would have expected management’s responses to outline how the 
implementation of SUITS and any other plans management has to address 
subpar collections performance, in order to receive a passing score in 
collections for the next audit. With such vague responses, during the next 
audit, it would be impossible for auditors to conclude if the 
recommendations were implemented. 
 
We also found that the following impactful paragraph from the draft, which 
DEW provided before the report was finalized, regarding Contribution 
Report Processing had been omitted in the final report: 
 
Inaccurate SOAs [Statement of Accounts] defeat the 
purpose for which these are prepared. These SOAs 
are issued to provide accurate and up-to-date records 
of individual employer-account transactions. If these 
documents are not prepared accurately there is no 
confidence in the value of these documents or 
confirmation that the Contributions Report 
Processing function maintains accurate quarterly 
reports. That could mean that money which is owed 
to SCDEW will not be billed and therefore will not 
be collected. Collectively, this presents an 






80. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should evaluate its 
collection efforts to determine its effectiveness and implement plans for 






 Chapter 8 








DEW dedicates the top portion of its website’s homepage to place important 
announcements for users. However, DEW’s homepage does not allow for 
the user to view all announcements across the top banner without waiting 
for them to automatically cycle through. Currently, a user has to remain on 
the homepage and wait for the various messages to automatically cycle 
through or revisit the homepage to see if a different announcement appears. 
The homepage could be improved by allowing the user to select button 
options to cycle through all announcements.  
 
We also found that DEW’s website is not updated regularly, which could 
lead to confusion. For example: 
 
 DEW posts advance notices when its unemployment insurance tax 
computer system, SUITS, will be down for maintenance, but does not 
delete the message immediately after the date has passed. 
 
 As of late January 2019, the homepage made reference to the new tax 
rates for 2018, which were not the current rates. This was also the case 
in early April 2019. 
 
 The webpage containing a listing of job fairs around the state included 
several job fairs which had ended. In one case, a job fair that was held on 
May 15, 2019 was still listed on the job fairs’ website as of June 12, 2019. 
 
 DEW did not upload its October 2018 Midlands regional workshop 
calendar in a timely manner. As of October 9, 2018, the October Midlands 
regional workshop calendar was not posted on DEW’s website to replace 
the September calendar (see SC Works Regional Workshop Calendars). 
 
 
Additionally, we found that several data links were to outdated information 
or were not functional. For example: 
 
 On the video resources webpage, clicking on the links to the video for 
how to create an account and how to file your weekly claim returned a 
YouTube webpage that stated the videos were unavailable. Links to three 
other video tutorials worked.   
 
 On DEW’s forms webpage, clicking on the link to the form to request an 
appeal of your UI claim (APP-100) returned a result that stated that the 
resource could not be found. Also, on DEW’s frequently asked questions 
webpage for exemptions from UI coverage, the links to the forms for 
corporate officers or owners to apply for an exemption (UCE-1050 and 
UCE-1060) resulted in a “404-file or directory not found” message.  
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DEW is a customer service-oriented agency and documents, such as the 
form to request an appeal, are time-sensitive. While the information cited in 
the links was on DEW’s website, and we were able to locate it through other 
web searches, visitors to DEW’s website may encounter broken links and 
may not try to search for the information other ways or may assume the 
information is no longer available. This can result in frustration for the 






81. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should revise 
its website to allow a user to cycle through all announcements on its 
homepage. 
 
82. The S.C. Department of Employment and Workforce should regularly 
review its webpage to address any broken links and ensure that the 







We are in a position to evaluate some of the operational issues that we 
repeatedly encountered having conducted three previous management 
reviews of DEW. 
 
A Management Review of the South Carolina Employment Security 
Commission 
(2010) 
A Management Review of the Department of Employment and Workforce 
(2012) 
A Management Review of the Department of Employment and Workforce 
(2014) 
 
We find the following regarding some fundamental operational issues where 
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ESC referred for prosecution approximately $98,000 (less than 1%) of 
approximately $10.2 million in fraudulent overpayments from FY 06-07 and 
FY 07-08. ESC had stopped referring claimants for criminal prosecution and 
the last cases referred for prosecution were in February 2008. Claimants 
defrauded the agency out of $7.3 million.  
 
2012 
DEW struck an agreement with the South Carolina attorney general and 
selected 195 cases for prosecution totaling $2.7 million out of 1,844 cases 




DEW did not pursue approximately $15 million in potential fraud or 
overpayments due to a failure to receive wage audit notices from employers 
(the wage audit notice assists DEW in determining whether overpayments or 
fraud have occurred).  
 
2019 
DEW has essentially stopped prosecutions for fraud, having prosecuted only 







ESC does not track claimants who are most likely to exhaust benefits to 
determine if they have obtained employment. Also, DEW has not measured 
the effectiveness of its federally required Worker Profiling and Reenactment 
Services system, which requires agencies to use a system to identify 
claimants who are most likely to exhaust benefits.   
 
2012 
DEW is not adequately measuring the effectiveness of its services and that 
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2014 
DEW is unable to determine whether its REA program services are effective 
at returning people to work. DEW can do more to assess the effectiveness of 
its services on particular population groups, such as veterans, less-educated 
workers, and older workers.   
 
2019 
The performance measures used by DEW do not capture the effectiveness of 







External auditors cited ESC for not maintaining accounting records in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 
considered it a “material weakness” The weaknesses cited by the auditor 
included that the agency did not properly post adjusting entries, maintain 
complete trial balances, and recognized revenue in the wrong year.  
 
2019 
External auditors identified six material weaknesses in the audit of the 
unemployment Trust Fund for FY 17-18. DEW has failed its Tax 
Performance System reviews since 2011, requiring corrective action plans 
for USDOL. Also, DEW has not implemented recommendations from an 
independent consulting firm for improvement of financial operations and 
has stated it has no interest in doing so. Lastly, DEW is double keying some 
of its financial information into both SCEIS, the state’s accounting system 
and FARS, its legacy accounting system, and has not sought a solution to 
this problem since 2016. The Department of Administration has indicated it 
could create software to solve the assertion by DEW that SCEIS does not 
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Chapter 9 
 
Implementation Status of Prior 
LAC Recommendations 
 
 We reviewed seven of the recommendations made in the Legislative Audit 
Council’s May 2014 report titled A Management Review of the Department 
of Employment and Workforce because they were the most relevant to 
DEW’s processes related to measuring outcomes of its effectiveness of 
putting people back to work.  
 
We found that two recommendations were implemented and five 














The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should promulgate 
regulations pursuant to the South 
Carolina Administrative 
Procedures Act regarding its 






In our 2014 review, we found that DEW did not promulgate regulations for 
policies that have general applicability to the public, as required by the 
South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. S.C. Code §41-29-110 
states that DEW must promulgate regulations to carry out its duties. 
The law also requires claimants to actively seek work in order to be eligible 
for unemployment insurance benefits. DEW’s policies of requiring 
claimants to make four job contacts a week in order to be eligible for 
unemployment insurance payments and requiring them to conduct at least 
one job contact a week on the South Carolina Works Online System 
(SCWOS) website was not put into regulations.  
 
In our current follow-up review, we found that, effective May 2017, 
S.C. Regulation 47-104 requires that an active search for work includes at 
least two (2) job searches during one week, conducted through the 
SCWOS. The job search requirement may be waived for good cause, 
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The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should incorporate 
a comprehensive wage analysis 
as part of its evaluation protocol 
for both Wagner-Peyser and 
Workforce Investment Act 





In our 2014 review, we found that DEW did not incorporate a 
comprehensive wage analysis as part of its evaluation protocol for 
Wagner-Peyser and Workforce Investment Act (WIA) participants.  
 
In our current follow-up review, we found that DEW provided performance 
data collected on average earnings and retention rate for the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) and Wagner-Peyser participants for Program Year 
2015, along with median earnings for participants in Program Years 2016 
and 2017. However, it did not provide documentation to show that a 
comprehensive wage analysis report and findings were published annually.  
 
A wage analysis report would explain, for example, why a veteran’s average 
earnings in six-months totaled $11,511 in the Lower Savannah region, 
but totaled $17,035 in the Pee Dee region, along with a review of the factors 
that may explain variances, such as supply and demand of labor of particular 
jobs or industry sectors. To be a meaningful analysis, the type and amount 
of training, if any, must be included in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 






The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should perform 
wage analysis on key population 
subgroups of its participant 
population, including veteran 




In our 2014 review, in conjunction with the Office of Research and Statistics 
(ORS) of the former Budget and Control Board, we conducted a wage 
analysis to determine the effect of DEW’s reemployment services on 
program participants’ earnings to determine whether participants earned 
more after receiving reemployment services. We analyzed data based on 
age, education level, veteran status, disability status, and whether they were 
receiving unemployment insurance benefits at the time they were receiving 
Wagner-Peyser services. We found that: 
 
 Those who received intensive services, on average, benefitted from a 
higher percentage of earnings change than did the core and self-service 
participants, whether participants were receiving unemployment benefits 
or not. 
 Those who received services with the assistance of a work center staff 
were receiving core services. 
 Self-service participants relied on no staff assistance at all. 
 
In our current follow-up review, DEW did not provide documentation to 
show that a wage analysis was conducted on key population subgroups to 
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DEW did provide one table that depicted total employment, percent of total 
employment, and the average hourly wage, by region, in the state, as well as 
statistics on groups with barriers to employment from various sources, 
including the U.S. Census Bureau, S.C. Department of Corrections, and a 
non-governmental organization called DisabilityStatistics.org. This is, 
however, not a wage analysis which should show the effect that specific 
types of training, provided by DEW specifically, had on subgroup earnings 
(as opposed to statistics from regional and national groups, not specific to 
efforts by DEW in South Carolina).  
 
These compiled statistics do not provide DEW with any insight as to the 
variances in wages by subgroups, or the reasons for the variances and does 
not correlate types of training and other services to the wage amounts or 
other labor market conditions.  
 
DEW also provided us with a document from Program Year 2015, which 
lists average earnings and employment retention rate in South Carolina. 
According to a DEW official, this information is reported to USDOL. This 
does not demonstrate that a wage analysis was performed on any subgroup 






The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should revise its 
evaluation of service recipients to 
determine if those receiving 
intensive services are retaining 
employment for longer periods 
than those receiving core or no 





In our 2014 review, we recommended that DEW revise its evaluation of 
service recipients to determine if those receiving intensive services are 
retaining employment for longer periods than those receiving core or 
no staff-assisted services at all.  
 
In our current follow-up review, we found that, in Program Year 2015, 
DEW collected data on the retention rate of those categorized under 
Wagner-Peyser. However, DEW did not provide documentation to show 
that evaluations of service recipients were conducted to determine if those 
receiving intensive Wagner-Peyser services are retaining employment for 
longer periods of time than those receiving core or no staff-assisted services. 
 
Under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) performance 
accountability provisions, which took effect on July 1, 2016 and superseded 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, retention rates were no 
longer required to be tracked. This data should continue to be helpful to 
DEW, as drops in retention of employment could go unnoticed if this metric 
is not tracked. Knowledge of changes to this rate would alert DEW and 
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The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should analyze the 
duration of unemployment for 
Wagner-Peyser participants 
receiving core and intensive 
services. When the unemployment 
duration for those receiving 
services is longer than for those 
not receiving services, DEW 
should conduct analysis to 
determine the factors causing the 





In our 2014 review, we found that those receiving intensive services 
remained on unemployment longer, on average, compared to those receiving 
core or no staff-assisted services. This was contrary to the expected result 
that providing reemployment services should shorten duration of 
unemployment insurance (UI). We concluded that, without further analysis 
by DEW, it is unclear that the cost of the investment in intensive services is 
offset by the longer-term benefit of higher earnings and/or longer periods of 
sustained, gainful employment.  
 
In our current follow-up review, DEW cited various factors that influence 
the unemployment duration for individuals, such as barriers to entry 
(e.g. lack of certifications, lack of education, difficulty reading, etc.), 
which necessitate the need for skill upgrades and training. However, when 
asked, DEW did not show that it has implemented a process to analyze the 
duration of unemployment for Wagner-Peyser participants receiving core 
and intensive services and, therefore, did not provide source documentation 







Once the data and methodological 
issues have been addressed, the 
Department of Employment and 
Workforce should compare 
duration of unemployment 
insurance benefits between those 
participating in Reemployment 
and Eligibility Assessment (REA) 
and those not participating. If the 
duration is found to be longer for 
those receiving services than for 
those not receiving services, the 
department should evaluate its 
reemployment services to 
determine how they can be made 





In our 2014 review, we found that DEW experienced data issues in 
measuring the effectiveness of the Reemployment and Eligibility 
Assessment (REA), which was a program designed to reduce the duration of 
unemployment benefits for individuals who were determined most likely to 
exhaust their unemployment benefits. Therefore, DEW was unable to 
determine whether the REA services contributed to a more positive outcome 
than the outcome experienced by those not participating in the program.  
 
According to a report DEW filed with the USDOL at that time, most 
participants receiving REA services experienced longer periods of 
unemployment insurance (UI) duration than claimants in a comparison 
group with similar barriers to entry who did not receive services. This 
conflicted with one of DEW’s strategic goals, which was to demonstrate 
shorter duration of UI benefits for claimants receiving REA services.  
 
Since FY 15, REA has been replaced with a new but similar program called 
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA). Like REA, 
RESEA is a program designed to help claimants who are most likely to 
exhaust their unemployment benefits to reenter the workforce quicker 
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In our current review, we found that DEW has not conducted a comparison 
of the duration of unemployment insurance benefits between those 
participating in RESEA and a control group of individuals with similar 
barriers to entry who are not participating (see Chapter 5). A DEW official 
stated that the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) does not require a 
comparison group study of the RESEA program. Additionally, DEW stated 
that, because the RESEA program serves the claimants who are most likely 
to exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits and may have potential 
barriers to reemployment, comparing both groups would not give an 
accurate picture of the effectiveness of the program.  
 
However, comparing and reporting statistics on these individuals who 
receive RESEA services could provide a more accurate picture of program 
effectiveness. Even though conducting a comparison between both groups is 
not required by USDOL, it may provide useful data on periods of duration 






The Department of Employment 
and Workforce should develop 
policies and procedures 
governing its redesigned Wagner-
Peyser service delivery model that 
allows users in the workforce 
center and in the main office to 
access key information necessary 
for implementation. At a minimum, 
the manual should include 
information on staffing and 
procedures for identifying and 







In our 2014 review, we found that DEW did not have policies and 
procedures governing its redesigned Wagner-Peyser service delivery model 
that allowed users in the workforce centers and in the main office to access 
key information necessary for implementation. The materials that DEW 
provided contained no table of contents or index to which workforce center 
or main office staff could easily refer in order to ensure efficient and 
effective implementation of reemployment services to those who needed 
help finding employment.  
 
In our current follow-up review, we found that, as of January 2018, DEW 
developed its own Employment Services Manual, which identifies staff 
responsibilities and the procedures that staff should undergo to identify and 
assist those with barriers to employment. The manual communicates the 
career services offered to jobseekers to help them access key information 
necessary for reemployment, both in-person and off-site, including career 
guidance, job referrals, individual assessments, and resume assistance.  
 
The manual also includes a table of contents, with topics indexed to the 
corresponding page, which staff can refer to in order to ensure effective 
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Appendix A 
 
Comparison of Contingency Tax to  
Trust Fund Tax Ratios 
 
 
















$84  1  0.000  $0  $0:$0 
$84  2  0.028  $395  $1:$5 
$84  3  0.031  $440  $1:$5 
$84  4  0.035  $489  $1:$6 
$84  5  0.039  $542  $1:$6 
$84  6  0.043  $603  $1:$7 
$84  7  0.048  $669  $1:$8 
$84  8  0.053  $743  $1:$9 
$84  9  0.059  $827  $1:$10 
$84  10  0.066  $918  $1:$11 
$84  11  0.073  $1,021  $1:$12 
$84  12  0.081  $1,134  $1:$14 
$84  13  0.097  $1,361  $1:$16 
$84  14  0.177  $2,484  $1:$30 
$84  15  0.197  $2,759  $1:$33 
$84  16  0.219  $3,066  $1:$37 
$84  17  0.243  $3,406  $1:$41 
$84  18  0.270  $3,786  $1:$45 
$84  19  0.300  $4,206  $1:$50 
$84  20  0.540  $7,560  $1:$90 
 
* FORMULA — Multiply the taxable wage base ($14,000) by the contingency (0.006). 
** FORMULA — Divide the trust fund levy amount by $84. 
*** Includes base rate and solvency surcharge amounts. 
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$84  1  0.000  $0  $0:$0 
$84  2  0.036  $504  $1:$6 
$84  3  0.040  $560  $1:$7 
$84  4  0.044  $616  $1:$7 
$84  5  0.049  $686  $1:$8 
$84  6  0.055  $770  $1:$9 
$84  7  0.061  $854  $1:$10 
$84  8  0.067  $938  $1:$11 
$84  9  0.075  $1,050  $1:$13 
$84  10  0.083  $1,162  $1:$14 
$84  11  0.093  $1,302  $1:$16 
$84  12  0.103  $1,442  $1:$17 
$84  13  0.123  $1,722  $1:$21 
$84  14  0.216  $3,024  $1:$36 
$84  15  0.240  $3,360  $1:$40 
$84  16  0.266  $3,724  $1:$44 
$84  17  0.296  $4,144  $1:$49 
$84  18  0.329  $4,606  $1:$55 
$84  19  0.365  $5,110  $1:$61 
$84  20  0.540  $7,560  $1:$90 
 
 
* FORMULA — Multiply the taxable wage base ($14,000) by the contingency (0.006). 
** FORMULA — Divide the trust fund levy amount by $84. 
*** Includes base rate and solvency surcharge amounts. 
 
Sources: DEW Tax Rate Contribution Tables and LAC Calculations 
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$84  1  0.000  $0  $0:$0 
$84  2  0.041  $574  $1:$7 
$84  3  0.045  $630  $1:$8 
$84  4  0.050  $700  $1:$8 
$84  5  0.056  $784  $1:$9 
$84  6  0.062  $868  $1:$10 
$84  7  0.069  $966  $1:$12 
$84  8  0.077  $1,078  $1:$13 
$84  9  0.085  $1,190  $1:$14 
$84  10  0.095  $1,330  $1:$16 
$84  11  0.105  $1,470  $1:$18 
$84  12  0.117  $1,638  $1:$20 
$84  13  0.140  $1,960  $1:$23 
$84  14  0.236  $3,304  $1:$39 
$84  15  0.262  $3,668  $1:$44 
$84  16  0.292  $4,088  $1:$49 
$84  17  0.324  $4,536  $1:$54 
$84  18  0.360  $5,040  $1:$60 
$84  19  0.400  $5,600  $1:$67 




* FORMULA — Multiply the taxable wage base ($14,000) by the contingency (0.006). 
** FORMULA — Divide the trust fund levy amount by $84. 
*** Includes base rate and solvency surcharge amounts. 
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$84  1  0.000  $0  $0:$0 
$84  2  0.046  $644  $1:$8 
$84  3  0.051  $714  $1:$9 
$84  4  0.057  $798  $1:$10 
$84  5  0.064  $896  $1:$11 
$84  6  0.071  $994  $1:$12 
$84  7  0.078  $1,092  $1:$13 
$84  8  0.087  $1,218  $1:$15 
$84  9  0.097  $1,358  $1:$16 
$84  10  0.108  $1,512  $1:$18 
$84  11  0.120  $1,680  $1:$20 
$84  12  0.133  $1,862  $1:$22 
$84  13  0.159  $2,226  $1:$27 
$84  14  0.257  $3,598  $1:$43 
$84  15  0.285  $3,990  $1:$48 
$84  16  0.317  $4,438  $1:$53 
$84  17  0.352  $4,928  $1:$59 
$84  18  0.391  $5,474  $1:$65 
$84  19  0.435  $6,090  $1:$73 
$84  20  0.540  $7,560  $1:$90 
 
 
* FORMULA — Multiply the taxable wage base ($14,000) by the contingency (0.006). 
** FORMULA — Divide the trust fund levy amount by $84. 
*** Includes base rate and solvency surcharge amounts. 
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$84  1  0  $0  $0:0 
$84  2  0.052  $728  $1:$9 
$84  3  0.0581  $813  $1:$10 
$84  4  0.064  $896  $1:$11 
$84  5  0.071  $994  $1:$12 
$84  6  0.079  $1,106  $1:$13 
$84  7  0.088  $1,232  $1:$15 
$84  8  0.098  $1,372  $1:$16 
$84  9  0.109  $1,526  $1:$18 
$84  10  0.121  $1,694  $1:$20 
$84  11  0.134  $1,876  $1:$22 
$84  12  0.149  $2,086  $1:$25 
$84  13  0.286  $4,004  $1:$48 
$84  14  0.317  $4,438  $1:$53 
$84  15  0.353  $4,942  $1:$59 
$84  16  0.392  $5,488  $1:$65 
$84  17  0.435  $6,090  $1:$73 
$84  18  0.484  $6,776  $1:$81 
$84  19  0.538  $7,532  $1:$90 
$84  20  0.597  $8,358  $1:$100 
 
 
* FORMULA — Multiply the taxable wage base ($14,000) by the contingency (0.006). 
** FORMULA — Divide the trust fund levy amount by $84. 
*** Includes base rate and solvency surcharge amounts. 
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Appendix B 
 





The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2019, and 
December 31, 2019, are shown in the table below. An Annual Tax Rate 
Notice detailing individual rates was distributed to each employer. 
Individual rates are based on an employer’s computed benefit ratio. The tax 
rate class assignment in the notice should be used for the full calendar 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2018, and 
December 31, 2018, are shown in the table below. A Notice of 
Contribution Rate detailing individual rates was distributed to each 
employer. Individual rates are based on an employer’s computed benefit 
ratio. The tax rate class assignment in the notice should be used for the full 
calendar year. Please note that tax rates are applicable to the first $14,000 
each employee earns. 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2017, and 
December 31, 2017, are shown in the table below. A Notice of Contribution 
Rate detailing individual rates was distributed to each employer during the 
fourth quarter of 2017. Individual rates are based on an employer’s 
computed benefit ratio. The tax rate class assignment in the notice should be 
used for the full calendar year.  
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2016, and 
December 31, 2016, are shown in the table below. A Notice of Contribution 
Rate detailing individual rates was distributed to each employer during the 
fourth quarter of 2016. Individual rates are based on an employer’s 
computed benefit ratio. The tax rate class assignment in the notice should be 
used for the full calendar year. Please note that as of January 1, 2015, tax 
rates are now applicable to the first $14,000 each employee earns. 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2015 and 
December 31, 2015 are shown in the table below. A Notice of Contribution 
Rate detailing individual rates was distributed to each employer during the 
fourth quarter of 2014. Individual rates are based on an employer’s 
computed benefit ratio. The tax rate class assignment in the notice should be 
used for the full calendar year. Please note that as of January 1, 2015, tax 
rates are now applicable to the first $14,000 each employee earns. 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2014 and 
December 31, 2014 are shown in the table below. A Notice of Contribution 
Rate is distributed to each employer during the fourth quarter of 2013. 
Individual rates are based on an employer’s computed benefit ratio. The tax 
rate class assignment in the notice should be used for the full calendar year. 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2013 and 
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In the fiscal year 2012-13 budget, the SC General Assembly appropriated 
$77 million to the Department of Employment and Workforce (DEW) to 
make repayments on outstanding loans. Funds received from the General 
Assembly reduce the unemployment insurance tax rates for businesses. 
 
In late September 2012, businesses received a revised tax rate notice that 
showed the new tax rate that businesses should use when paying third and 
fourth quarter taxes in October 2012 and January 2013. 
 
Since first and second quarter taxes were paid at the higher rate, businesses 
received credits on any overpayments. The revised rate notice showed any 
applicable credit that the business received. 
 
Due to federal regulations, refunds are not available for first and second 
quarter taxes. Because these taxes were paid accurately under the law that 
was in effect at the time they were paid, only credits can be issued for 
overpayments. Credits can be used against any future unemployment tax 
liability and do not expire. 
 
The 2012 revised rates are shown in the table below. 
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The tax rates applicable for wages paid between January 1, 2011 and 
December 31, 2011 are shown in the table below. 
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2010 – 2004  
Contribution Table 
 
These tax rates were in effect for wages paid between December 31, 2010 
and January 1, 2004. 
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Appendix D 
 
Planned Contingency Assessment Expenditures 
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